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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the proposition that use must be made of quantitative 
infonnation to control the reporting of hazard scenarios in automatically generated 
HAZOP reports. 
HAZOP is a successful and widely accepted technique for identification of process 
hazards. However, it requires an expensive commitment of time and personnel near 
the end of a project. Use of a HAZOP emulation tool before conventional HAZOP 
could speed up the examination of routine hazards, or identify deficiencies I in the 
design of a plant. 
Qualitative models of process equipment can efficiently model fault propagation in 
chemical plants. However, purely qualitative models lack the representational power 
to model many constraints in real plants, resulting in indiscriminate reporting of 
failure scenarios. 
In the AutoHAZID computer program, qualitative reasoning is used to emulate 
HAZOP. Signed-directed graph (SDG) models of equipment are used to build a graph 
model of the plant. This graph is searched to find links between faults and 
consequences, which are reported as hazardous scenarios associated with process 
variable deviations. However, factors not represented in the SDG, such as the fluids in 
the plant, often affect the feasibility of scenarios. 
Support for the qualitative model system, in the form of quantitative judgements to 
assess the feasibility of certain hazards, was investigated and is reported here. This 
thesis also describes the novel "Fluid Modelling System" (FMS) which now provides 
this quantitative support mechanism in AutoHAZID. The FMS allows the attachment 
of conditions to SDG arcs. Fault paths are validated by testing the conditions along 
their arcs. Infeasible scenarios are removed. 
In the FMS, numerical limits on process variable deviations have been used to assess 
the sufficiency of a given fault to cause any linked consequence. In a number of case 
studies, use of the FMS in AutoHAZID has improved the focus of the automatically 
generated HAZOP results. 
This thesis describes qualitative model-based methods for identifying process hazards 
by computer, in particular AutoHAZID. It identifies'! range of problems where the 
purely qualitative approach is inadequate and demonstrates how such problems can be 
tackled by selective use of quantitative infonnatiol) apout the plant or the fluids in it. 
The conclusion is that quantitative knowledge is' required to support the qualitative 
reasoning in hazard identification by computer. 
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Chapter 1 : Introduction 
The thesis stated here is that quantitative information is needed to control the 
reporting of hazard scenarios in qualitative emulation of HAZOP by computer. 
Without such support, hazards are reported indiscriminately, which reduces the value 
of the output io human users of the program. 
HAZOP is a very useful technique for process hazard identification. However, it 
requires an expensive commitment of time and resources at the end of the process 
design phase. Therefore, a strong economic argument exists for automating this 
technique. 
Qualitative methods, among them graph based methods, can be used to efficiently 
model plant behaviour. By modelling fault propagation in the plant, programs can 
emulate the hazard identification of the HAZOP study method. 
However, qualitative methods are weak representations, which often do not permit 
unambiguous simulation of the plant. This leads to indiscriminate reporting of process 
hazards, which reduces the value of the resulting hazard study reports. 11 is thought 
likely that this problem cannot be solved without the use of quantitative information 
of some kind. An example of the type of information often represented weakly in the 
plant model, is the details of the fluids present in the plant, and their properties. Fluid 
properties can be used to assess the feasibility of hazards which otherwise would be 
reported indiscriminately. 
The AutoHAZID computer program was developed as part of STOPHAZ, a 3\1, year 
long ESPRIT-funded collaborative project. In AutoHAZID, qualitative reasoning 
using signed directed graphs (SDGs) is supported by conditions for judging the 
feasibility of fault-consequence scenarios. These conditions are based on the fluids 
present in the plant, and are implemented by the Fluid Modelling System (FMS) in 
AutoHAZID. The FMS also allows verification of scenarios by checking the possible 
limits of deviations in process variables. The result of applying these conditions is that 
the results of computer-based HAZOP become more focussed. 
The remainder of this chapter introduces some of the ideas expanded on in later 
chapters. Firstly, some of the terms used in process safety work are defined, in 
Section 1.1. Hazard identification and risk assessment are introduced as vitally 
important activities in the design of chemical plants, in Section 1.2. Among the hazard 
identification methods used in the process industries, the HAZOP study is the most 
popular method for assessing new plant designs. Section 1.3 describes HAZOP briefly 
and Section 1.4 makes the case for automation of safety assessment methods, with 
particular reference to HAZOP studies. HAZOP emulation requires model-based 
simulation of the plant behaviour. AutoHAZID uses qualitative graph-based models to 
simulate the fault propagation behaviour that can occur in the plant. Therefore, 
Section 1.5 gives a description of what is meant by "fault propagation" and 
Section 1.6 introduces graphs, describing some of the basic concepts of graph search. 
The chapter concludes with some points of justification for the work done on HAZOP 
. 
emulation, in Section 1.7. 
The chapters following this one deal with the following areas of concern in qualitative 
modelling as applied to hazard identification: 
• Chapter 2 is a review of the literature relevant to hazard identification, qualitative 
physics and the application of AI techniques to process safety evaluation. 
• Chapter 3 describes the HAZID system developed during the STOPHAZ project, 
including its qualitative modelling system. A significant portion of this chapter 
discusses the process of developing equipment models for hazard identification. 
• Chapter 4 covers some of the problems experienced with the qualitative hazard 
identification system, and how these problems were addressed. 
• Chapter 5 explains an important method for overcoming problems related to fluids 
in the plant and their interaction with the process itself. The solution is to add 
conditions to arcs in the SDG models, to execute rule-based checks within the 
frame of the FMS. 
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• Chapter 6 discusses topics raised by the work described here, and pinpoints some 
areas of future work. 
• Chapter 7 fonnulates some overall conclusions about qualitative hazard 
identification and its extension, using the FMS. 
1.1 Nomenclature 
Before addressing hazard identification and other aspects of process safety, we must 
clarify the meaning of some tenns used in safety work. A valuable reference for 
"standard" nomenclature in this field has been prepared by Jones (1992). This guide is 
the result of a working party set up by the Institution of Chemical Engineers 
(IChemE), with the aim to help standardise some of the (sometimes rather freely 
adapted) terminology in use in industry. 
The terms of most relevance to this thesis are defined by Jones as follows: 
Hazard 
Chemical hazard 
Risk 
Loss prevention 
Hazard analysis 
A physical situation with a potential for human injury, damage 
to property, damage to the environment or some combination of 
these. 
A hazard involving chemicals or processes which may realize 
its potential through agencies such as fire, explosion, toxic or 
corrosive effects. 
The likelihood of a specified undesired event occurring within a 
specified period or in specified circumstances. It may be either 
a frequency (the number of specified events occurring in unit 
time) or a probability (the probability of a specified event 
following a prior event), depending on the circumstances. 
A systematic approach to preventing accidents or minimizing 
their effects. The activities may be associated with financial 
loss or safety issues and will often include many of the 
techniques defined in this [Jones'] report. 
The identification of undesired events that lead to the 
materialization of a hazard, the analysis of the mechanisms by 
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Risk assessment 
which these undesired events could occur and usually the 
estimation of the extent, magnitude and likelihood of any 
harmful effects. 
The quantitative evaluation of the likelihood of undesired 
events and the likelihood of harm or damage being caused 
together with the value judgements made concerning the 
significance of the results. 
Throughout this thesis, I will attempt to use these terms consistently. It should be 
noted that there is still a good deal of variability in the usage of these terms in the 
chemical industry as well as confusion with similar terms in other fields (e.g. "risk 
assessment" as applied to financial risk). 
1.2 Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 
Process safety is vitally important to any operating company In the chemical 
industries, not only because of the human cost of accidents, but also for economic 
reasons. A serious accident on plant can mean loss of production and consequent loss 
of customers, compensation payments to injured workers and possibly a serious loss 
of the considerable investment in plant and machinery. 
Such losses can be prevented by two complementary means. Firstly, the philosophy of 
management of the plant and its personnel should encourage safe working and "good 
housekeeping" in day-to-day operation. Systems of communication, training and 
control of access to plant items should be installed, to ensure that people are aware of 
potential hazards and do their work safely. Increased awareness of safety and 
operability issues among staff will reduce the frequency of accidents, near-misses and 
environmentally damaging releases of process materials, thereby increasing 
productivity and profitability. 
Plant safety can also be helped at a much earlier stage by use of safe plant design 
practices, where the plans for a plant are examined at various stages of the design 
process. By identifying hazards and possible concerns for plant operation early, and 
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asseSSing the risks they pose to safety, costly changes in the later design can be 
minimised, or avoided altogether. Information on potential hazards can be used even 
before a process or specific product has been decided upon, so that (possibly) a more 
benign product or an inherently safer process can be chosen for development. 
The ICI hazard study review programme, as described by Duxbury and Turney (1989), 
addresses safety, health and environmental (SHE) issues at all stages of the design of a 
new plant, from process selection and siting through to commissioning and initial 
operation. The six stages of the programme, outlined in Table 1.1, include both hazard 
identification and risk assessment activities in the first three studies. These studies 
typically produce a large number of actions, ranging from the addition of alarms or 
indicators to the complete redesign of sections of the plant. The later stages (N, V and 
VI) are mostly concerned with checking that all actions have been processed and that 
the safety measures recommended are appropriate and will function adequately when 
required on the operating plant. 
Hazard When pcrfonncd ? What is examined? 
Study 
I Project exploration stage. Hazardous properties of materials, constraints on siting 
plant, environmental impact, ete. 
II When process flow General top events (major hazards) in each plant section. 
diagrams (PFDs) are Characterise likely problems and hazards early. 
available. 
III HAZOP when detailed Detailed and systematic examination of ELDs and 
Engineering Line Diagrams operating instructions using method study approach. 
(ELDs) are available. 
IV Before start-up. Checks that all actions from stages I, II and III have been 
completed. 
V Before start-up. On-site inspection with regard to access, escape, 
guarding, emergency equipment, etc. 
VI Post-commissioning. Compare actual plant performance to expected 
performance. review operating procedures, etc. Feedback 
to design team. 
Table 1.1: The six stage lel hazard study programme 
The "hazard identification" part of hazard analysis is concerned with finding out what 
hazards are possible within a process and characterising the scenarios which allow 
those hazards to come about. This is a mostly qualitative task, which concentrates on 
identification and analysis of the mechanisms underlying events, rather than 
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quantifying specific risks. "Risk assessment" is a more pains-taking, quantitative 
technique, which is applied to a small number of the most important or complicated 
hazards identified. The objective is to analyse the risk associated with a scenario in 
terms of the logic for its development, probabilities of various events occurring and 
consequent losses which could occur. 
Figure 1.1, taken from "HAZOP and HAZAN" by T.A. Kletz (1992), neatly illustrates 
some of the techniques which can be used to identify and to assess hazards. Note that 
Kletz uses the terms "HAZAN" and "hazard analysis" to denote the quantitative 
activities classified here as "risk assessment". 
Methods of 
identifying hazards 
Obvious 
Methods of 
assessing hazards 
Obvious 
See what ___ ::::::fH:(;.ij;;Rr);;-r: Experience 
happens 0:LH~N.AA~~D::::Sl::::--codes of 
Checklist 
practice 
Hazard analysis 
HAZOP (H.AZ.AN) 
Figure 1.1: Some ways of identifying and assessing or treating hazards 
Some of the hazards in a plant may seem to be "obvious" properties of the materials 
or the process used. However, this assumes that someone looks through the designs 
with enough awareness of safety issues to notice the problems. Even such "obvious" 
hazards don't reveal themselves while the plant designs are still just on paper. If 
checks on the design fail to identify problems, then any hazards may make themselves 
apparent by the second means, the "see what happens" approach, which identifies 
hazards by having them cause an accident first. Experience gained from accidents or 
from recognition of "obvious hazards" can be formally recorded in checklists, so that 
future plants can be safer than ones in the past. For novel plant designs, other 
techniques such as HAZOP can be effective in picking out problem areas. 
Once hazards have been identified, action must be taken to prevent them or protect 
against their consequences. Often, preventive measures are readily available and can 
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be easily implemented, or engineers' experience in previous cases can be used to solve 
the problems. Codes of practice are a more formal approach to design, which ensure 
safety by avoiding specific known hazards or by managing them using methods 
known to have been effective in the past. Risk assessment is used to quantify the risks 
associated with the most significant hazards and decide what action is needed. This 
approach must be used selectively, however, because of the time and effort required. 
To be effective, hazard identification and risk assessment must be integrated with the 
activity of process design which proceeds via a number of stages. Firstly, the design 
team must obtain a detailed statement of requirements from management or the 
customer. This allows them to decide what product(s) to make, what reactants to use 
and the details of intermediates and process chemistry involved. It is also important to 
decide on the likely siting of the plant, to allow capital cost estimation, environmental 
impact assessment and safety assessment to proceed from an early stage. 
When these basic process details have been decided, the team develops a preliminary 
process design in the form of a block diagram of the process steps. The block diagram 
identifies main flows into and out of each plant section, as well as unit operations in 
each section. This design is refined into a process flow diagram (PFD) by performing 
heat and mass balance calculations and doing some preliminary equipment selection 
and design. Several different process options may be worked through to this stage. 
After preliminary cost estimation, funds are authorised for one process option. 
Detailed process design and piping and instrumentation design follows, producing the 
"Engineering Line Diagrams" (ELDs) for the plant. ELDs are also sometimes known 
as "Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams" (P&IDs), but the usage of these terms is 
not standardised in industry - where some companies refer to the P&ID as a more 
detailed level of specification than the ELD, others use the opposite convention. 
Further design tasks include layout planning, mechanical engineering and civil 
engineering. Design is followed by procurement, fabrication, construction and 
commissioning of the new plant. 
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As mentioned earlier, awareness of process hazards at each stage can simplify the 
design and cut down on expensive redesign due to late discovery of problems. A wide 
range of techniques can be used for hazard identification during process design, as 
reviewed in Section 2.1. However, HAZOP is described in this chapter because it 
plays a much larger part in the work described in the rest of the thesis. 
1.3 Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP) 
The most commonly used hazard identification technique in the process industries is 
the hazard and operability study (HAZOP), which is Hazard Study ill in the lCl 
programme mentioned above. This method has been widely used for many years and 
is described in detail in many publications, such as Kletz (1992), CIA (1977), 
Knowlton (1981 and 1992), Lees (1996) and Lawley (1974). 
HAZOP is a systematic critical examination of the process and engineering design of 
a plant, to identify all possible deviations of the plant from its intended operating 
condition. For each deviation, any possible associated hazards and problems with 
operability are recorded. The design of the plant is characterised by its Engineering 
Line Diagrams (ELDs) and operating instructions.) The study takes the form of a 
series of "brainstorming" sessions, attended by a cross-section of project personnel, 
under the control of a team leader who directs the procedure of the meetings. 
The team leader must be familiar with the HAZOP method and be trained for the job 
of leading a HAZOP team, but he/she need not be involved in the rest of the project. 
The decisions and points discussed by the team must be recorded - the team leader 
may do this, but it is generally better to employ a secretary (or "scribe"), to avoid 
holding up the progress of the study. The remainder of the team should represent all 
parties with an interest in the project, including each main engineering discipline. The 
team should not be too large; six members is probably a good maximum. 
I Operating instructions are an important part of the plant design, which should be available for 
HAZOP, but frequently are not complete at this stage. 
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For each ELD in the plant, the team leader chooses the equipment items to be grouped 
together as "lines", transferring fluid between the equipment items allocated as 
"vessels" in the drawing. This grouping of equipment should allow the study to 
proceed at a reasonable pace, without the risk of missing any hazards. The choice of 
lines is a matter of judgement on the part of the team leader. 
The drawing is examined line by linc and vessel by vessel, with the group considering 
deviations from intended operation in each line. This requires that the intentions of all 
lines and vessels are declared as and when they are encountered. Deviations are 
formed by combining a guide word (more, less, no, other-than) with a relevant 
variable in the line or vessel (flow, pressure, temperature, liquid level), or with 
intended operations or processes (e.g. mixing, crystallisation). The following 
questions are addressed for each deviation: 
• Is the deviation meaningful? 
• Could it arise, and how? 
• What consequences would result, and are those consequences hazardous, or do 
they prevent efficient operation? 
• If so, can the deviation be prevented from occurring, or can the consequences be 
protected against by changing the design or operation of the plant? Redesign must 
be avoided in the HAZOP meeting, but may be a recommended action. 
Any significant findings of the HAZOP team are recorded, typically in a table 
including columns for identifying the deviation, possible causes and consequences of 
the scenario, and any suggested actions to tackle the identified hazard. Common 
practice in modern HAZOPs also includes listing any existing protections against the 
identified hazard, such as trip systems, alarms, etc. 
Figure 1.2, taken from CIA (1977), illustrates the sequence of examination of the 
HAZOP, emphasizing the methodical and systematic approach of the technique. 
Clearly, a lot of very creative activity is implied in the central steps (7, 8 and 9), 
examining possible causes, consequences and detecting hazards, but the method 
appears highly algorithmic when seen at the level shown here. 
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Start 
End 
Select a vessel 
Explain the general intention of 
the vessel and its lines 
Select a line 
Explain the intention of the line 
Apply the first guide word 
Develop a meaningful deviation 
Examine possible causes 
Examine possible consequences 
Detect hazards 
Make suitable record 
Repeat 6-10 for a1l meaningful deviations 
derived from first guide word 
Repeat 5-11 for alllhe guide words 
Mark line ashaving been examined 
Repeat 3-13 for each line 
Select an auxiliary (e.g. heating system) 
Explain the intention of the auxiliary 
Repeal 5-12 forthe auxiliary 
Markauxiliary as having been examined 
Repeat 15-18 for all auxiliaries 
Explain intention of the vessel 
Repeat 5-12 forthe vessel 
Mark vessel ascompleted 
Repeat 1-22 for all vessels on flowsheet 
MarkflowSleet as completed 
Repeat 1-24 for all flowsheets 
Figure 1.2: Sequence of examination for HAZOP meeting 
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HAZOP is usually carried out after most of the detailed process design has been 
completed. Large-scale changes to the design are very expensive at this stage. 
Therefore, early use of other hazard identification techniques (as discussed in 
Section 2.1) must have already eliminated the major problems in the process design 
wherever possible. Simple checks on equipment designs should be dealt with before 
HAZOP, by checklists relating to equipment items or fluids present in the process. 
These checks can be performed more cost-effectively by a single engineer than by a 
team. It is also important to make sure that all information on the safety and control 
systems proposed for the plant is available before the HAZOP meeting, to avoid delay 
in getting hold of this information. 
Much of the strength of HAZOP arises from systematically examining the interactions 
between separate parts of the process and from the creative interaction of the team 
members in looking at the problem. These are factors which are absent from many 
simpler hazard identification methods. The method involves a lot of redundancy, as 
the same scenarios are examined from many different viewpoints. This reduces the 
chance that significant hazards will be overlooked, but the requirement for a group of 
experts to be present for the full duration of the study means that HAZOP can be 
rather expensive. 
Because HAZOP meetings are so painstaking and methodical, they can be very tiring 
for the people involved, who must remain motivated and alert throughout. It is not 
usually productive to run sessions for longer than about three hours, and the frequency 
of meetings should be kept low, too. The time and personnel required for HAZOP 
studies at such a late stage in the project often mean that this stage delays final 
delivery of the project (i.e. HAZOP is on the "critical path" of the project plan). 
Therefore, there is a lot of interest in automating safety verification tasks such as 
HAZOP. 
In the discussion of computer emulation of HAZOP which follows in this and later 
chapters, a particular approach is taken. This is to consider how deviations of the 
process variables in a plant could arise, and how they could give rise to hazards. 
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Although this does comprise a large part of the work of a conventional study, there is 
more involved. A full HAZOP, conducted by a team of experts, considers all possible 
deviations of the plant from its intended operation, which includes many phenomena 
which are not process variable deviations. Examples include maintenance and 
operation in abnormal modes, such as start-up, shut-down or process upsets. 
1.4 Automation of Safety Assessment 
Computers have been used to increase the speed and efficiency of many process 
engineering tasks. Examples include computer aided design (CAD), flowsheet 
simulation, layout planning and visualisation, and project planning. The automation of 
safety-related tasks is an area where appropriate use of computers could greatly reduce 
costs. Applications of Information Technology (IT) in this area so far fall into four 
main types: 
I. General-purpose office software packages, such as word processors, 
spreadsheets and databases, are widely used to process and present information 
in connection with the work of safety assessment. 
11. More structured IT applications have also been developed, to facilitate specific 
safety tasks, such as documenting HAZOP studies. Here, basic IT has been 
used in a tightly structured domain, to aid a well-defined task. 
Ill. Many computer packages exist for performing detailed (often numerical) tasks 
in risk assessment. These include numerical simulations of vapour cloud 
dispersal, fires and explosions, or support tools for fault tree development. 
IV. The most interesting software developments apply Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
techniques to diagnosis of process disturbances, real-time monitoring of plant 
performance using control system data, hazard identification, etc. This is the 
area in which the Plant Engineering Group at Loughborough University has 
been working. In particular, the group has developed qualitative simulations of 
plant behaviour for automated hazard identification. 
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The advantages of using a computer-based approach for hazard identification include: 
• Repeatability. Given the same input, a computer program will always produce the 
same set of results. This is not necessarily true for a human team-based task. 
• The computer is impervious to boredom, so that it will examine everything it is 
asked to, without loss of interest part way through. 
• Systematic and thorough approach. Given results from a computer study, we can 
be reasonably certain that everything has been examined to a consistent level of 
detail, so that the quality of analysis is consistent throughout. 
There are a number of disadvantages to using even a well-designed computer aid for 
hazard identification. As with the advantages listed above, many of these are shared 
with programs in other domains of application: 
• The results may be lacking in originality, with a "mechanical" feel to them. Partly 
this is a result of the use of language in the computer results - inevitably the 
phrases used seem artificial after many repetitions. 
• Programs are usually unable to indicate clearly where they do not have the 
expertise to solve a particular problem, so that weak areas of knowledge may not 
be appreciated by the human reader of the report. 
• The level of detai I produced by computer programs can be inappropriate. Often, 
the report is too detailed in areas which are not very interesting or important. 
• Human users often accept, without question, the correctness of results produced by 
computer. This acceptance is a dangerous tendency in safety-critical work. The 
assumptions and processing behind safety-related results should be stated, and 
questioned, wherever appropriate. High quality presentation of results can also 
mask poor quality content. 
• Because of the systematic nature of any computer aid, weaknesses and errors in 
programs or models will be systematic, too. In this way, single weaknesses can be 
greatly magnified. 
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Despite these problems, it is still deemed to be a worthwhile aim to develop computer 
programs which can automate certain tasks in the safety analysis arena, not least 
because the attempt at automation may reveal weaknesses in conventional hazard 
identification approaches and thereby lead to their remedy. 
The economic argument for automating HAZOP is that, even if the software can only 
identify a small class of routine problems, the time and effort saved during the 
HAZOP study probably makes using the program worthwhile. A consistent quality of 
hazard identification can also be expected from the software tool. By comparison, a 
HAZOP team may occasionally have a "bad day". 
A software tool for hazard identification should allow initial failures and final 
consequences to be brought together, to bring potential hazards to light. It should not 
attempt to model all classes of fault in full detail, but should instead allow the full 
range of safety concerns to be identified by users when working through the output 
generated. 
HAZOP emulation software could be used by a design engmeer, to evaluate a 
substantially completed design, just before the conventional HAZOP study. 
Alternatively, the tool could be used at earlier stages of design, before detailed ELDs 
are available, to screen for problems when the cost of design changes is lower. 
1.5 Fault Propagation 
To automate the identification of hazards in a process plant design, some formal 
representation of the plant itself must be constructed. With such a plant model, a 
computer program can then be designed, to reason about it symbolically or 
numerically, to determine how the process system could behave in ways that lead to a 
hazardous situation. 
A promising approach is to build a qualitative model of the plant from individual 
models of the equipment items present and the connections between them. In 
conjunction with an appropriate computer program (an "inference engine"), the model 
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should predict the behaviour of the plant under nonnal conditions, as well as 
predicting its response to individual things that can go wrong. It is not usually 
necessary to predict in detail what will happen after a hazard has occurred -
identification of the hazard is enough. 
The approach used in most of our work, to model the development of hazards in 
process systems, is known as "fault propagation". This is not the only way to model 
the (sometimes complex) sequences of causes and effects which comprise real-life 
accident scenarios, but it is a simple approach to tackling many such scenarios. Fault 
propagation can also be fonnalised (and therefore automated) quite easily. The wider 
issues of hazard modelling and how best to model equipment for hazard identification, 
are discussed in Chapter 3 and, later, in Section 6.4 of Chapter 6. 
Fault propagation distinguishes two types of event, or states of affairs, as important: 
"faults" and "consequences". Both are simply modelled as named events and are 
usually associated with some equipment item in the plant. Faults model the initial 
causes of hazards in the plant, such as equipment failures. An example for a pump 
might be "seal failure". Consequences model the final, reportable, hazards or 
operability concerns in the hazardous scenario. An example might be "possible 
explosion" . 
Faults and consequences are linked together by what is known as a "fault propagation 
chain". This may be a single link between the initial fault and final consequence, or it 
may be a sequence of links via a number of process variables in the plant. In the latter 
case, each variable is deviated from its normal value enough to propagate a 
disturbance from an initial fault to a final, possibly quite remote, consequence. 
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--- -----------------
The single link type of fault propagation chain characterises local failures of 
equipment which give rise to immediate problems at the same location. For a pump 
containing a toxic and volatile fluid, we might have: 
'seal failure' 
(fault) 
1 
'toxic gas release' 
(consequence) 
The multiple link type of fault propagation chain models more interesting failures, to 
do with the way the plant is put together. These are the type of hazards which HAZOP 
studies are particularly good at identifying. A more complicated example, shown in 
Figure 1.3, will illustrate this type of scenario. 
product from 
reactor 
flow ratio controller 
1---1-- inhibitor 
FCV502 
11<505 
to storage 
P505 
Figure 1.3: Product stabilisation example 
A product chemical is stabilised by adding a polymerisation inhibitor before final 
storage. The flow rate of inhibitor is maintained at a constant fraction of the product 
flow rate (using ratio control), to ensure that there is a constant small percentage of 
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------------
the inhibitor in the final product If the inhibitor control valve FCV502 fails closed, 
the following chain of events may occur: 
FCV502 fails closed 
(fault) 
1 
inhibitor flow decreases 
(to zero) 
1 
concentration of inhibitor 
in tank decreases 
1 
concentration of inhibitor 
in pump P505 decreases 
1 
Possible polymerisation of 
product in P505 or storage 
(consequence) 
Each event between the fault and the consequence is a deviation of some variable in 
the plant (here we have a flow and two composition variables). Notice that the site of 
the consequence (the pump P505) is distant from that of the fault (the valve FCV502). 
The aspect of fault propagation, as described here, which makes it suitable for use in 
automated hazard identification, is the use of deviations in intermediate variables to 
transmit a cause to a possibly quite remote consequence. Because the faults and 
consequences can be simply modelled as named events, and the variables in the plant 
can be determined from a model of the process including the connections between its 
equipment items, the problem of hazard identification can be simplified to finding 
links between the modelled faults and consequences. 
One approach to modelling fault propagation is to model variables in the plant as 
nodes in a signed directed graph (SDG).2 Arcs in the SDG then represent causal links 
between deviations of the variables, corresponding to the physical behaviour of the 
plant. Faults and consequences correspond to extensions of the SDG, linking named 
2 Graphs are discussed in more detail in Section 1.6. 
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events to specific deviations of variables. This graph-based representation is the one 
used in AutoHAZID and is explained in Section 3.3. It allows fault-consequence 
scenarios to be modelled by paths in the SDG from faults to consequences. 
Given a qualitative modelling framework of this nature, there are a number of things 
one can do with it. One might use a graph search algorithm to search in a model 
forwards from selected faults to determine their eventual consequences. One might 
use the ability of the system to qualitatively model process plants and analyse the 
causation of major hazards to produce fault trees automatically, as Hunt et al. did with 
the FAULTFINDER program (Hunt, 1992, Hunt et aI., 1993). Alternatively, one 
might choose to emulate HAZOP, as we have with the STOPHAZ project. 
The approach used In HAZOP emulation is to first compile a list of sensible 
deviations for each of the process variables in the plant model. Then, for each 
deviation, backwards search is used to find possible causes, in terms of initiating 
faults. Any direct consequences of the deviation being considered may therefore be 
caused by the faults identified. In this way, a list of fault-consequence scenarios can 
be associated with each deviation. These results are presented in a tabular form, 
similar to the format used to record conventional HAZOP findings. 
The following section discusses graphical representations and the search methods 
used wi th them. It can be seen as an introduction to the SDGs used in AutoHAZID 
models, referred to briefly above and presented in more detail in Chapter 3. 
1.6 Graphs, Search and Complexity 
Since fault propagation is implemented in AutoHAZID (and in some other systems) 
using a graphical representation for process variables and their effects on one another, 
this section gives a brief general introduction to graphs. Graph search algorithms and 
their complexity are inevitable concerns, and are also dealt with briefly. The 
descriptions given owe much to "Artificial Intelligence and the Design of Expert 
Systems", by Luger and Stubblefield (1989), which gives a particularly clear 
explanation of these concepts. 
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A graph can be defined as a set of nodes and the arcs which connect those nodes to 
each other. It is possible to add information to a graph, in the form of labels attached 
to either the nodes or the arcs in the graph, or both. This labelling information can be 
simple or complex, depending on what the graph is to be used for (its "domain 
problem"). Typically, a directionality is attached to arcs in the graph, in the form of 
arrowheads, so that arcs can be considered as uni-directional or bi-directional. The 
nodes in the graph may also be labelled with names. An example of such a "directed 
graph" is shown in Figure 1.4. 
s 
Figure 1.4: An example of a labelled directed graph 
The usual purpose of defining graphs is to examine how different parts of a problem 
are connected, so the concept of a "path" through a graph is usually very important to 
solving the problems which graphs are used to represent. A path is characterised either 
by a list of nodes, or a list of arcs in the graph, defining a list of nodes "visited" in 
sequence, between a'starting point and an end point in the graph. An example from 
Figure 1.4 above is the path from S to G via the nodes [S,D,C,B,G]. There can in 
general be multiple paths between any two nodes in a graph. 
An important consideration in solving problems using graphs is the topology of the 
graph, which includes such questions as whether it contains circuits or not. A path 
contains a circuit, or cycle, if it passes through some node in the graph more than 
once. A graph contains a circuit if there is some path in it containing a circuit. A 
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"rooted" graph is one where a single node is identified as the root node, such that 
there is a path from the root node to every other node in the graph. This sort of graph 
is usually drawn with the root node at the top of the page. 
A "tree" is a graph in which there is a maximum of one path between any two nodes 
in the graph. This sort of graph is often drawn as a rooted graph, with the branches of 
the tree drawn out below the root node. A particular example of this kind of 
"hierarchical" relationship is a family tree, and the terminology of family relationships 
is usually used in talking about relationships between nodes in a tree, using terms such 
as "parent", "child" and "sibling" (brother/sister). 
Whenever graphs are used to represent a problem in some domain, the interpretation 
of what the nodes and arcs "mean" is of course dependent on the problem. A 
frequently used type of interpretation is that of the graph as a "state space 
representation". In this case, each node represents a possible state of the world, with 
respect to the problem at hand, and each arc represents a possible change between 
states, consistent with some rule about the system. Typically, each node stores a 
description of the state of the world at each point in the graph. Taken as a whole, the 
graph (which may not contain a finite number of arcs or nodes!i forms a description 
of the whole scope of the problem. This whole description is often referred to as the 
"state space" of the problem. 
An example of a partial state space representation is shown in Figure 1.5 for the 
problem of the "8-puzzle". This puzzle consists of a 3x3 grid of tiles, from which one 
tile has been removed, leaving 8 numbered tiles and an empty space. The tiles can be 
slid past one another into the empty space, one at a time, allowing the player to 
rearrange the pattern of numbers in the puzzle. To solve the puzzle, the user must 
rearrange the tiles from an initial, unsorted configuration into numerical order, as in 
the "goal state" of Figure 1.5, without removing them from the grid. 
3 Any explicit representation of a graph! in terms of arcs and nodes, must contain a finite number of arcs 
and nodes. However, where a graph is specified in terms of a node and a set of rules to generate new 
nodes, then such a graph could be infinite (or extremely large, as in chess, for example). 
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4 5 3 
7 8 6 
123 
4 5 6 
"Goal" 
State 
2 3 
5 6 
7 8 
Figure 1.5: Partial state space for the "8-puzzle" problem 
In this example, the graph represents the positions of all the tiles at each node. This 
information gives a complete description of the 8-puzzle "world" in each possible 
state. Arcs connecting the nodes correspond to "legal moves" in the puzzle (a tile may 
only be moved into the empty space if the tile is horizontally or vertically adjacent to 
the space). In this simple puzzle, it is helpful to notice that instead of thinking about 
moving the tiles, one can consider that this is equivalent to moving the blank space 
around the grid. There can be a maximum of four moves from any state of the puzzle, 
corresponding to the directions in which the space can be moved. Notice also that the 
arcs in the graph are bi-directional, so that any moves are reversible in the puzzle. 
A different example of graph interpretation is the signed directed graph (SDG) model 
representation in the AutoHAZID program, as described in Chapter 3. Here, the nodes 
are interpreted as variables in the physical system being modelled. Arcs between them 
represent the causal influences of variables on one another locally. The influences may 
be "direct" or "reverse", encoded by the signs "+" and "-" attached to arcs. 
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In the 8-puzzle graph, paths through the graph represent how the state of the puzzle 
may be changed, which might include solving it. The path corresponding to a solution 
of the puzzle would therefore terminate at the goal state shown above, and one might 
imagine that a program could be used to find paths from any other node in the graph 
to the goal state. Such a program would be able to solve the 8-puzzle problem, or 
direct its solution, using graph search to find the paths to the goal state. 
Paths in the SDG model correspond not to "moves in the game", or changes in a 
world state, but rather to (possibly remotely propagated) influences between variables. 
This is quite a different interpretation from the one used for the state space 
representation above. At no point is there a state description corresponding to the 
plant being considered, unless the whole graph, with associated variable values at 
each node, is considered as a description of a state in some larger graph.4 
Finding paths in a graph therefore serves different purposes dependent on the 
application domain for that graph. For the 8-puzzle, the goal might be to solve the 
puzzle from some pseudo-random start position. For the SDG system used in 
AutoHAZID, the path-finding activity is directed at finding what the wider effects of 
process equipment failures will be, within the scope of fault propagation, discussed in 
Section 1.5. Here, finding paths between variables establishes a possible causal 
influence between potentially quite distant state changes, which may give rise to a 
hazard by fault propagation. 
Graph search algorithms are implemented to find paths through graphs from some set 
of specified start points, to some set of goal nodes, which may not be fully specified in 
advance. In the 8-puzzle example, the starting (pseudo-random) position is given, and 
the goal state is a single known configuration of the tiles. For the SDG-based fault 
propagation model the starting positions are the faults known about in the models of 
the equipment in the plant model. The goal nodes correspond to deviations which can 
give rise to consequences in the plant model. 
4 Even in such a larger "super-graph" it would be difficult to describe or define the arcs which connect 
the states of the system, defining "legal changes" in the state of the world. 
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The specification of a search problem must include the following information: 
• The nodes and arcs which comprise the graph itself, also known as the "search 
space" of the problem. 
• A set of starting information defining the starting node(s) of the problem. 
• Some definition of the goal of the search, either in terms of a list of nodes, some 
property of the nodes, or some property of the paths to be found in the graph. 
• Some definition of the termination conditions for the search as a whole. This may 
involve finding the first path, the shortest path, or the "best" path with respect to 
some scoring criterion, or it may involve finding all solution paths in the graph, by 
exhaustive search. 
Given this specification, the next choice is what direction to search the graph: 
• Either: Work from the starting nodes using the data given to develop the problem 
forwards, hopefully finding the goal state(s) at some stage (this is known as data-
driven, forward chaining search). 
• Or: Work backwards from the goal, producing successive subgoals, in order to 
find the starting nodes (this is goal-driven, backward chaining search). 
• Or: Some graph search procedures develop paths simultaneously from goal nodes 
backwards and from start nodes forwards, until a path is found which meets up in 
the middle (this is known as "bi-directional" search). 
The choice of which direction to use is dependent on the nature of the problem. Some 
problems can only be formulated in one direction, and some may be very difficult to 
express in anything other than the "obvious" form. The "branching factor" of the 
search space in forwards and reverse directions will also influence the choice of 
whether to search forwards or backwards, for computational reasons. 
The branching factor of a graph is a number expressing the (typical or maximum) 
number of arcs attached to each node in the graph. If the arcs have an associated 
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direction, there will be a forwards and a backwards branching factor for the graph, 
which may have quite different values, depending on the problem being considered. 
The reason branching is important is because, unless an algorithm has perfect 
judgement at each step in the search, each node offers many possible paths to explore, 
most of which will not lead to a solution path. Therefore, the wasted search effort 
involved in exploring these paths is the main computational cost in searching a graph. 
This effort can be reduced by reducing the number of alternative branches to be 
considered at each node. Some problems have a characteristically larger branching 
factor in one direction than the other, meaning that a clear-cut decision can be made 
between forward and backward chaining search. 
As an example, if we want to check the truth of the proposition "I am a descendant of 
William Shakespeare", we need to find a path of lineage between the "I" and the "S" 
(there is a maximum of one such path). Considering that Shakespeare was born in 
1564 and I was born in 1968, there are about 400 years between us. Assuming a gap of 
about 25 years between generations, this means that the line of descent (if there is one) 
will be about 16 steps long. 
The choice is therefore between searching backwards from "I", to find out if "S" 
appears as an ancestor, or of searching forwards from "S" to find if "I" appears as a 
descendant of "S". We can analyse the branching factors in each direction to decide 
which is the best way to search. Everyone has exactly two biological parents, so the 
branching factor for backwards search is 2. However, in the past, people tended to 
have more than 2 children, so that the branching factor for forwards search is greater 
than 2. If we assume that the forwards branch factor is 3, the potential number of steps 
in exhaustive forwards search could be 316 = 43,046,721, compared to 2 16 = 65,536 
for backwards search. Clearly, the backwards search will be more efficient in this 
case, but still of exponential complexity. 
Note, however, that the notion of a typical branching factor can be niisleading in some 
problems because of the nature of the search space. A particular example is the 
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travelling salesman problem described in Section 1.6.3 below, and illustrated In 
Figure 1.6. 
One factor which affects the choice of how to conduct search is the possibility of 
finding either multiple or cyclical paths between nodes in the graph. Multiple paths 
which do not include cycles are mostly a nuisance, giving rise to repeated search, or 
overhead in checking for previously seen nodes in the search. But cycles can cause 
infinite cycling in the search if the algorithm does not include a check for previously 
seen nodes within the same path. If it is possible to say with certainty that the graph is 
a tree, then the overhead of looking for previously seen nodes can be eliminated from 
the algorithm. Therefore, it is important to consider the topology of the graph before 
implementing any search algorithms for it. 
Having decided whether to search forwards or backwards, the next decision is what 
search algorithm to use. Two of the most common are discussed briefly below. 
1.6.1 Depth-first (backtracking) search 
This search procedure works by expanding paths as far as they will go, until either a 
dead-end is reached or a solution path is found. In the case that a dead-end is found, 
the search "backtracks" to the nearest node which still has unexamined branch nodes. 
If a goal node is found, the search finishes, returning the path developed to that node. 
This is best explained as a search which recursively examines each of the nodes 
attached to the current node in turn, to see if there is a solution path along that route. 
Whenever possible, the search goes deeper in the graph. The general algorithms which 
implement this search must include a record of nodes which have already been 
examined, or found to lead to dead-ends, so that cyclical and redundant paths can be 
avoided in the search. 
Depth-first search is not guaranteed to find the shortest path in the search space, 
unless the search space is finite and search continues until the whole space is 
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searched. The strength of depth-first search lies in the fact that it does not require 
much storage, because it only stores one partially completed path at any time. 
In the example of Figure 1.4, forward-chaining depth-first search from S to F might 
examine the following nodes in turn: S, A, B, G, no way forwards - backtrack to B, to 
A, to S, then D, C, (B and G already visited), E, F (goal found - stop). 
1.6.2 Breadth-first search 
In breadth-first search, the paths examined in the graph are all extended by one step 
before any of them is further examined. This results in an expanding "search front" of 
nodes to be examined next, and guarantees that search progresses through the graph so 
that the shortest paths between start and goal nodes are found first. 
This method typically uses a lot more storage space than the depth-first method, 
because all the paths still under consideration have to be stored at the same time. It 
can therefore be intractable for highly branched search spaces, but is guaranteed to 
find the shortest path between start and goal nodes before any longer paths. 
In the example of Figure 1.4, searching breadth-first from S to F would examine the 
following nodes in order: S, A, D, B, C, G, E, F (goal found). 
1.6.3 Complexity Analysis 
Much of the theoretical work of computer science is concerned with the development 
of algorithms for performing well-defined tasks on large amounts of data. Computer 
scientists are therefore concerned with the following questions about an algorithm: 
• Is it guaranteed to terminate in a finite amount of time? 
• What is the maximum length of time the algorithm will take? 
• How much space will it need? 
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The first question is the most difficult one to answer in general for algorithms and I 
will therefore not consider it further, beyond making the point that any search on a 
finite graph must terminate in a finite amount of time if it does not examine cyclical 
paths in the graph. The time and space required for exhaustive search in this case may 
make such an algorithm intractable for any realistically sized computer, but the 
problem is not in any fundamental sense insoluble. 
The computational complexity of an algorithm is a measure of the amount of time or 
space it requires for it to do its job. This is usually expressed in terms of the size of 
the problem to be solved. For example, the complexity of a procedure for sorting 
elements in a list may be expressed in terms of the number of elements in the list, N, 
such that the time taken is "of the order of NZ ", or O(N\ meaning that the most 
significant part of the time taken is proportional to NZ. 
The estimation of search complexity depends heavily on knowledge about the 
topology of the search space, as well as the termination conditions and the goals of the 
problem at hand. It is not always possible to use a typical branching factor constant in 
assessing the number of paths to be examined. 
As an example, consider the travelling salesman problem, as illustrated in Figure 1.6 
below. A travelling salesman has to start at his home city (A) and visit all the other 
cities in the graph once only before returning home. The distances between the cities 
are used to label the arcs between them. The objecti ve of the problem is to find the 
route which minimises the total distance the salesman must travel. 
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Figure 1.6: Example travelling salesman problem for 5 cities 
In the travelling salesman problem, the number of arcs in the solution path to be found 
is fixed at N, where N is the number of cities in the problem. To assess how much 
time it takes to find the minimum distance path, it is necessary to observe that the total 
length of the path is not known until the end of the path is found. Therefore, finding 
the minimum length path could require expanding all possible routes covering the N 
cities, computing the total length of each one and choosing the shortest one. 
There are (N - I)! different paths through the graph covering each of the cities, so the 
time required to check these (the time complexity) is of the order of (N - I)!, which 
becomes impossibly long for quite small values of N. The storage required (the space 
complexity) is of the order of N because all that is required is the list of cities to visit 
in order, for the shortest path found so far and for the path currently being considered. 
However, various strategies for the travelling salesman problem have been developed 
to make this problem more tractable. An example is the "branch and bound strategy", 
which at every stage of path generation checks the length of the partially generated 
paths against the minimum total path length found so far. Any path (partial or 
complete) which is longer than the minimum length completed path can be rejected 
immediately. This has been found to reduce the time complexity to exponential, rather 
than factorial values, O( 1.26N). 
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Exponential' complexity is typical for exhaustive graph searches in search spaces 
where a branching factor is found which remains more or less constant throughout the 
search space. In cases like these, the time complexity for finding a path of length N in 
a graph, with a branching factor of B branches for each node, will be O(BN). This is 
equivalent to the number of nodes which will typically have to be examined in the 
graph to find the first solution path. This time complexity applies equally well to 
depth-first as to breadth-first search, but the space complexity of breadth-first is 
O(BN), while that of depth-first is only O(N). 
Despite the space requirements, breadth-first search is often a good choice for 
problems where the aim is to generate (and store for later reference) all the shortest 
paths between a number of starting nodes and a number of goals. This is the case with 
the fault propagation model used for AutoHAZID. 
1.7 Justification 
HAZOP is an effective means of identifying hazards, but it is also very expensive, in 
terms of personnel, time and money. The technique is also highly structured and, in 
overall structure, appears almost algorithmic in nature. These considerations support 
the view that HAZOP automation is a useful and feasible task to attempt. 
The techniques for qualitative modelling of process plants developed at 
Loughborough are novel and therefore exploratory in nature. However, they promise 
efficient hazard identification for test cases much larger than those commonly 
reported in the literature. The model formalism used is a graph-based one, which uses 
the well-proven AI technique of graph search to reason about fault propagation in the 
plant. 
The Plant Engineering Group at Loughborough University has been active in fault 
propagation modelling and the automation of safety assessment tasks for many years 
now. Some of the early work, reported by Parmar and Lees (l987a, 1987b), used rule-
based systems to identify equipment hazards. In parallel, Hunt et al. (1993) developed 
the FAULTFINDER system for synthesising fault trees from models of the behaviour 
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of plant components. The latest hazard identification system, AutoHAZID, was based 
on the QUEEN codes developed by Chung (1993) and in turn builds on the work of 
Zerkani and Rushton (1992, 1993). 
So, Loughborough has extensive experience in this area, the techniques we are using 
build on mature AI techniques of knowledge representation and inference by search, 
and there is a strong economic argument for automation. These are the main reasons 
for the effort, in the STOPHAZ project, to build a prototype HAZOP emulator capable 
of analysing reasonably large problems. Our partners in the STOPHAZ project were 
Aspentech (Belgium), Bureau Veritas (France), Hyprotech (Spain), ICI Engineering 
(UK), Intrasoft (Greece), SfK (UK), Snamprogetti (Italy), TXT (Italy) and VTT 
(Finland). 
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Chapter 2 : Literature Review 
This chapter reviews three main areas of work which form a background to this thesis: 
• Conventional hazard identification, as practised In the process industries 
(Section 2.1). 
• Qualitative Physics and the problem of emulating commonsense reasoning within 
a computer program (Section 2.2). 
• Applications of ideas from qualitative physics and knowledge based systems to 
hazard identification, process engineering and particularly to emulation of the 
HAZOP study (Section 2.3). 
This review does not attempt to comment at any length on related areas, such as 
failure diagnosis or process monitoring by computer. There is also no attempt to 
review the various "new technologies" of fuzzy matching, neural networks, etc. The 
number of papers in these areas is huge, and they arc of only limited relevance to the 
work presented here. 
2.1 Conventional Process Safety Methods 
This section covers some of the methods used to identify potential hazards in a 
process design and to ensure the safe operation of chemical plant. A particularly good 
overview of the commonly used techniques is gi ven in Chapter 8 of ''Loss Prevention 
in the Process Industries" by F.P. Lees (1996), which has been used as a guide for the 
material gi ven here. 
As discussed in Section 1.2, the safety of a process plant can be promoted by two 
complementary means: management systems which encourage safe practices in the 
workplace, and safe plant design methods. 
A broad range of hazard identification and risk assessment techniques are available, 
covering all stages of design, from process selection through to fully detailed process 
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design. Some of these techniques can be seen as complete methods, while others are 
supporting methods to deal with detailed identification/analysis tasks or specific 
classes of problem. Event trees and fault trees, in particular, are more often used in 
risk assessment than hazard identification. The table below lists some of these 
methods, with references to the sections where they are described. 
Complete Methods COl1lJ'lementarv Techni'lues 
What If? Analysis (Section 2.1.6) Event Tree Analysis 
(Section 2.1.1 0) 
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (Section 2.1.7) Fault Tree Analysis 
(Section 2.1.1 0) 
Coarse Hazard Studies (Section 2.1.8) Computer HAZOP 
(Section 2.1.11) 
Hazard and Operability Studies, HAZOP Sneak Analysis 
(Section 1.3) (Section 2.1.12) 
Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Human Error Analysis 
Analysis (Section 2.1.9) (Section 2.1.13) 
Table 2.1: Commonly used hazard identification techniques 
There is a good deal of overlap between techniques, in terms of applicability to each 
stage of design. Any particular organisation should select appropriate techniques for 
each stage of the design process, and for plant operation. 
In addition to the choice of which methods to use, engineers and managers must 
organise a system of safety management so that hazard studies are performed by the 
right people at the right time. The necessary information to carry out hazard studies 
and the results of those studies should be made available whenever needed, and 
actions produced by the hazard studies should be executed. The safety management 
system of an organisation and the technical means it uses to find hazards are both 
important in ensuring the safety of employees and the wider public. 
A further level of checks and balances is usually employed, in the form of 
management and safety audits (discussed in Section 2.1.1), which are used to check 
through the procedures in the organisation to see that they are being used 
appropriately. 
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Following on from the discussion of audit methods is a discussion of materials 
properties and how they can be used to screen process options for early process route 
selection, in Section 2.1.2. Knowledge of material properties is required in any case, 
for adequate assessment of the hazards in a process. Hazard indices (Section 2.1.3) are 
another instrument used to assess the hazards presented by a process or its equipment, 
and pilot plants (Section 2.1.4) can also provide valuable information about the 
hazards of novel process options. 
Checklists, as mentioned above and discussed in Section 2.1.5, are a good way of 
preserving the "lessons learnt" information gained from accidents, but only if they are 
used and maintained regularly. The subsections following Section 2.1.5 cover each of 
the techniques mentioned in Table 2.1 in turn, and in Section 2.1.14 the techniques 
discussed are put in the context of the activities which go on during the design of a 
new process plant. 
2.1.1 Management and Safety Audits 
As a part of the management structure of an organisation, procedures ami codes of 
practice for management and operation of plant, as well as the more technical aspects 
of process engineering, are important in maintaining a safe place of work for 
employees. In the UK, management has a responsibility for the safety of employees 
covered by the Health and Safety at Work Act, HSE (1990). 
Audits of the safety systems in use in an organisation are directed at discovering areas 
of strength, weakness and vulnerability in the activities of that organisation. Typically 
this sort of investigation will cover the control of maintenance through a permits to 
work scheme, reponing procedures for accidents and "near misses", etc. The safety 
audit can be quite detailed in its scope, including some identification of main hazards 
as well as the assessment of site systems of work and reporting. An example of this 
type of check is given in "Safety Audits", by BCISC (1973). 
Management system audits are usually focused on a wider range of commercial 
activities, but also form the main type of inspection carried out in the UK by the HSE. 
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All techniques are directed at ensuring the optimum levels of performance throughout 
the company, including profitable and safe operation of its plant. 
2.1.2 Materials Properties and Process Screening 
Many hazards associated with a process are related to the properties of materials or 
intermediates used. Therefore, considerations of safety, operability and environmental 
problems can take place even before process chemistry or plant siting have been 
decided. 
By considering safety problems for each process option, designers can choose an 
inherently safer plant. This could be achieved by using a more benign process, which 
avoids extreme temperatures and pressures, or by eliminating hazardous chemicals 
altogether. Alternatively, process intensification can be used to reduce inventories of 
hazardous materials, or plans for siting the plant can be changed to minimise the 
impact of accidents on local people or the environment. 
Screening process routes requires that certain information is available about the 
process materials, such as physical and chemical properties, as well as safety related 
information, relating to flammability and toxicity. Standard safety data sheets usually 
provide some of this information, and some of the rest can be found in reference 
books. It should be noted, however, that information on likely impurities and their 
effects on the process chemistry and safety can be difficult to obtain. 
According to the EC Safety Data Sheet Directive, CONCA WE (1992), the contents of 
a material data sheet should include the following items: 
• Identification of • Composition/information on 
substance/preparation and company ingredients 
• Hazards identification • First-aid measures 
• Fire-fighting measures • Accidental release measures 
• Handling and storage • Exposure controls/personal protection 
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• Physical and chemical properties • Stability and reactivity 
• Toxicological information • Ecological information 
• Disposal considerations • Transport information 
• Regulatory information • Other information 
Information about the thermal stability of materials in the process can be vital to 
ensuring the operability of a process as well as its safety. Two factors come into play 
here. One is the inherent stability of single components, with regard to physical 
changes in plant and storage conditions. The second factor is the stability of reaction 
mixtures in the reactor environment and the question of exothermic runaway. For 
some compounds explosion caused by mechanical shock, rather than straightforward 
thermal stability may be the dominant issue. Care must be taken to identify what sort 
of hazards will be present due to the compounds and reactions in the system. 
A certain amount of "desk screening", using book data, guidance on chemical bond 
groupings, computer programs, etc. can be used to filter out compounds which are 
likely to be highly unstable. Then, preliminary tests can be performed to detect the 
presence of all exotherm or gas evolution when a material is heated. Further tests can 
also be used (using various forms of calorimetry) to get more detailed information 
about the stability of compounds or reactions of interest. 
2.1.3 Hazard Indices 
A number of index methods are available to assess the losses that could be caused by 
fires, explosions and releases of process materials. These are applicable where a 
preliminary flowsheet and site plan are available, so that process fluids, inventories, 
pressures and temperatures are known. Examples of these techniques include: 
• Dow Fire and Explosion Index (Dow Chemical Company, 1994). 
• Mond Index - Similar to the Dow Index, for fires, explosions and the acute 
toxicity effects of releases. 
• Dow Chemical Exposure Index. 
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• Instantaneous Fractional Annual Loss (IF AL). 
• Mortality Index, which relates to materials with a major hazard potential. 
These indices can be used to inform process selection decisions or to identify the main 
hazards in the process design, with a view to controlling them. 
2.1.4 Pilot Plants 
A large quantity of potentially useful data can be gained from pilot plant studies, 
which help in clarifying the safety and operability issues in a process, as well as 
informing the scale-up of the process from lab experiments to full scale operation. It is 
very important that the experience gained on the pilot scale is used to good effect 
when full scale production is considered. Due consideration must also be given to the 
hazards presented by the pilot plant itself, before it is built. 
2.1.5 Checklists 
If used appropriately, checklists are an effective way of passing on information about 
the characteristic hazards of a process or piece of equipment. They are based on past 
experience of hazards or accidents and may therefore be less useful when developing 
novel processes, than when reusing or mOdifying an existing design. 
Checklists are often used at the design check stage, when developing a process flow 
diagram into an ELD, to quickly examine the proposed design for any problems. They 
should therefore be used only as a final check that nothing has been missed, and not as 
a protocol to guide the design process itself. 
Some guidance on the use of checklists is given by Miller and Howard (1971). There 
are a huge number of references on the subject, a selection of which is offered in 
Table 8.4 of Lees (1996). 
A useful checklist should provoke enough thought to prevent the user from simply 
answering "yes" or "no" to each question. This requires a careful choice of questions, 
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which must be worded appropriately. The user of the checklist must of course raise 
appropriate actions if he/she finds any problems with the design. 
Lastly, checklists must be used regularly and updated as necessary, in the light of 
experience with their use. Ownership and responsibility for the lists need to be 
maintained and passed on within an organisation. 
2.1.6 What If? Analysis 
This method is described by Burk (1992) and by CCPS (1985). It is best used at the 
stage in design when a process flow diagram (PFD) has been produced. All available 
design information is examined, including the PFD, any operating instructions and 
equipment design parameters. 
The objective is to produce a list of potential safety problems or actions to be 
considered in revising the design, by considering the effect on the plant of abnormal 
situations. A group of design team personnel meet to examine the design and ask 
questions about possible things that could go wrong. The method uses the team's 
collective imagination to identify more obscure problems than might be possible using 
a checklist alone. 
Burk (1992) combines the "What If?" method with a checklist approach, to give more 
comprehensive coverage of process hazards. This method can be used to evaluate new 
plant designs, review an operating plant periodically, or to check for hazards when 
making modifications. The study is performed by a multi disciplinary group, aided by a 
team leader to conduct the meetings and a scribe to record the questions raised. The 
analysis proceeds through a number of st"ges: 
• Organisational Meeting - The team leader explains the method to be used, and the 
scope of the review, to the whole group. Information packages, containing all 
necessary drawings, technical details and a timetable of meetings, are distributed 
to each team member. 
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• In-Depth Review of Process - For tearn members unfamiliar with the process, the 
main features of the plant are explained and a tour of the plant takes place, if 
appropriate. 
• Question Formulation Meeting - When the team members have familiarised 
themselves with the information available, the plant is studied in detail, from feed 
to product storage. The team formulates questions focusing on potential hazards or 
incidents, and their causes: 
• There is no attempt to answer any questions at this stage, as this impedes 
the generation of further questions. 
• Questions are recorded in full sentences on a flip-chart visible to the whole 
group. 
• All points raised are recorded, even if they appear to be "dumb questions". 
o Questions do not have to begin with the phrase "What IT?". 
• Closely related questions are grouped together, as some questions will give 
rise to other related ones. 
• When the whole process has been reviewed in this "brain-storming" way, the team 
leader hands out a checklist of possible areas of concern. The group works through 
the list, to see if any further questions are raised by this. Burk provides an example 
of a I ist which could be used here. 
• After the question formulation meeting, questions are allocated to team members, 
who take them away and prepare draft answers to them. When the answers have 
been prepared, they are distributed to all tcam members before the next meeting. 
• Question Response Meeting - The group reviews the questions raised and answers 
produced, to agree on what to do about each problem area. It is very important that 
all agree with the actions produced by this meeting. 
• The report should (at minimum) document the identified hazards, their causes and 
the agreed actions to eliminate or control these hazards. Burk suggests that the 
report should not be presented in a tabular format, but instead should use complete 
sentences to record the questions and answers. This is felt to be more effective in 
communicating the full meaning of what has been discussed. 
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2.1.7 Preliminary Hazard Analysis 
Methods for identifying hazards during early design, when only a block diagram of the 
process may be available, vary widely. Therefore, use of the term "preliminary hazard 
analysis" (PHA) is quite loose. The usual objective of PHA (as described by, for 
example, CCPS, \985) is to raise awareness of the major hazards in equipment 
proposed for the design, as early as possible. Analysis should produce a set of causes 
and consequences of specific scenarios, with associated corrective measures. 
The following aspects of the design should be considered, with regard to the hazards 
that may be present: 
• Properties of the raw materials, intermediates and products in the process, as weIJ 
as utility fluids such as steam, nitrogen, fuels, etc. 
• Types of equipment used in the process, their temperatures and pressures. 
• Interfaces between components of the designed system, such as fluid interactions 
and compatibility with materials of construction, fire initiation and propagation, 
etc. 
• Operating environment. Consider external factors such as temperature limits, 
humidity, earthquakes, etc. 
• Operation of the plant (maintenance, testing, start-up and shut-down, etc.). 
• Facilities support, such as storage, staff training, utilities required. 
• Safety Equipment (e.g. emergency shutdown instruments, personal protective 
equipment, fire protection). 
2.1.8 Coarse Hazard Studies 
Coarse hazard studies, such as the method outlined in Section 4.1 of the CIA Guide to 
Hazard and Operability Studies (1977), aim to identify problems caused by missing 
data or hazard information, or features of the basic design, layout and plant siting. 
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This assessment is carried out early, when a block layout of plant items and (possibly) 
a basic flowsheet is available. It should clarify to all those taking part what the main 
sources of hazards and problems with operation will be, as well as indicating 
deficiencies in data about the process and the materials in it. 
A method study approach similar to that used in HAZOP (Section 1.3) is common, 
where a team of experts reviews the design under the supervision of a chairman. 
Guide words provoke generation of ideas in combination with the general design 
parameters decided so far and a number of potential hazards. The guide word lists 
given by Knowlton (1981), as the "creative checklist" approach are: 
General Design Parameters: 
• Materials 
• Raw materials 
• Intermediates 
• Products 
• Effluents 
• Unit Operations 
• Mixing 
• Distillation 
• Drying 
• etc. 
• Layout 
• Arrangement between unit operations within the plant 
• Spatial relationships with other facilities 
Potential Hazards: 
• Fire • Noise • Explosion 
• Vibration • Detonation • Noxious material 
• Toxicity • Electrocution • Corrosion 
• Asphyxia • Radiation • Mechanical failure 
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The actions produced by the study may be queries for infonnation on equipment or 
materials, or actions to plan for, or design out, certain hazards highlighted in the 
study. 
2.1.9 Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) 
Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) revIews specific failures of system 
components and the consequent effects of each failure mode on the whole system. 
Criticality analysis can be added to this cause-effect analysis, so that the severity of 
the effects of failure, and the frequencies of the root cause failure modes, are 
estimated. When this additional method is used, FMEA becomes FMECA, "failure 
modes, effects and criticality analysis". 
The two methods are described in the CC PS hazard evaluation guidelines (CCPS, 
1985) and are also covered by a British Standard, BS5760: Part 5 (BSI, 1991). An 
example of the results of application of FMEA to a liquefied natural gas terminal is 
given by Aldwinckle and Slater (l983). An example for a differential pressure 
transmitter is given in Appendix 3 of Green (1983). 
FMEA is a systematic and laborious procedure which requIres detailed design 
infonnation. It therefore can only be used selectively, late in a project, on the more 
critical parts of the process, control or safety system. 
Before starting the study, it is important to decide what equipment is to be examined 
and in how much detail, as well as collecting all available information on the 
functions of the equipment items. 
Each element of the system is examined in turn (by a team or a single analyst), and all 
conceivable failure modes are noted. Failure modes are malfunctions that change the 
normal operation or function of equipment items. For each failure, the effects on the 
system are detennined and the results recorded in a standard format. This requires a 
detailed understanding of the events involved in the fault-consequence scenario. For 
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FMECA, the criticality of each failure mode is added, in tenns of a severity and 
probability class (e.g. a rank number in the range 1-4), for each identified scenario 
The results of the study should record the failure modes of equipment, causes of these 
failure modes and the further effects on other components, and the system as a whole. 
It is also important, if possible, to classify the failure mode in tenns of how it can be 
detected, the possibility of testing or replacing components to eliminate the problem, 
and any provisions made to compensate for the failure if it occurs. 
FMEA and FMECA are best for considering components whose failure could have a 
serious effect on a large part of the (process) system. They are good for serial failure 
logic, where causes and effects chain together one after another but for more 
complicated logic, fault tree and event tree analysis are more suitable techniques. 
2.1.10 Event Tree and Fault Tree Analysis 
Event trees are logic diagrams illustrating the development or escalation of a 
hazardous consequence, or scenario. Fault trees are logic diagrams which show the 
mechanisms by which a hazardous event can be caused (sequences of events in the 
fault tree are known as "fault paths"). 
Both types of tree are used mainly for risk assessment, to quantify the risk or the 
losses resulting from an incident. Nevertheless, constructing them can be a useful 
exercise in focusing thinking during hazard identification. The use of event trees and 
fault trees for hazard analysis is described in Chapter 9 of Lees (1996). 
2.1.11 Computer HAZOP 
The failure modes of computer systems can be quite different to those of process or 
mechanical equipment, and the use of computers in modern process plants is 
increasingly pervasive. For this reason there has been a lot of recent interest In 
techniques for analysing the reliability of programmable systems, and in methods to 
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identify the hazards which could arise due to failure of components in computerised 
systems. 
A number of factors combine to make safety assessment of computer-controlled plant 
more complicated than for plant which does not involve any programmed component. 
Relevant considerations include: 
• Failure of process equipment. 
• Failure of computer hardware. 
• Common mode failures across the whole plant, related to problems with the 
computer control system, other services or plant-wide utilities. 
• Latent errors in computer programs. These coding errors are systematic and are 
only revealed under certain conditions of operation. 
• Errors in specification of the computer software due to poor communication 
between cngineers and programmers. 
• Communication errors between machines, due to unforeseen conditions ill the 
plant, or within the equipment items themselves. 
Computer HAZOP is carried out at the same time as, or after, the process-related 
HAZOP of a plant. Details of the instrumentation and control systems, including loop 
diagrams for instruments and control program documentation, must be available. The 
project instrument and control engineer and someone responsible for the technical 
programming and configuration of the computer system must be present, as well as 
the usual HAZOP team members. 
The method deals with computers by adding extra guide words to the traditionally 
used set, describing possible faiiures in relation (normally) lo instrument signals and 
the output signals from controllers. Normally the computer has no power to affect the 
operation of the process, except through actuators connected to the process. In this 
sense, the guide word approach proposed by Andow (1991) makes sense for inputs 
and outputs. 
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Chung and Broomfield, in Chapter 2 of "Computer Control and Human Error" (Kletz 
et al., 1995), present a methodology for HAZOP of computer-controlled systems. 
Their approach concentrates on examining each of the functional requirements of the 
system in turn, decomposing the requirement into tasks which must be accomplished 
in sequence, and then asking questions derived from analysis of incident reports. An 
interesting idea used in this work is that of decomposing a system into components, 
each of which maps onto a component class and a corresponding "functional layer" in 
the system as a whole. The layers of the system define the classification of tasks and 
incidents in the approach, with communications to/from the computer defined as 
arrows on an "event time diagram", as illustrated in Figure 2.1. 
(a) Intervention 
Input/Output 
mmunication 
Sensor. Hurran input 
device, Actuator. 
Dis /a 
Utility, Opetator 
~ (b) 
Figure 2.1: (a) Functional Levels and Basic Components of the Event Time 
Diagram, (b) An Example ETD for a Flight Management System 
2.1.12 Sneak Analysis 
An account of slleak analysis in process plant is given by Whetton (1993). The 
technique is adapted from "sneak circuit analysis", a method for finding design errors 
in electronic circuits, developed in the aerospace industries in the 1960's. 
Sneak analysis is a niche method which can be seen as a supplement to other methods 
of process hazard identification, such as HAZOP, "What 1f...?", etc. A sneak is 
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· defined as "an undesired condition which occurs as a consequence of a design error, 
sometimes but not necessarily in conjunction with a failure". 
For process systems, Whetton (1993) identifies six categories of sneak. The categories 
may occasionally overlap, for some incidents: 
I. Sneak Flow - An unintended flow from a source to a target location, possibly due 
to a valve being opened erroneously. A simple example of this is shown in Figure 
2.2. If the two drain valves are opened simultaneously, fluid from the high 
pressure vessel can get into the low pressure vessel, with potentially hazardous 
results. 
2. Sneak Indication - Incorrect or ambiguous indication by instruments or safety 
systems. An example of this type of problem is one from the Three Mile Island 
incident, where an indicator intended to show the state of a remotely operated 
valve actually showed the state of the switch operating the valve (Figure 2.3). 
Clearly if the valve is faulty and cannot operate, the lamp does not indicate this. 
3. Sneak Label - An incorrect or ambiguous label on instrumentation or process 
equipment. 
4. Sneak Energy - Unintended presence or absence of energy. Examples of this 
include reactor vessels where a mixer, which has been switched off for a while, is 
reacti vatcd causing a reaction to run out of control, or cases where pressure 
remains in a system after shutdown, injuring personnel when the process is opened 
for maintenance. 
5. Sneak Reaction - Unintended reactions, such as side-reactions in a reactor, or 
reaction of materials outside the reactor environment. 
6. Sneak Procedure or Sequence - Where events occur in the wrong order or in 
conflict with one another. 
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" " Vessel A Vessel B 
1 Bar 100 Bar 
'- /' "- /' 
Drain ~ Oral Valve A Volv n e B 
I To Drain 
Figure 2.2: An example of sneak flow 
t~ItCh - Power 
Indicator 
light 
Figure 2.3: An example of sneak indication 
By analysing incident reports, a list of clues to identifying sneaks can be prepared, and 
stored in a database, indexed according to the type of sneak (flow, indication, labei, 
etc.), the type of equipment, process parameter (temperature, level, pressure, etc.) and 
deviation (high, low, none as in HAZOP). This clue list database can be used to access 
the clues relevant to each deviation when conducting a HAZOP study and to provoke 
identification of sneak faults in addition to the usual "brainstorming" method. 
Whetton calls this method "sneak-augmented HAZOP". 
In addition to the clue list method mentioned above, "sneak flow analysis" can be 
used to systematically identify sneak flows. This method partitions the process as built 
into sections and identifies all possible sources and destinations for fluid in each 
section. Then, each pairing of source and target within a section is examined to see if 
fluid could flow from one to the other (assuming that all valves are open). Any 
resulting problems with regard to overpressure, tluid reactions with other fluids and 
with materials of construction, are noted as sneak flow problems. 
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2.1.13 Human Error Analysis 
Human error is often implicated in the root causes of accidents and in their 
development. However, techniques to deal with this type of problem are difficult to 
apply, perhaps because of the vast range of errors which can occur. Two methods are 
mentioned here which can be used to identify operator error problems. It should be 
noted that this class of error by no means covers the whole field. 
Task analysis can be used to look at the actions performed by an operator and to 
identify potential problems. It is a technique which breaks down high level tasks into 
successively more detailed subtasks, forming a plan on a number of levels of detail. 
This technique is not used a great deal for hazard identification, but was developed as 
a training tool. 
Action error analysis, developed by Taylor (1979), is a method of looking at the 
operating procedures of the plant and considering the possible errors which could take 
place in the sequence, using a guide word approach. The procedure is modelled as a 
sequence of actions and their associated effects on the plant. An error is then 
developed with regard to a particular action, and the consequences of this error are 
evaluated. Particularly important in considering the effects of errors is whether they 
can be detected or corrected afterwards. 
For any assessment of human error in a particular plant, reasonably detailed operating 
instructions must be available, as well as a full specification of the instrumentation 
systems and (ideally) a layout diagram of the control room instrumentation and 
alarms, etc. This means action error analysis is only possible at a late stage of the 
project. Recomm'mdations from the study may include modification of the operating 
instructions, changes to the operating sequence and operator training schemes, extra 
field instruments, or changes to the organisation of control room instrument panels. 
Chapter 6 of Taylor (1994) offers an analysis of the subject of human error in process 
plant, reviewing some of the techniques which can help, such as action error analysis 
and sneak path analysis. 
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2.1.14 Hazard Identification in the Context of Process Design 
The methods discussed so far form a menu of options from which safety managers can 
choose in formulating their own system for safe plant design. These will now be put in 
the context of the time-line from process conception through to checking on the final, 
detailed process design. 
First of all, the design team must decide what product to make, where, and with what 
process chemistry. A basic process outline must be produced for a number of 
candidate options. At this stage, collecting data on process materials, screening them 
for potential hazards and testing for thermal stability are important concerns. 
Experience gained in pilot plant studies, or from previous operation of similar 
processes, should also be used, at this process definition stage and later. The use of 
checklists should also be encouraged at all stages of the project where a process 
design exists at such a level that specific aspects of it can be usefully questioned. 
Once a block diagram of the process has been developed, index methods such as the 
Dow Fire and Explosion index can be used. These inform decisions on inventories of 
hazardous materials, layout of plant sections, etc. Later, when a PFD has been drawn, 
a more specific view of the hazards to be expected in the plant can be gained by using 
either "What If?" Analysis, PHA, or a Coarse Hazard Study method. 
For hazard identification on the detailed process design, HAZOP can be combined 
with a number of the supporting methods, as appropriate for the plant being designed: 
• Sneak analysis can help to look at potential hazards from a different angle. 
• FMECA can be used to investigate the more important components of the system, 
to evaluate the implications of their failure. 
• Fault trees and event trees may be chosen for risk assessment, or to clarify the 
causation of complex events. 
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• Computer HAZOP may be used to review the potential problems associated with 
programmed components in the plant, including the control system. 
• Human error analysis is most useful for plants involving a lot of operator 
intervention (e.g. batch or semi-batch operations). 
There must be a sensible choice of a range of the above techniques, to cover the 
specific characteristics of the plant being designed. The technical studies must be 
integrated into a system of management and communication, so that all involved are 
aware of how the information generated is to be used. 
2.2 Qualitative Physics 
Qualitative Physics (QP) is an active field of research in Artificial Intelligence (AI). In 
QP, models of physical systems are based on qualitative variables with discrete 
val ues, rather than the real numbers typically used in the differential equation models 
of classical physics (De Kleer, 1992). Study in this area is justified by a number of 
points: 
• QP can provide more causally satisfying explanations for physical behaviour than 
the mathematical equations most often used in classical physics. 
• Solutions to problems in QP may be simpler to obtain, compared with those of 
quantitative physics problems. 
• Computationally, QP simulations are cheaper than numerical simulations. 
• More intuitive explanations of behaviour may be offered by QP. It seems likely 
that the mental physical understanding we use (our own "naIve physics") is 
fundamentally qualitative in nature. 
• QP may be able to solve problems where only an incomplete specification is 
available. 
• The precision required in specifying parameters in a quantitative simulation 
ensures that only one behaviour is produced from any given starting point. By 
contrast, a qualitative simulation can deal with uncertain or imprecise values and 
can therefore represent a wider range of physical scenarios. This means that QP 
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can be made to produce all physically possible behaviours of the physical system 
corresponding to the qualitative model studied. 
• QP models can be used to focus attention on areas of concern and simplify later 
quantitative analysis. 
2.2.1 General Issues to be Tackled by Qualitative Formalisms 
Whatever approach is chosen for studying Qualitative Physics, a number of important 
issues must be addressed (De Kleer, 1992). Firstly, there is the question of what to 
represent in the QP system - for instance, whether the fundamental "units" in the 
system are physical processes which mayor may not be in operation (Forbus, 1984), 
components of a mechanism (Kuipers, 1986), or constraints operating between 
variables (De KIeer and Brown, 1984). These three most common standpoints in the 
field are discussed later, in Sections 2.2.4, 2.2.5 and 2.2.6 resIJectively. 
A second issue is the treatment of variables and values. We have established that the 
values of variables in QP are discrete, but what values those variables may take, under 
what conditions, etc., is a separate argument. Most of the time, the qualitative variable 
under consideration is produced by segmentation of the real number line 
(corresponding to the related quantitative variable) into a number of non-overlapping 
intervals. 
The most commonly used value set is {-,O,+}, corresponding to quantitative values 
which are negative, zero or positive: For a particular material in pure form and at 
ambient pressure, there may be five qualitative temperature values, corresponding to 
the temperature ranges where the material is solid, melting, liquid, boiling or gaseous. 
The points on the number line where the qualitative value of the variable changes are 
known as "landmark values" and they usually correspond to significant qualitative 
changes of applicable laws or behaviour. 
In addition to the definition of qualitative variables, algebraic axioms and rules must 
be provided to allow mathematical operations to be defined on the variables. Often, 
these axioms and rules are derived from the mathematical analysis of real numbers. 
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Some generic and some problem specific constraints must also be brought into play in 
order to establish relationships between the variables in the model system. How 
constraints are expressed depends on how the concepts of "structure" and 
"mechanism" are treated. Some workers (e.g. De K1eer and Brown, 1984) represent 
constraints directly, avoiding the construction of a constraint set from some other 
form. In the component based approach to modelling, constraints are specified 
between variables within the same component, and inferred from linkages between 
components, so that a network of constraints is formed in the composite system. 
The principle of "no function in structure" is a guiding principle for developing 
models. The laws of individual parts of a system (its "units") must never presuppose 
the function of the whole. The purpose of this principle is to prevent the development 
of context-specific models where the answers to questions put to them are built into 
the laws governing individual units and their linkage. In such a situation, difficulties 
will be encountered when the unit is presented wiL'1 a different context. 
A major problem with QP systems is that of representing time, and therefore change, 
in physical systems. As variables change, they may reach landmark values, changing 
the beh~viour of the system. Which variables reach landmark values first is the 
question addressed by transition analysis, or limit analysis (Forbus, 1984). Time is 
usually represented qualitatively as a sequence of "intervals", optionally separated by 
"instants". Having decided on a representation for time, predictions can be made using 
a qualitati ve calculus which allows simulation of behaviour forwards in time from a 
given initial state. This is particularly illustrated by De K1eer and Brown (1984), who 
describe the concept of "envisioning" the behaviour of a mechanism. 
Causality (the issue of what events can cause other events in the system) mayor may 
not be addressed explicitly in a QP model, as with any physical explanation. There is a 
problem here, in that the scientific community has not yet come up with a satisfying 
formal definition of causality. As a minimum for causal linkage, dependency must be 
demonstrated between two events. If A and B are assignments of values to qualitative 
variables ("events"), then for A to cause B, the occurren,ce of B must depend on A 
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occurring. Usually, the constraints of spatial and temporal order are also imposed to 
determine if the causal link exists: only physically connected components may 
interact, and for A to cause B, A must precede B. 
2.2.2 Ambiguity 
Ambiguity in qualitative simulation arises when the simulator cannot decide which of 
a number of possible outcomes actually takes place. This leads to a branched "tree" of 
possible states of the system being simulated, where every one of the possible 
outcomes must be considered. Computational complexity becomes a problem when 
this sort of ambiguity is widespread. 
Ambigui ty of various kinds is inherent in the nature of most models in Qualitative 
Physics. One important type of ambiguity is that of certain arithmetical operations, 
such as addition. If two qualitative variables A and B each take values from the set 
{-,a, +} then their sum, (A+B), is highly ambiguous (the sum of a "+" and a "-" may 
be "+" or "-", or even "0"). This is a problem when considering mass balances around 
dividers or headers in simulations of chemical plant, for example. 
Another significant source of ambiguity is where a model uses a very loose functional 
constraint between two variables. Such constraints are needed to allow a wide range 
of mathematical functions to be generalised within the qualitative framework. The 
downside is that a whole family of functions are implied, every time the qualitative 
constraint is used, so that the simulated behaviours of the system include all those 
consistent with the different interpretations of the constraint. 
Temporal ordering of state changes in qualitative simlllations also increases 
ambiguity. Where the system is unable to decide which of a number of possible 
changes in the system will occur first, it must consider each of them as equally 
possible. This occurs when a number of variables are changing, moving towards 
different landmark values, so that there is a problem in determining the order in which 
these landmarks are reached. 
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In QP, we want to be able to distinguish real behaviours of the system as specified 
from physically impossible predictions. There may actually be multiple real 
behaviours consistent with the model used, in which case we want to know about 
them all. Impossible behaviours may arise due to the inability of the model to capture 
real constraints which exist between objects in the world. 
Usually, such constraints are high level ones, such as conservation of mass or energy, 
which cannot be captured very easily in localised qualitative models. However, some 
attempt to capture these types of constraints may be made by inspecting the 
configurations of units in the model of the system as a whole. 
2.2.3 NaIve Physics and Commonsense Reasoning 
In his "Na'ive Physics Manifesto", Hayes (1979) criticises AI research for being too 
limited to so-called "toy worlds" and simple, well-defined puzzles and games. While 
the programs developed may possess an ability to play chess, or to reason about 
blocks on a table top, there is no sign of the general intelligence we are accustomed to 
making use of in the real world. As a first step towards intelligent systems, Hayes 
proposes formalising large parts of the commonsense knowledge we have about the 
world (our "na'ive physics"). 
Among the many interesting topics discussed by Hayes (1979), the idea of histories is 
particularly useful for its potential in tackling a long-standing AI problem known as 
the "frame problem". A frequently used representation in AI models the state of the 
world using a set of propositions about individuals in that world. Rules are used to 
define possible transitions between states of the world, in terms of changes in the set 
of propositions. This model of change is known as the "situational calculus" and is 
described by (among others) McCarthy and Hayes, (1969). 
Although this model is mathematically and computationally attractive, it suffers from 
a serious problem: one must specify, for each individual in the world, whether it 
changes or does not change in response to each possible action defined in that world. 
This is known as the frame problem, and it causes an explosion in the number of 
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rules, as each variable must have a "frame axiom" to state if it does or does not 
change when some particular operation is carried out. The situational calculus allows 
the state of an object to depend on all the other elements of the world model. 
The real world (when viewed in a deterministic way) is somewhat different. We 
intuitively know that two objects must physically interact with one another, typically 
through the action of some force or exchange of material, in order to affect their 
behaviour. Hayes calls for a state representation of objects that includes a limited 
spatial extent, but potentially unlimited temporal extent. This is the idea of a 
"history": a projection of the spatial extent relevant for an object through time. 
Histories are associated with an object and the places which can physically interact 
with that object over the temporal history of the object. These places are not 
necessarily fixed in size and they can overlap or be nested inside one another - and 
therefore so too can histories. The history of a composite object is defined as the 
union of the histories of each of its component objects. 
Objects may only interact if their histories intersect in space-time. This substantially 
tames the frame problem because it restricts candidates for variables changes to those 
changes caused by the intersection of histories of adjacent objects in the world. Such a 
restriction embodies the two important causal considerations of spatial and temporal 
order, mentioned in the previous section. 
2.2.4 The Process-Based Approach 
"Qualitative Process Theory" (QPT) was developed by Forbus (1984). In this theory, 
changes in the world arc caused by the operation of physical "processes", 
corresponding to such phenomena as motion, heating, bending, boiling, etc. 
According to Forbus, this model of change is more descriptive than solving constraint 
equations to yield evolving patterns of variation in state variables (as in QSIM, for 
example - see Section 2.2.5 below). Hayes' idea of spatially limited histories, 
described in Section 2.2.3, is used to tackle the frame problem, so that only objects 
whose histories overlap in time and space are permitted to interact. 
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Variables in QPT are defined in terms of a "quantity space" representation. An 
arbitrary number of landmark values are placed on the real number line of the 
quantitative variable being modelleq. These define a number of non-overlapping 
intervals, which correspond to the values of the qualitative variable in question. 
Landmark values may mark places where significant changes in the physical model of 
the system occur. They may also be discovered during simulation, so that the quantity 
space may be extended dynamically. 
Time is modelled using ideas from Alien's work on time and action (Alien, 1981 and 
1984) and makes use of the concepts of events, instants, intervals and episodes. 
Significant landmarks on the time axis are not predetermined, but instead are 
uncovered by simulation, as points in time when significant changes take place. This 
is similar to the way in which the qualitative value sets of other variables are modified 
by the addition of new landmark values during simulation. 
The objects in the world of process theory are termed "individuals". These represent 
phYSically real objects such as containers, substances, fluids, as well as more abstract 
objects, such as events, hcat paths or processes themselves. Individuals are associated 
with a type, stating what sort of object they are. 
"Individual views" (also known as "views") model situations and changes in 
individuals that may be dependent on the value of some quantity in the system. Each 
view is specified in four lists, as shown in Figure 2.4, taken from Forbus (1984), 
which shows a simple view for describing the fluid contained in a cup. 
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ii We take amount-of-in to map from 
ii substances and containers to quantities 
Individual View Contained-Liquid(p) 
Individuals: 
con a container 
sub a liquid 
Preconditions: 
Can-Contain-Substance (con, sub) 
QuantitYConditions: 
A(amount-of-in(sub,con)]>ZERO 
Relations: 
There is p E piece-of-stuff 
amount-of{p) = amount-of-in(sub,con) 
rnade-of(p) = sub 
container{p) = con 
Figure 2.4: Qualitative process theory view for fluid in a cup 
Views form templates for the realisation of "view instances". For every collection of 
objects that satisfies the descriptions of the individuals specified by the view, a view 
instance (VI) is created, which relates the individuals. Unless the preconditions and 
quantity conditions of the view are satisfied, the VI remains inactive. When the VI is 
activated however, the specified relations apply between the individuals. 
Note that preconditions are used to specify how the view depends on events or 
situations that may occur outside the scope of the dynamic model of the system. 
Quantity conditions, on the other hand, may be satisfied or broken by changes 
predicted within the simulation itself. 
Processes are used to describe how changes occur. Examples of physical processes 
include fluid and heat flows, boiling, motion and stretching. They are specified in a 
similar way to individual views, but have an extra part in their specification, for 
"influences". Two examples of process specifications are given in Figure 2.5, taken 
from Forbus (1984), for heat flow between two objects and a contained fluid boiling. 
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process heat-flow 
Individuals: 
src an object,Has-Quantity(src,heat} 
dst an object,Has-Quantity(dst,heat) 
path a Heat-Path,Heat-Connection(path,src,dst) 
Preconditions: 
Heat-Aligned (path) 
QuantityConditions: 
A[ternperature(src)]>A[temperature(dst)] 
Relations: 
Let flow-rate be a quantity 
A[flow-rate]>ZERO 
flow-rate ~~ (ternperature(src)-ternperature(dst» 
Influences: 
I-(heat(src),A[flow-rate]) 
I+(heat(dst),A[flow-rate]) 
process boiling 
Individuals: 
w a contained-liquid 
hf a process-instance,process(hf)=heat-flow 
Adst (hf) ; w 
QuantityConditions: 
Status (hf,Active) 
-A[ternperature(w)] < A[t-boil(w)] 
Relations: 
There is 9 E piece-of-stuff 
gas (g) 
substance (g) ; substance ("1) 
temperature (g) ; ternperature(w) 
Let generation-rate be a quantity 
A [generation-rate] > ZERO 
generation-rate 0<:0+ flow-rate (hf) 
Influences: 
I-(heat(w),A[flow-rate(hf)]) 
;; The above counteracts the heat flow's influence 
I-(arnount-of(w),A[generation-rate]) 
I+(arnount-of(g),A[generation-rate]) 
I-(heat(w),A[generation-rate]) 
1+ (heat (g), A[generation-rate] ) 
Figure 2.5: Process specifications for heat flow and boiling fluid 
As with individual views, processes form templates for the definition of "process 
instances", so that a process instance is created for each collection of individuals in 
the world which satisfy the description in the "individuals" section of the process 
definition. Process instances lemain inactive until their preconditions and quantity 
conditions are satisfied, when the relations and influences specified come into effect. 
Quantity conditions for processes may include inequalities between parameters of 
individuals (typically stated in terms of the "amount of' certain parameters, as in 
HA [varl] >A [var2] "), or conditions on the status of processes and individual 
views. "Relations" may include constraints imposed on parameters of the individuals 
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and any new entities created by the process. The indirect effects imposed by functional 
relationships are represented in the "Relations" part of the process description. The 
"Influences" section is for specifying the direct causal effects of the process. In the 
heat flow example of Figure 2.5, influence statements describe how the heat flow 
negativei"y affects the heat content of the source object and positively affects the heat 
content of the destination object. 
Implementation of QPT requires a simulator which is capable of monitoring a set of 
individuals and their parameters, automatically creating and activating appropriate 
view and process instances as appropriate. The views and processes should be taken 
from a library of models, the "process vocabulary", which defines the sorts of 
phenomena that can be modelled by the theory. 
Simulation of system behavio<!r typically involves a process called "limit analysis". 
Changes in variables are observed, to detennine which landmark values could he 
crossed, and in what order, and thereby determine the behaviour in the new qualitative 
state. This may give rise to more than one possible outcome from any particular state, 
so that simulation may produce a branching, tree-like pattern of possible behaviours. 
Limit analysis may uncover new landmark values during simulation, requiring that the 
quantity spaces of the variables are added to. It is not clear whether aB these new 
landmarks necessarily correspond to physically significant events with respect to the 
variable concerned. 
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2.2.5 Qualitative Simulation - QSIM 
Kuipers (1986) describes the approach taken to qualitative simulation in the QSIM 
algorithm. QSIM models the constraints represented by ordinary differential equations 
(ODEs), using analogous qualitative relationships. An ODE model can be directly 
translated into a system of qualitative constraints, suitable for processing by QSIM, as 
illustrated by the following example: 
The differential equation 
d'u du 
dt' - dt + arctan(ku) = 0 
becomes: 
Quantitative Qualitative 
IJ = duldt DERN(u, fl) 
fz = d!JIdt DERIV(fl, f2) 
13 = ku MULT(k, u, f3) 
!4 = arctan(h ) M+(f3, f4) 
/z-IJ+14=O ADD(f2, f4, fl) 
In the above, the DERN, MULT and ADD constraints are self-explanatory. However, 
QSIM also uses the more general type of functional constraints, M- and M+. 
M+(f3, f4) above denotes a monotonic increasing functional relationship, where f4 is 
a monotonic increasing function of f3. M- is used to represent a monotonic 
decreasing functional relationship in the same way. 
What is interesting about M+ and M- is the way that they introduce a whole class of 
possible functions into the otherwise quite rigidly defined qualitative constraint 
system. This vastly increases the range of possible problems with qualitative 
ambiguity, but is unavoidable if a QP system is to be of any general use. Kuipers 
discusses the different approaches used by researchers to represent this idea of an 
unspecified functional relationship between quantities, including the qualitative 
proportionality of Forbus' qualitative process theory (Forbus, 1984) and the 
confluence representation of De Kleer and Brown (1984). 
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The variables in QSIM are often known as "functions", because each is a function of 
time in the system. Kuipers uses the quantity space idea of Forbus (1984) to define 
qualitative values by comparison with a set of landmark values (a function can have a 
value at, or between, landmark values, and can be increasing, steady or decreasing). 
As with Forbus, the quantity space can be extended by discovering new landmark 
values. 
Transitions of variables between states are governed by well-defined rules borrowed 
from the analysis of real numbers. For example, a variable cannot move from a value 
of "between I, and lz and increasing" « (11, 12)' inc» to a value of "between 12 
and 13 and increasing" « ( 12 ' 13 ) , inc» without first passing through "equal to lz 
and increasing" «12, inc». 
At each step, QSIM uses the basic rules for transitions between function states to 
generate possible transitions which may be considered for the function. These are then 
filtered for consistency with the constraint set describing the problem at hand, checked 
for internal inconsistency and filtered down to a final set of possible successor states. 
In general, QSIM will produce a branching tree of states, linked by function 
transitions, as a description of the possible behaviours of a system. 
QSIM constrains the relationships between functions in its constraint set models only 
very loosely (e.g. the M+ constraint described above). Therefore, each set of 
qualitative"constraints corresponds to a larger number of equivalent ODE models. 
Simulation in QSIM produces a branch for every physically real behaviour of each of 
these ODE models, which means that the tree produced can be highly branched. 
Unfortunately, physically impossible behaviours are sometimes also predicted. This is 
due to a combination of localised constraints and qualitative variable values. 
Localised constraints do not capture global considerations, such as conservation of 
energy, while arithmetic on qualitative variables is often inherently ambiguous. 
As an example, for a friction less oscillating spring, QSIM produces three branches, 
for steady, increasing or decreasing oscillation. The three-way branch occurs in the 
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simulation at every cycle, so that the behaviour predicted by QSIM could change 
arbitrarily, from steady, to increasing, to decreasing oscillation. Steady oscillation is 
the only physically real solution - the others are produced because the QSIM model 
does not represent conservation of energy. Kuipers identifies the problem of 
modelling high level constraints as particularly important for qualitative simulation. 
2.2.6 Constraint-Based Qualitative Reasoning - "Confluences" 
In the work of De Kleer and Brown (1984), explicitly represented constraint equations 
(referred to as "confluences") take centre stage, in partnership with a strong 
component-based approach to modelling complex mechanisms. This is a similar 
approach to that in QSIM (described above), but De Kleer and Brown's approach to 
modelling physical components is much stronger. 
The objective is dynamic qualitative simulation, using qualitative differential 
equations (QDEs), which are analogous to the ordinary differential equations (ODEs) 
of real number physics. As demonstrated for QSIM in Section 2.2.5, direct translation 
from ODEs to QDEs is possible. However, this is not the only way to derive 
confluence models - one can develop models specifically for the qualitative domain. 
The world view in De Kleer and Brown's ENVISION program is highly mechanistic. 
Mechanisms are put together from "components" which process "materials" (such as 
fluids electrons, force, mass, etc.) and are connected by "conduits". The task of 
simulation consists of describing how the attributes of materials in the model change 
over time. De Kleer and Brown call this activity "envisioning" the behaviour of the 
mechanism. They also make the observation that attributes often occur in pairs, with 
one a flow-iike variable and the other a pressure-like variable. This shows certain 
parallels with the fluid modelling approach for AutoHAZID described in Section 3.5. 
State dependent behaviour plays a very important role in the ENVISION models. Each 
component may be in one of a number of different states, depending on the values of 
its attributes. A different set of confluence equations applies to the component in each 
of its states, which gives rise to different types of behaviour in simulation. The 
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applicability conditions of the component states are dependent on landmark values of 
certain variables, so that when a landmark value is crossed, the behaviour may change 
significantly. 
Qualitative variables in ENVISION use a standard set of values, {-,O,+}, rather than 
any more complicated scheme, such as Forbus' quantity space idea. Using this 
convention, De Kleer and Brown have developed a large body of arithmetic and 
calculus theory for confluence equations, based on similar results in the analysis of 
real numbers. 
At the start of simulation, the components in the system are all in known states and 
the attributes are all known (in terms of their values and directions of change). At each 
stage of simulation, the constraints applicable to each component are examined, to see 
what possible changes in attributes are possible. In general, many possible changes are 
possible, so that the behaviour of the system may branch at each step of the 
simulation. For each component, the state of the component mayor may not change, 
depending on the constraints in operation. According to De Kleer and Brown, every 
one of the paths in the envisioned behaviour tree should correspond to a consistent 
interpretation of some physical system formally identical to the model being 
simulated. 
De Kleer and Brown address at length the problem of how a qualitative system can be 
made to offer causal analyses of its reasoning. They favour a state transition diagram 
explanation, rather than any form of symbolic "proof' method using manipulation of 
constraint equations. 
The reason for this preference is that variables in constraint equations must change in 
such a way that the confluences themselves are always satisfied. Thus, for the value of 
any variable to change in a confluence, others must also change (simultaneously). This 
removes the notion of cause and effect from this part of the behaviour, as one cannot 
establish a temporal or causal ordering between variable changes within a confluence. 
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The search for a useful way of constructing causal explanations of ENVISION results 
forms a large part of the De Kleer and Brown (1984) paper. It certainly is an important 
problem area for "purists" in QP, who want satisfying explanations of which events 
cause which other events, as well as workable models. The problem of explaining 
behaviour (changes of attribute values) within a single state is particularly difficult, 
and the authors invent a system of "mythical causality" to build candidate orderings of 
attribute changes for this behaviour. 
2.3 Applications of Qualitative Physics in Process Safety 
The most commonly seen. applications of Qualitative Reasoning in Process 
Engineering are in the area of safety for process plants. Usually, a component-based 
modelling system, based around models of individual equipment types, is used. The 
models may use rules of the traditional "IF-THEN" expert system format, or they may 
rely on a graphical formalism to represent causal links between variables. The 
application types most commonly seen in the papers reviewed here are diagnosis of 
faults in operating plants and identification of potential hazards in a plant design. The 
latter type of application most often uses the framework of a HAZOP study as an 
organising structure. 
In a review for the European Process Safety Centre (EPSC) of work being done in 
"Knowledge Based HAZOPs", Rushton (1997) identified a number of groups doing 
work on HAZOP emulation by computer. These were: 
• Dow Benelux, Netherlands [Rootsaert and Harrington (1992)]. 
• Loughborough University, UK [e.g. Parmar and Lees (1987a, 1987b), Zerkani and 
Rushton (1992, 1993), Chung (1993)]. 
• University of Pennsylvania, USA [e.g. Catino et al. (1991), Grantham and 
Ungar (1990)]. 
• Purdue University, USA [e.g. Venkatasubramanian and Vaidhyanathan (1994)]. 
• Seoul National University, Korea [e.g. Chae et al. (I 994)]. 
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• VTI, Technical Research Centre of Finland [e.g. Heino et al. (1994), Suokas et al. 
(1990)]. 
To this list should be added the following groups, active in areas connected with 
qualitative physics and process safety: 
• Taiwan (two groups) [e.g. Chang et al. (1994), Kuo et al. (1997)]. 
• Argentina [e.g. Martinez et al. (\992), Vecchietti and Leone (1996)]. 
• Japan (two groups) [e.g. Iri et al. (1979), Shimada et al. (1993)]. 
Of the above, Pennsylvania are the only group who have taken a process-based 
approach to modelling, concentrating on "phenomena" in a plant. This approach may 
be very powerful in the long run, but suffers from problems of complexity even for 
very simple systems, because of the frequent need to recompile models. 
The other groups have systems which use a component-based "hybrid" approach, 
typically using some Qualitative Physics and some Expert System ideas. 
Discrimination between trivial and significant results seems to he an area where 
problems are often encountered, where a purely qualitative treatment can give 
ambiguous results. 
The following subsections outline some of the work done by the groups mentioned 
above. Attention has been concentrated on hazard identification and the qualitative 
modelling techniques of interest in this area. This means that many papers on fault 
diagnosis, process monitoring, etc. have been omitted from this review. 
2.3.1 Purdue 
The Laboratory for Intelligent Process Systems at Purdue University is led by Venkat 
Venkatasubramanian. This group has made a good deal of progress in recent years in 
developing a tool for emulating HAZOP, known as HAZOPExpert. Because of the 
similarity of this 'system to the work done at Loughborough on AutoHAZID, this 
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section concentrates almost exclusively on HAZOPExpert, although one other area of 
application is mentioned at the end. 
HAZOPExpert uses Gensym's G2 system as a framework for development. G2 
provides an object-oriented shell for development of on-line process-related expert 
systems, supported by a strong Graphical User Interface (GUl). Using this GUI, users 
of HAZOPExpert can easily specify process descriptions to the program as P&IDs (an 
example is shown in Figure 2.6 below, from Srinivasan et ai., 1998). 
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Figure 2.6 : Example P&ID created using HAZOPExpert 
Venkatasubrarnanian and Vaidhyanathan (1994) justify computer emulation of 
HAZOP by reference to the time-saving potential of a tool capable of automating the 
routine parts of the HAZOP analysis. Given that all process plant installations in the 
U.S.A. are now required to formally assess their process hazards at regular intervals, 
the demand for HAZOP studies is bound to increase. 
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A principle which underpins HAZOPExpert is the separation of process specific from 
process generic parts of the knowledge base. I This means that models of equipment 
items and fluids are used which are not dependent on a particular plant and can be 
used in any plant model. The process specific parts of the knowledge base are the 
specifications of what equipment items are present, how they are connected together 
and what fluids are present. Also included are the values of attributes belonging to the 
equipment in the plant model, to specify information about the operation of those 
equipment items. 
The object-oriented system in 02 allows equipment and fluid models (the generic 
process information) to be defined as classes of object, which can be related to other 
classes using inheritance and thereby organised in a hierarchy. Model information also 
includes methods for diagnosing causes of deviations in process variables, for doing 
fault propagation through the plant, and for finding possible consequences of a 
deviation. 
The information stored in HAZOPExpert concerning process fluids consists of simple 
data, such as whether the fluid is flammable, toxic, corrosive, what its physical state 
is, etc. Such information is used in connection with the rest of the plant description to 
provide better information about the hazards identified by the program. This form of 
fluid model system adds to the list of hazards found by the system, rather than acting 
as a filter for ensuring the validity of hazards found (the latter is the approach used in 
the AutoHAZID program developed at Loughborough). 
The first models for HAZOPExpert, described by Venkatasubramanian and 
Vaidhyanathan (1994), used a propagation equation approach for qualitatively relating 
variables te one another. This method has also been used at Loughborough by Parmar 
and Lees (l987a, 1987b) and Hunt et al. (1993), for example. Propagation equations 
can be seen as implementations of the confluences described by De Kleer and Brown 
(1984). In process systems they typically characterise the relevant balance equations 
(heat and mass balances) in the equipment. In papers after 1994, by Vaidhyanathan 
1 The importance of this principle was noted in an carly paper by Venkatasubramanian and Rich (1988). 
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and others (1995, I 996a, 1996b and I 996c), the representation used by Purdue 
changes to the "HAZOP Digraph" (HOG). This is a form of the signed directed graph 
(SDG) representation to which are added further nodes representing faults and 
consequences related to process variable deviations. 
The HDG allows nodes for process variables to take values from the set 
{-, +, Normal, Zero}, which correspond to the variable being lower than intended, 
higher than intended, within the intended range of values, or zero, respectively. This 
compares with the more usual SDG model, where the value set excludes the "Zero" 
value, representing only the values "+" and "-" explicitly (all nodes which are not 
given a value are assumed to be "Normal"). Purdue do not explain how their HOG 
model handles propagation of "Zero" values in the graph. 
The normal mode of use for HAZOPExpert, as described by Vaidhy~nathan and 
Venkatasubramanian (1995), is interactive. A user initiates "HAZOP" of a variable by 
selecting it on the P&ID and giving it a deviated value (High, Low or Zero), after 
which the computer performs a search in the HOG and produces results on the P&ID 
and in a separate window. The program searches in an upstream direction for causes 
of the deviation and in a downstream dircction for adverse consequences. Because 
causes may not be downstream and consequences may not be upstream in the plant, 
HAZOPExpert has problems if there are recycles in the plant model, and will fail to 
identify scenarios where propagation of effects occurs in an upstream direction. 
Recycles are examples of feedback in the plant model. Feedback occurs in a physical 
system wherever a physical variable, such as a flow, has an effect on other variables in 
the system, such that a part of the original change is propagated back to .influence that 
variable itself. Feedback may arise due to control loops in the plant, which give rise to 
a link via feedback of information, or due to material recycle in the plant, or due to 
any number of physical phenomena which tend to remain in a stable state if not 
disturbed. 
Feedback mechanisms give rise to cyclical paths in the graph, if the components of the 
loop are modelled individually. Handling and interpreting cycles as they are found by 
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search is a significant problem in qualitative simulations generally. In HAZOPExpert, 
control loops are treated as "subsystem" components (described below), but any other 
paths found in the HDG which contain cycles are ignored. Ignoring causal feedback in 
this way is rationalised by Vaidhyanathan and Venkatasubrarnanian (1995) using the 
rule that "an effect cannot compensate for its own cause", from Oyeleye and Kramer 
(1988). 
The approach used by Oyeleye and Kramer (1988) is to ignore transient effects and 
other dynamic features of a plant, modelling only the steady state behaviour of the 
system. This allows them to make the above simplifying assumption about the 
behaviour of causal feedback, and it probably reduces the complexity of simulations 
considerably. However, it does not seem to be appropriate for any attempt to model 
non-steady behaviour of the plant in, for example, hazard scenarios. 
The problems presented by control loops when tracing influences through SOG 
models have been discussed by (among others) Kramer and Palowitch (1987) and 
Mohindra and Clark (1993). One of these problems is illustrated in Figure 2.7, where 
a level control loop controls the level in a tank, through which a liquid is passing. 
Figure 2.7: A level control problem 
The response of the control loop to a change of inlet flow, Qin , is to reguiate the outlet 
flow, in order to maintain the level in the tank at a constant setpoint. Therefore, any 
deviation in Qin will cause a deviation in Qout due to the action of the controller, but 
the level~ Lliq will remain (practically) the same, provided the disturbance in Qin is not 
too large. The question is how to model this homeostatic effect using the SOG, where 
influences must propagate via deviated variables. Any SOG model which causally 
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links Qin to QOUI via Ltiq must deal with the fact that the (steady-state) liquid level does 
not change and cannot therefore have a deviated value. 
Another problem is that of finding the effects of failures within the control loop itself, 
such as component malfunction or loop saturation. In these cases, the controlled 
variable belonging to the malfunctioning/saturated loop may not remain nonnal, while 
other loops in the plant may remain steady. 
In HAZOPExpert, every variable node in the HDG is marked with an attribute stating 
whether it is controlled or not (see Vaidhyanathan and Venkatasubramanian, 1995). 
The attribute is set up by HAZOPExpert when it examines the plant for control loops. 
Additional causes of deviations in controlled variables are added to take account of 
failure of components in the loop, or control loop saturation. 
The action of the control loop (direct/reverse) is encoded in an arc linking the 
measured variable to the manipulated flow by a single HDG arc and a "valve opening" 
node, connected to the outlet flow of the relevant control valve. Figure 2.8 shows how 
this is done for the level control example. In addition, propagation of deviations 
through the controlled variable is pennitted without changing the node from its usual 
"Normal" value. Vaidhyanathan and Venkatasubramanian do not explain how this is 
done. 
Figure 2.8: SnG feedback loop for level control example 
Most recently, Purdue have started to incorporate semi-quantitative information about 
the process into the rules governing the inference in the system, in order to eliminate 
unrealistic scenarios and rank the results produced (Vaidhyanathan and 
Venkatasubramanian, 1996b, I 996c, Srinivasan et at. 1997, 1998). The quantities 
used include design specifications (operating and design temperatures and pressures) 
and fluid properties (autoignition temperature, boiling point temperature). These 
69 
properties are integrated into the HDG model of the process and are used to make 
order of magnitude estimates of whether identified hazards are likely to occur. If loss 
of containment is identified, for instance, the operating temperature of the unit is 
compared to the (ambient pressure) boiling point of the fluid (both are stored as single 
fields in the frame data for the unit). If this temperature is exceeded by a certain 
(fixed) margin, then the hazard of flashing release is indicated. There is also some 
order of magnitude reasoning in the treatment of qualitative ambiguity in equipment 
involving flow splits, based on the relative sizes of the normal flows through the 
branches of the tee piece. 
The work presented by Srinivasan et al. (1997 and 1998) uses a quantitative method 
developed by one of the authors, Dimitriadis, (including "mixed integer linear 
programme optimisation") to evaluate a small number of chosen scenarios for 
credibility. The example, given relate to evaluating the time required to overfill a 
surge drum or the base of a stripping column, based on the mass balance and likely 
flowrates into or out of these equipment. By considering the time taken for a fault to 
cause a problem, the importance of the scenario can be evaluated and problems of low 
importance can be screened out. Additionally, this sort of method may reduce the 
number of ambiguous predictions made by the system. 
It is interesting to note that, in all their work on model-based HAZOP emulation, 
Purdue view the situation as one where process generic (model based) knowledge 
interacts with process specific knowledge. The view at Loughborough has usually 
been that unit models are instantiated by being used in a plant description, so that the 
plant model used for simulation is an essentially separate entity from the equipment 
models, which are kept in a library. Another difference is that, while we at 
Loughborough have organised equipment models into a hierarchy of types, placing 
similar models close together in the tree, Purdue have not made so much use of this 
sort of structure with the smaller number of models they have developed. 
The whole approach to semi-quantitative reasoning in the Purdue papers is quite 
simplistic and seems to be based on a small number of ad hoc rules about hazards. It is 
questionable whether the reasoning methods used are sound enough to reject many of 
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the hazards they do reject. By use of just these simple rules, Purdue claim that they 
halve the size of the results file for their case study plant. 
Other work of interest at Purdue includes that of Srini vasan and Venkatasubramanian 
(1996). They describe a combination of digraphs and Petri nets, used to model batch 
processes, and to tackle the mixed continuous and discrete nature of such processes. A 
batch process consists of a network of tasks comprising the product "recipe", 
represented as a Petri net. The sequence of tasks need not be entirely linear, as some 
tasks can be performed in separate equipment concurrently. Each task in the recipe 
consists of a linear sequence of subtasks. 
Within each subtask, the dependencies between variables are represented as a digraph, 
with additional nodes for quantities such as "amount of masslheatltime". These nodes 
are referred to as "integral quantities", because they generally change over time as the 
subtask progresses. The digraphs for adjacent subtasks may be connected through 
these nodes, allowing disturbances to be propagated through the different subtasks in 
the task. The aim of this approach is to capture the different behaviours of equipment 
items as their uses are changed throughout the batch. 
2.3.2 Dow Benelux 
The program developed by Dow is known as COMHAZOP (Rootsaert and 
Harrington, 1992). It is a rule based expert system for HAZOP emulation which 
produces RAZOP output tables and also makes recommendations for solving the 
problems it finds. 
From the limited information available, it is clear that Dow have recognised the 
importance of separating the generic knowledge base of information on equipment 
types, hazards and recommendations, from the description of the plant and its 
configuration. This separation is analogous to the use, in AutoHAZID, of a library of 
equipment models and a plant description file. 
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2.3.3 Loughborough 
The Plant Engineering Group at Loughborough University has been working in safety 
and fault propagation since the early 1970's. Applications of fault propagation 
investigated during this time include alarm analysis, fault tree synthesis, on-line 
process diagnosis and hazard identification (typically by emulation of HAZOP). 
Andow and Lees (1974 and 1975) describe some early work on the design and 
organisation of alarm systems. Human factors are often not considered sufficiently in 
designing alarm annunciator panels or computer displays. In particular, if too many 
alarms operate simultaneously when a process upset occurs, operators can be unable 
to identify the true cause of the upset and take appropriate action. Andow and Lees 
(1975) outline a program used to group process variables together into networks, so 
that alarms can be assigned to the variables of most use in identifying the root cause 
of an upset. In this work, cause and effect variables are related to one another using 
qualitative "functional equations" (or "propagation equations"), similar to the 
confluence equations described by De Kleer and Brown (1984). 
Later, Lees (1984) considers on-line fault diagnosis and analysis of alarms. Two 
approaches to automatic generation of data structures, suitable for producing fault 
trees in response to alarm events, are considered. One uses the functional equations 
and alarm networks of Andow and Lees (I975). The other uses mini-fault trees for 
each process variable as components for on-line construction of fault trees. Included 
are many ideas stilI used in fault propagation modelling, in terms of the pattern of 
fault initiation followed by propagation of deviations and termination in significant 
·final events. The problems recognised here are also still relevant to current work in 
fault propagation modelline. Some of these- are: 
• The problem of ambiguity in qualitative models. 
• In fault trees, much useful information about the time ordering of events is lost. 
Such information can help diagnose the causes of alarm sequences, particularly in 
batch plant operation. 
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• Building models is laborious, so a library of reusable models is collected, and 
methods for systematic conversion of models from one form to another are 
investigated. 
• Models containing just propagation are not much good. Some initiating faults and 
final consequences must be present, to produce interesting results. 
• AND logic is hard to model in mini-fault trees or functional equations. 
• Fault propagation must go upstream as well as downstream. 
• Instrument failures and control system failures complicate the analysis of 
disturbances. Instrument reliability is a worry for the operator in interpreting plant 
disturbances and instrument failure is a possible root cause of deviations on plant. 
Fault tree synthesis has been a significant area of work at Loughborough in the past, 
culminating in the development of the FAULTFlNDER program, described by Hunt 
et at. (1993). Kelly and Lees (1986) built on some early work by Martin-Solis et at. 
(1977), producing a fault tree synthesis system based on a component-based 
equipment modelling system and fault propagation modelling. In a plant model, 
several units (equipment items) are connected together. Each unit is described by a 
model taken from a library of commonly used unit types. 
Initiation of faults is represented by event statements, propagation of deviations by 
propagation equations, and undesired consequences are modelled by event models. 
Each unit model may contain any of these types of entities, as well as decision tables, 
used for relationships which cannot be covered by the propagation equations, such as 
AND logic. Fault tree construction proceeds by converting (automatically) all the 
relevant parts of the unit models into mini-fault trees, which are then combined to 
construct the fault tree for the chosen top event. 
This fault tree synthesis system was further developed by Hunt et at. (1993). In 
FAULTFINDER, decision tables for modelling AND logic were used far more, 
particularly for problems like reverse flow, etc. Hunt also investigated automatic 
construction of customised vessel models, where a small amount of information about 
the inputs and outputs of a vessel is used to classify the connections between units 
into one of a number of types. The connection type determines the flow and pressure 
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relationships appropriate for the associated ports. This work is of interest because a 
tool was developed for creating new vessel models in the AutoHAZID system. 
As an interesting alternative to unit modelling, Shafaghi et aL (1984) systematically 
constructed fault trees based on the control loops in a process, by connecting together 
sub-trees encapsulating the failure modes of loops. The aim is to produce better 
structured fault trees which are easier to understand than those produced by a unit 
modelling approach. However, automatic construction of the plant model may pose 
significant problems for this method. 
Hazard identification is the .problem tackled by Parrnar and Lees (I 987a). They 
describe an early system which uses fault propagation to emulate HAZOP, by finding 
causes and consequences for plausible deviations in the plant. The plant model is 
decomposed quite coarsely into units which correspond to control loops, large items 
such as storage tanks, etc. Propagation equations and event statements are used in 
models, but are converted to a rule format for fault propagation. Consequence models 
can be conditional on properties of process materials or materials of construction, and 
there are models for each type of material in the system to support this. During fault 
propagation, checks on these properties are used to search for "specific realisations" 
of hazards in the plant. Parrnar and Lees see fault propagation as only one part of the 
hazard identification solution and suggest that their system could be deployed as part 
of a larger expert system for hazard identification. 
In the case study described by Parrnar and Lees (1987b), which is the water separator 
example also used by Law ley (\ 974), the authors show how their program can be used 
to produce HAZOP-like results. The results are compared to those reported by 
Law!cy. They also point out that their program is not able to consider consequences 
which occur outside the line which the program is examining, meaning that forward 
fault propagation is limited to components within the line under examination. 
Zerkani and Rushton (1992 and 1993) present a hazard identification package for 
HAZOP emulation developed in Poplog. It uses a unit model library in combination 
with a plant description file to build a process model which is used in backwards 
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chaining search to find cause-consequence pairs. Backwards, rather than forwards 
chaining search is used, as this makes it easier to filter consequences for significance. 
Each model is a member of an inheritance hierarchy and contains information about 
process variable deviations, their causes and consequences, and functional equations 
governing the propagation of deviations. More detailed items of equipment are 
modelled than in Parmar and Lees (l987a). Zerkani and Rushton recognise that a 
major problem with acceptability of such systems is that of automating plant data 
input, through an interface to an existing CAD system. 
Chung (\ 993) developed the "Qualitative Effects Engine" (QUEEN) as a generic 
tool kit for modelling causal influences in process plants using signed directed graph 
(SOG) models. QUEEN has been the basis for all further development of hazard 
identification at Loughborough, including AutoHAZID. Chung presents QUEEN as 
the core of a number of systems, performing tasks such as fault tree synthesis, alarm 
analysis, hazard identification, etc. It uses a frame-based unit modelling system in 
which each equipment item is modelled by a mini-SOG. QUEEN constructs the SOG 
model of the whole plant from the models used and the connections between them. 
lefferson et at. (1995) describe a program known as CHEQUER (Computer HAZOP 
Emulation using Qualitative Effects Reasoning), which was developed from the 
QUEEN utilities described by Chung. After 1efferson's work on HAZOP emulation, 
the STOPHAZ project further developed QUEEN and the HAZOP algorithm, 
converting them to C++ and produCing the tool now known as AutoHAZID. This 
program is described in some detail in the following chapters, and elsewhere by 
Larkin et at. (\ 997) and Wakeman et at. (1997). 
2.3.4 Pennsylvania 
The modelling approach used at Pennsylvania is of particular interest because it is 
based around the Qualitative Process Theory (QPT) ideas of Forbus (1984). No other 
group reviewed here has taken a process-centred approach to plant modelling. The 
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authors claim that this approach avoids some of the difficulties in terms of 
completeness and correctness encountered in component-based modelling? 
As described by, for example, Catino et al. (1991), typical input is a structural model 
of the plant, describing the objects in it. The model system includes the concept of 
different "zones" in complex equipment, and a classification of equipment items into 
"homogeneous" (i.e. well-mixed), "plug flow" and "stream pair". The structural 
model is matched to models of processes and views stored in a library, to produce a 
process-centred description of the plant. The process model can be used to compile a 
set of constraints between qualitative variables, which are then used to determine the 
state of the plant and its possible behaviours. The constraints generated can be 
expressed either as SDG models or as QSIM constraint sets. 
One major strength of the approach taken by Pennsylvania is that the process models 
are produced automatically, so that they can be changed by the program at run-time 
and therefore used to model the plant in various different states, rather than relying on 
a single model of the "healthy" plant. This capability may give advantages in 
diagnostic ability, but comes at the price of increased computational complexity, so 
that the solution of anything other than trivial problems can be intractable. 
The approach usually taken therefore, is to tackle small plant subsystems in detail and 
to offer detailed explanations of faults, rather than attempting to model large plant 
sections with many interconnected component units. The authors acknowledge that 
the component-based modelling techniques investigated elsewhere are more suited to 
the latter class of problem than their own method. 
GraDlham and Ungar (1990) considerthe problem of fault diagnosis as that of finding 
sets of assumptions in the plant model which give rise to discrepancies between 
simulated behaviour and that of the plant itself. A generate and test method is used, 
where heuristic knowledge is used to select additions or removals of processes from 
2 It seems that this claim rests on the ability of the system to automatically rebuild constraint models 
and to model state changes in the plant. 
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the model, to account for the observed differences. After the model is changed, the 
process model is rebuilt automatically, its behaviour is simulated and compared to the 
plant behaviour, to evaluate how successful the changes made are in explaining the 
discrepancies observed. The methods used for comparison are discussed by Grantham 
and Ungar (1991). 
Complexity of qualitative simulations is a particular problem with the Pennsylvania 
model system. Catino et al. (1991) discuss some techniques for focusing the 
examination of simulation results on more interesting possibilities first. These 
focusing techniques concentrate on reducing the number of variables in models, 
limiting attention to only one vessel in the system, or adding further constraints to the 
system to produce only steady state behaviours, for example. 
The "Qualitative Hazard Identifier" (QHI), described by Catino and Ungar (1995), 
exhaustively tests all possible instances in a plant of a small number of fault types. 
The applicability of faults in this library is governed by a set of rules, which typically 
dictate the appropriate equipment where the fault can occur. The consequences of 
each specific fault are simulated to see if any hazards arise. The procedure is therefore 
more similar to FMEA than to HAZOP. 
The structural plant model used in QHI includes not only the equipment itt:ms present 
and connections between them, but also fluids present and assumptions about the 
operating conditions of equipment. The process-based model constructed from this 
structural model is converted into QSIM constraints for simulating plant behaviour, 
and the results of QSIM simulation are examined to identify resulting hazards. 
Faults can either <::ause a perturhation in some variahle, or they can cause some of the 
assumptions, upon which the current process-based model rests, to be changed. In the 
former case, simulation of a single model will accurately predict the behaviour of the 
system. However, if some assumptions have been changed, the process model must be 
reconstructed, converted to QSIM and simulated, to determine the correct behaviour 
of the plant. 
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Because of the frequent rebuilding of process models, computational complexity is a 
big problem for QID. However, this approach does have a theoretical advantage over 
less rigorous systems, in that it simulates fault propagation in a model of the process 
which accurately describes the faulty condition. 
Two simplifying assumptions are used by Catino and Ungar (1995) to reduce 
problems with interpreting the results of QSIM simulations. The first is the "perfect 
controller" assumption, where transients associated with controlled variables are 
ignored, and control is considered to operate instantaneously. The second assumption 
is the "pseudo-steady state" assumption, which ignores all transients in the plant, so 
that the results of simulation show only transitions between steady states of the plant. 
Despite the complexity and ambiguity problems, the fundamental modelling approach 
by Catino and Ungar (1995) is sound. To get a workable system, however, it seems 
likely that some compromises must be made in the modelling and simulation system. 
Vinson and Ungar (1992 and 1995) concentrate on on-line process monitoring for 
fault diagnosis. The "Qualitative Modelling and Interpretation" (QMI) system, takes 
noisy plant data and interprets it in comparison to qualitative models of expected 
process performance in different states. By finding the model which matches the 
observed qualitative state of the plant, faults are diagnosed. 
Qualitative models are prepared using off-line QSIM simulation and organised into a 
tree of system states, each describing the qualitative value of all parameters in the 
plant. Possible transitions between states correspond to the occurrence of a fault or its 
development in the plant. Comparing the current state of the plant (extracted from 
suitably conoitioned sensor data) with the states in thl! tree. the system can tell what 
fault has occurred in the plant. 
The Qmimic system, compared to QMI by Vinson and Ungar (1995), uses seml-
quantitative information to rule out some predictions. It uses an updated version of the 
QSIM simulator to handle the numerical information. An on-line, incremental 
simulator updates thc simulation of the plant one step at a time. This simulation 
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provides candidate model states against which the sensor data are compared. Raw 
sensor data are preconditioned using a statistical method, Student's t-test. 
2.3.5 Seoul 
Yoon et al. (1992) concentrate on the knowledge structures needed by expert systems 
for on-line fault diagnosis. Two representations are considered: symptom trees and 
fault-consequence digraphs (FCDs). Symptom trees are similar to fault trees, 
representing the conditions which must be satisfied for a deviation in a measured 
process variable to occur. A symptom tree is produced from a library of mini-trees 
relating to equipment items. in the plant, and used to suggest causes of observed 
deviations. The fault-consequence digraph (FCD) represents the fault propagation 
which occurs in the plant. It can be produced either by analysis of results from 
numerical plant simulation, or from qualitative simulation results (e.g. using QSIM). 
Nam et al. (I996a, 1996b) use the G2 system, in combination with SDG models, for 
on-line fault diagnosis. Sets of "symptom-fault associations" (SFAs) are produced by 
off-line search of the plant SDG model. Each SFA associates a variable deviation with 
the faults which cause that symptom. Diagnosis consists of finding a set of faults 
which could cause the observed symptoms in the plant. Nam et at. (\996a) 
concentrates on producing SFAs, while Nam et at. (l996b) presents two case studies 
in which these symptom-fault associations are useu. 
In the first case study described by Nam et at. (I 996b), complexity is tackled by 
decomposing the whole plant into a number of semi-independent subsystems. These 
are typically sections of plant separated by large capacity buffer tanks, or sections 
which can he shut down \'lithout affecting normal operation of the remainder of the 
process. 
The second case study in Nam et at. (l996b) uses a model called the "reduced cause 
effect digraph" (RCED), which is an SDG model in which all nodes corresponding to 
unmeasured variables are excluded. Additional arcs are added to the digraph to make 
up for the causal links which are broken by removing these nodes. The ReED is used 
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in conjunction with the "Pattern Graph Through Time" (PGTT) method to do fault 
diagnosis on an unsteady process. The PGTT is a time series of RCED graphs and 
diagnosis consists of finding the root nodes of the PGTT which account for the 
observed phenomena. 
Chae et al. (1994) describe an interactive knowledge based expert system for hazard 
identification, which investigates causes and consequences of variable deviations 
chosen by the user. The user decides the decomposition of the plant into "study 
nodes" for HAZOP, producing a small number of "vessels" and "transport lines". 
Generic knowledge about process units and fluids is organised in a hierarchical way, 
using inheritance, but there does not appear to be any way to connect process units 
together in the plant. Without this connectivity information, the scope for identifying 
hazards, by connecting causes and consequences with fault propagation chains 
through the plant, must be very limited. 
The fluid information used includes National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 
indices for various classes of hazard, used to evaluate the severity of consequences in 
the plant. The number of equipment types used in this prototype is small (seven), but 
the range of causes and consequences modelled appears very similar to the most 
commonly modelled events in systems developed by other groups (blockages, leaks, 
fires, toxic releases, etc.). 
Chae et at. (1994) include a system of rules for reasoning about the consequences of 
certain scenarios, so that initial events can cause intermediate consequences which 
may go on to produce final consequences. This is a more complex approach than is 
generally used. 
Suh et al. (l997a, 1997b, 1997c) also work on an interactive rule based expert system 
approach to hazard identification. They argue that many workers do not use a 
particularly strong representation for modelling ac~nt scenarios. Suh et al. therefore 
introduce a system which uses three databases to re:\sent the plant data model: the 
unit, organisational and materials databases. Three alg~ithms are used to manipulate 
this data, covering analysis of deviations, malfunctions a~d accidents as a whole. 
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The STARS project is mentioned in a paper by Heino et al. (1992) which also 
presents a short review of expert systems applications in the field of process safety 
analysis. STARS is a software system operating on multiple levels of process design, 
to provide a supportive integrated environment for process engineers to do hazard 
identification and analysis on a plant design, using a number of knowledge bases. It is 
not a HAZOP emulator, but provides stimulus for hazard identification through guide 
word prompts, checklists, knowledge of equipment failure modes and access to 
previously examined analyses. 
The KRM project, described by Heino et al. (1994), used an object-oriented model of 
a chemical process to support the provision of safety information to various user 
groups associated with the plant. The two main areas discussed were safety analysis 
during the design of a plant, and making knowledge from safety analysis available to 
operating personnel for troubleshooting and diagnosis during operation. The issue of 
knowledge-based HAZOP was not addressed in this project, and KRM can be seen 
more as an integrated framework for organising and communicating the knowledge 
required for safe operation of a plant in a useful way. 
HAZOPTOOL, described by Heino et al. (1995), is an integration of some of the 
previous ideas from VTT, including KRM, STARS and HAZOPEX. It was developed 
in conjunction with a Taiwanese engineering company, CTCI. The same sort of 
object-oriented plant modelling is used as in HAZOPEX, but this system also uses 
mUltiple knowledge bases corresponding to chemical properties and reactions, as well 
as those for causes and consequences. The tool is used interactively, displaying the 
causes of chosen deviations in a tree format and displaying related consequences as 
lists. Other aspects of safety analysis can also be addressed within HAZOPTOOL, 
such as conventional RAZOP documentation and checklist management, in addition 
to the knowledge-based HAZOP system. 
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2.3.7 Taiwan 
There are two groups working on qualitative reasoning for process industry 
applications in Taiwan. 
The group at the National Taiwan Institute of Technology seem to be concentrating on 
improving resolution in fault diagnosis. Yu and Lee (1991) concentrate on using the 
fuzzy set membership function in conjunction with qualitative SDG models. Chang 
et al. (1994) present an approach based on equation-based models of the process 
system, called the "deep model algorithm". 
The group at the National Cheng Kung University present a method for fault tree 
synthesis based on the structure of complex ratio control schemes, in a paper by 
Chang and Hwang (1994). This does not appear to have been implemented in a 
computer program, but does use an SDG modelling approach. Digraphs are also used 
in the system known as IHAS ("Integrated Hazard Analysis System"), described by 
Kuo et al. (1997), which attempts to emulate HAZOP by applying programs for fault 
tree and event tree analysis to cause and consequence investigation, respectively. 
IHAS makes use of plant topology and a database of digraph models to construct the 
internal plant model, and it presents its results in the form of a HAZOP table, 
including recommended actions generated by a simple rule system. 
2.3.8 Argentina 
Martinez et al. (1992) describe the development of a real-time, on-line expert system 
(containing about 70 inputs and 90 rules) for monitoring an extraction unit comprised 
ef two columns in a butadiene plant Of interest here is the way that. during the 
knowledge elicitation phase, HAZOP and FMEA techniques were used to provoke 
more detailed thinking from experts in order to "flesh out" the reasoning behind 
relatively shallow heuristic rules. 
In papers by Leone (1996) and Vecchietti and Leone (1996), a system known as 
SERO is described, which is a HAZOP emulator using a high level, object·oriented 
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representation language to model fault propagation. SOGs represent influences 
between variables and HAZOP emulation seems to rely on local fault propagation at 
the interfaces between objects, using message passing. This "distributed" method can 
be contrasted with the more common approach of compiling a plant SOG from a plant 
model and then searching it using a global HAZOP algorithm. 
2.3.9 Japan 
There are a number of research groups working in Japan on problems related to 
knowledge based safety analysis, fault diagnosis and control. Just two are mentioned 
here: the group associated with Iri, 0' Shima and Matsuyama, and the group associated 
with Shimada, Suzuki and Sayama. 
In a frequently cited paper, Iri et al. (1979) describe the SOG-based modelling of 
chemical processes for fault diagnosis. The state of the plant is seen as a pattern of 
variable disturbances across the SOG model, and non-deviated variables are of no 
interest. The problem of finding a cause for the observed deviations in the plant is 
simplified by the assumption that there is only one root cause for the deviations, and 
characterised as the search for a "maximal strongly connected" node in the graph. 
lri et al. recognise the problem presented by controlled variables which may 
themselves remain normal while propagating a deviated value to other variables 
around them. The "trick" of using two extra qualitative values to represent controlled 
variables which remain normal, but would be deviated in a certain direction if they 
were not controlled, is introduced in this paper. Some improvements to the basic 
algorithm presented by Iri et aI., in terms of enhanced diagnostic and computational 
efficiency, are discussed by Shiozaki et al. (1985). 
In work from another group, Shimada et al. (1993) describe a computer system which 
uses information from fault tree analysis to build IF-THEN rules for use in a rule-
based expert system for fault diagnosis. Later work by Shimada et al. (1996) moves 
on to the operability study as an application, and the authors present a knowledge-
based system in Prolog for performing a type of HAZOP study. This system contains 
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both process-specific and genenc knowledge bases, and uses decision tables for 
expressing causal relationships in the plant. The user interface is interactive, with the 
user providing details of the deviation to be examined and the system reporting causes 
and consequences for that deviation in a tabu lar format. 
2.4 Summary 
This chapter has given a review of some of the work being done in the area of process 
safety and the automation of hazard identification. Firstly, an overview of 
conventional methods used for process hazard identification was given, in Section 2.1. 
Section 2.2 introduced the field of qualitative physics research, which seeks out 
methods for modelling the world qualitatively, instead of using numbers and 
equations. Ideas from qualitative physics have been used by the research groups 
whose work is described in Section 2.3. This work co"ers attempts to automate hazard 
identification as well as fault diagnosis, using qualitative model-based reasoning to 
simulate plant behaviour. 
Most of the research groups mentioned in Section 2.3 have looked at more than one 
possible application (from process monitoring, HAZOP, fault diagnosis, simulation, 
etc.), and many have tried a number of different modelling techniques. The most 
common areas of application have been HAZOP emulation and fault diagnosis, 
mostly using a graph-based model system. 
One notable exception to this choice 'of modelling system is Pennsylvania, who have 
concentrated on a process-based system for modelling the phenomena in a plant, 
combined with QSIM simulation to predict the changes in process variables. The 
process-based system has certain theoretical advantages, not least that it allows the 
state-dependent behaviour of the plant to be taken into account. However, 
Pennsylvania have encountered intractable problems of computational complexity, 
because of qualitative ambiguity. These problems have limited their programs to 
tackling "toy" case study plants. 
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The HAZOPExpert program developed by Purdue aims to emulate HAZOP and uses a 
SOO-based model system. In terms of development, it is the system closest to 
Loughborough's AutoHAZID system (described later). It benefits from the graphical 
user interface of the 02 expert system shell, which allows the same environment to be 
used for developing SOO models and plant description P&IDs. However, the range of 
equipment modelled does not appear to be as wide as that attempted in AutoHAZID, 
and the HAZOP results presented in papers from Purdue suggest that they have not 
attempted to model a very wide range of failure modes. 
In common with Loughborough, Purdue have recognised that quantitative information 
is needed to improve the focus of HAZOP results and reduce the number of spuriously 
reported hazards. Their approach to the problem uses a linear programming method 
based on a quantitative dynamic model of the relevant process units, and relies on 
optimisation to determine whether scenarios predicted by SOO search are realistic 
(Sriniv~san et aI., 1998). The fluid modelling system in AutoHAZID, as described in 
Chapter 5, adds quantitative conditions to the SOO arcs in order to validate fault paths 
found by graph search. It seems that the latter approach involves much less numerical 
computation than the method used in HAZOPExpert, and so may be more efficient. 
It is clear that no group has yet succeeded in developing a fully rigorous qualitative 
treatment of process hazards. Problem areas include modelling the behaviour of plant 
items in different states, dealing with the sometimes complex logic underlying 
scenario development, and reasoning with sequences of events in time. There is no 
reason why these problems should' not eventually be solved, once the somewhat 
simpler problem of modelling continuous plant has been solved. 
There remain quite a few methods mentioned ip. Section 2.1 which can be considered 
for automation. One example is sneak analysis, which could be integrated into 
AutoHAZID as a preliminary task - the plant model would be examined, before 
HAZOP, looking for and reporting sources and destinations of sneak flows. Another 
possibility is to add further models or rules to an existing hazard identifier system, 
such as AutoHAZID, to cover computer HAZOP and/or human error analysis. 
Management of the plant-specific safety data and generic expertise used in safety 
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assessment, is another important area. The work reported in Heino et a/. (1994), 
which integrates diverse information resources for common access throughout an 
organisation, is of particular interest here. 
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Chapter 3 : Description of AutoHAZID and its 
Qualitative Modelling System 
The HAZID software package was developed for automated hazard identification as 
part of the STOPHAZ project. Its central module is AutoHAZID, a program 
developed mostly at Loughborough University, which coordinates the HAZOP 
emulation that HAZID does. 
This chapter first outlines the intended purpose and scope of the HAZID tool. Then 
the modules of HAZID and the internal modules within AutoHAZID are described. 
The main part of the chapter describes the qualitative modelling system used by 
AutoHAZID in modelling plant behaviour. A methodology for model development is 
described by reference to an example problem - that of modelling flow and pressure 
propagation. Finally, some conclusions are drawn from the material covered. 
3.1 Scope of the HAZID Packaae 
It is intended that AutoHAZID emulate the hazard identification activities of HAZOP, 
to save some of the time spent by conventional HAZOP teams. Qualitative simulation, 
using SOG models, is used to find causes and consequences of variable deviations, 
corresponding to characteristic failure modes of equipment and possible resulting 
hazards on the plant. An option is also available, to identify items of equipment in the 
plant (such as trips, alarms, etc.) which will protect against the identified hazards. 
The range of things detected in conventional HAZOP studies depends on how much 
previous scrutiny the plant design has been subjected to. Many problems are most 
cost-effectively detected by simple use of checklists by a single engineer, but are often 
found at the HAZOP stage. The best use of group time is made by considering 
previously unexamined combinations of equipment failures and susceptibilities, using 
the HAZOP guide word method to detect possible hazardous scenarios. 
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AutoHAZID does not attempt to deal with checklists of concerns relevant to single 
items of equipment. It also does not seek to check the correctness of equipment 
designs, except by detecting a small number of errors related to the configuration of 
equipment. Instead, the approach used in AutoHAZID is to search for links between 
faults and consequences in a qualitative model of the plant, by constructing fault 
propagation chains. I 
Some of the other scope limitations, applying to the type of HAZOP emulation 
attempted by AutoHAZID program, are listed below: 
• The usual emphasis is on predicting the behaviour of a continuous plant during 
normal operation, where only single faults occur. 
• As originally defined, HAZOP examines all deviations from intended operation, 
which covers a quite wide variety of guide words and considerations. AutoHAZID 
only addresses the hazards which can be modelled in terms of the effect they have 
in causing deviations in process variables. To widen the scope, AutoHAZID 
would have to model the design intent of equipment, as well as the influences 
between variables. 
• Time is not represented in the AutoHAZID models, except in so far as the causes 
represented in SDO arcs must precede their consequences. It is therefore difficult 
to reason about sequences of events (temporal ordering), duration and relative 
speeds of changes, etc. An example of the type of problem here is where a leak of 
fluid out of the process can result in a (later) leak of material into the plant. 
• Transitions between states of equipment items, or of the plant as a whole, are not 
modelled. Because AutoHAZID uses only one SDO model for each equipment 
item, any serious attempt to model batch or semi-batch processes in detail, is 
limited. AutoHAZID allows models to be instantiated in particular states, by "sub-
typing" them, but does not allow the state to change during analysis. Specifically, 
1 The creation of an environment for integrating and systematically applying software components for 
hazard identification and risk assessment would be a worthwhile project, but was not an objective of 
STOPHAZ. The AutoHAZID plant models contain the information needed, but the necessary number 
of rules and checks is too large to make a system like AutoHAZID practical for this sort of application. 
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AutoHAZID does not model changes in the behaviour of equipment items when 
those items have failed. 
• Complex fault trees or event trees, involving logic and (potentially) probabilities 
cannot be directly modelled in the SDG-based system. This is usually not a 
problem for hazard identification, where enabling conditions for faults can be 
assumed to be satisfied. Complex logic is more closely associated with risk 
assessment than with hazard identification. 
Some of the above limitations are further discussed in Chapter 6, where possible 
future improvements to AutoHAZID are considered. 
3.2 Description of the HAZIO Software Package 
HAZID was intended for delivery in a Windows 95 or Windows NT environment. A 
UNIX version of the AutoHAZID program exists, but this is not able to take 
advantage of the links to the other modules present in the Windows version. 
The various HAZID modules are linked together as illustrated in Figure 3.1. The 
modules were developed by a number of partners in STOPHAZ. This section explains 
briefly the connections between the HAZID modules shown, as well as the internal 
modules within AutoHAZID. 
As shown in Figure 3.1, AutoHAZID has a parser, which allows it to read in data from 
library files and plant description files. It also links to two other modules in the 
STOPHAZ software package, the Database "Applications Programming Interface" 
(API) and the Physical Property Calculation packages. These links are described in 
Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 below, and an overview of the information flows in HAZID is 
shown in Figure 3.2. 
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AutoHAZID Program 
Figure 3.1 : Schematic Diagram of HAZID Architecture 
Graphical 
Tool 
Plant Des:::ription 
File 
API 
Plant Model 
Figure 3.2 : Information Flow in HAZID 
The intended mode of use for HAZID is as follows: after starting the program, the 
user chooses a plant description to examine. This plant description is loaded into 
AutoHAZID, either from a text file, or from the Database API. Then, the user selects 
91 
filtering options for HAZOP and initiates the HAZOP emulation stage, which 
executes without further user intervention. Output is produced in an ASCII text file, in 
tabular form, with columns for deviation, cause, consequence and (if selected) 
protections, for each hazardous scenario identified. The start-up procedure and various 
menu options available in AutoHAZID are described in Appendix A, which also 
includes (in Section A.8) a sample of the type of output report produced by HAZOP 
emulation. 
The units in AutoHAZID which are treated as potential protections against hazardous 
scenarios are: alarms, indicators, relief valves (including emergency vent manholes), 
check (non-return) valves and control valves. When the option to detect protections is 
enabled during HAZOP, the program looks for any such equipment which respond to 
the deviations in the fault paths identified by the program. It reports these protective 
equipment items in the "protections" column of the HAZOP report table. 
3.2.1 Plant Descriptions from Database API and Graphical Tool 
Plant descriptions can be prepared in the form of graphical ELDs, using the HAZID 
Graphical Tool (developed by TXT). This is an alternative to laboriously keying in a 
text file containing the description of the plant. 
The plant descriptions produced by the Graphical Tool are stored in a database. 
Access to the database from the Graphical Tool is mediated by the library of functions 
known as the Database API. The API was implemented by Intrasoft in the STOPHAZ 
project. AutoHAZID has access to this API and can retrieve the plant descriptions 
from the database using the same set of functions. 
AutoHAZID first reads all information on a plant of interest, through the API. It then 
writes a text file containing this information, in the same format as a keyed in plant 
description. This file is read into AutoHAZID using the parser, to create an internal 
plant representation. Using this approach allowed AutoHAZID to be developed 
independently, in a text-based UNIX environment, before the other components of 
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HAZID were available. It also allowed the links to the API to be tested by examining 
the text files generated. 
3.2.2 Physical Properties Calculations 
The Fluid Modelling System (FMS) makes use of physical properties of the fluids in 
the plant, as described in Chapter 5. These properties can be accessed by look-up in 
the fluid model library, or estimated by calls to external software packages. The two 
packages considered in the STOPHAZ project were Properties Plus, developed by 
Aspentech, and HYSYS, developed by Hyprotech. Both are based on the technology 
of flowsheet simulators and the property estimation methods used in them. 
A library of functions and data structures was defined to implement the property 
requests interface as a Windows "dynamic link library" (DLL). The library is common 
to the FMS and the external properties packages, and it allows AutoHAZID to make 
use of whichever software package is available. The link to a chosen properties 
package is made when AutoHAZID starts up. 
3.2.3 Internal Organisation of AutoHAZID 
The constituent parts of AutoHAZID, shown in the shaded areas of Figure 3.1, are: 
• Parser - AutoHAZID reads most of its input data through a parser. The parser 
module reads characters from a text file and interprets them to generate the 
internal models used in the program. 
• Database Reader and Temporary Plant File - The method for reading in plant 
descriptions from the Database API was described in Section 3.2.1. The database 
reader is the part of AutoHAZID which does this. 
• Plant Model - This is the internal model of the plant, composed of a list of 
instances of equipment models. It is constructed from data read in from external 
plant descriptions, from the Equipment Models and from Template Definitions 
used in the plant. The plant model is the starting point for constructing the Signed 
Directed Graph of the plant, used in HAZOP emulation. The Configuration 
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Rules (for detecting plant design errors) and the Fluidisation Routine (for 
propagating fluid information through the plant) both also make use of the 
information in the internal plant model. 
• (Internal) Equipment Models - These are the frame models, defining the types 
of equipment used in plant descriptions. The models are read in from a library file 
when the program starts. 
• Template Definitions - Templates are commonly used groups of SDG arcs which 
can be used within an equipment model, as described in Section 3.4. When the 
program starts, all template definitions are read in through the parser. 
• Functions and Predicates, Fluid Data Structures and the Fluid Modelling 
System - The FMS influences the results of the HAZOP algorithm by applying 
conditions to check the validity of fault paths produced by graph search. The 
conditions are defined by functions and predicates, and make use of fluid 
information from the plant description, the fluid library and properties packages. 
• HAZOP Algorithm - This module coordinates the graph search which forms the 
core of HAZOP emulation in AutoHAZID. An exhaustive two-stage breadth-first 
search algorithm is used, as described in Appendix B. This search produces a 
record of deviations, faults which cause them and possible consequences of these 
deviations and faults. The checks in the FMS can be used to improve the focus of 
results, but AutoHAZID is not dependent on this link. The HAZOP algorithm also 
initiates a number of extra checks on the configuration of plant items, using the 
Configuration Rules. The results of these checks are integrated with the HAZOP 
results, and provide a way of detecting elementary design flaws in the plant 
description, as passed to AutoHAZID. The configuration rules are complementary 
to the fault propagation approach, permitting the identification of faults which are 
not easily identified by fault propagation. 
• Report Generator - This part of the program takes the results of exhaustive 
search, as produced by the HAZOP algorithm, and formats them in an appropriate 
order, eliminating duplicated results as necessary. It produces a formatted text file 
containing the results of the HAZOP study. 
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• Filtering Rules - These influence the HAZOP algorithm and the report generator 
by controlling the amount of repetition in reports, by dictating the scope of the 
HAZOP and by defining the order in which deviations are considered. 
3.2.4 HAZOP Output Formats 
The main output from HAZOP emulation in AutoHAZID is a text file containing two 
or three sections. The first section is a header, giving details of files used, filtering 
options selected and settings in use when the results were produced. The next section 
is the main HAZOP results table, containing identified hazards in a tabular form. The 
table has columns for deviations, causes, consequences and (if a search for protections 
has been enabled) protections. The third part of the report is produced by the fluid 
compatibility checker (see Section 5.2.8), and gives details of adverse fluid 
interactions detected during HAZOP. This last section can only be produced in the 
Windows version of AutoHAZID, when given a sufficient plant description. 
One alternative, more structured, form of output has been implemented already - an 
option to produce results in the format required by PrimaTech's "PHAWorks" 
software package. Information on this package is available on the world-wide web, at 
http://www.primatech.com/. Other types of structured output (as opposed to 
simple text file formats) could be implemented with little difficulty, when a format 
has been agreed. 
3.3 Models in AutoHAZID 
The most basic, qualitative SDG models in AutoHAZID use no information about 
numerical quantities in a plant, and no numerical calculations. Influences between 
process variables are modelled by SDG arcs and hazardous scenarios are identified by 
finding fault propagation chains, by which consequences may result from initial 
failures. 
The real chemical plant can be seen as a collection of equipment items, connected by 
streams carrying fluids between them. Most of the individual items in the plant are 
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taken from a small set of commonly used equipment types, such as valves, pumps, 
vessels or pipes. This makes the task of process design much easier and cheaper 
because standard components are mass-produced and are better understood than 
customised, one-off items. 
Because of this process design method, a component -based modelling approach is 
used in AutoHAZID for plant representation. Each piece of equipment in the plant is 
modelled as an instance of an equipment model, taken from a library of process 
equipment types. The SDG model of the plant is constructed from the SDG models of 
the units in it and links are added to model the propagation of deviations, via streams, 
to other units. The simplest plant description therefore consists of a list of equipment 
instances and their interconnections. 
Using models for types of equipment in this way is economical in terms of the amount 
of information required by the program for assessing each plant. Once an equipment 
model is present in the library, it can be used in a large number of plants, or indeed 
many times within the same plant. It should be noted, however, that this modelling 
approach makes the implicit assumption that most interesting causal influences (from 
the point of view of identifying hazards) propagate via variable deviations in streams 
between units. This assumption is challenged in the case of non-process propagation 
of faults, which is discussed in Section 6.6. 
The decomposition of the plant model is carried one step further for template models, 
which group together commonly used groups of arcs to model parts of equipment 
models. Templates are described in Section 3.4. 
The failure modes of equipment are modelled in AutoHAZID by including faults and 
consequences in the SDG models, associating them with deviations of process 
variables. The elicitation from human experts of the knowledge upon which these 
failure modes are based, is a very important part of the model development process. 
Every variable in the plant model is associated with a port located in some unit in the 
plant. As an example, the discharge pressure for a pump, plOl, would be referred to 
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as [plOl, out, pressure], where out indicates the discharge port. In the library 
model of the pump, from which plOl is derived, the same variable would be referred 
to as [out, pressure] , because the unit name is unknown within the model. 
Ports are required for locating variables and for connecting equipment items together 
in the plant, so that deviations in process variables can be propagated to other units. 
The process ports are of three types: input ports are locations where fluid may flow 
into the equipment, output ports are locations where fluid may flow out, and internal 
ports are internal locations not directly connected to other units at all. Only input ports 
and output ports are used for connecting process equipment items. 
When a plant description is loaded, in the form of a number of "instances" of 
equipment models, the connections specified are translated into SOG arcs connecting 
the units. The SOG arcs belonging to the units themselves are "instantiated" by adding 
information about the units to which they belong (unit names and specified attributes). 
The resulting complete set of arcs is the SOG model of the whole plant, and this is 
used to simulate the plant'S behaviour during HAZOP emulation. 
Arcs corresponding to propagation of effects between units allow some deviations to 
propagate downstream (in the direction of intended flow), some to propagate upstream 
(against the direction of flow), and some to propagate in both directions. Deviations in 
some variables, such as level, are not defined in relation to inlet or outlet ports and are 
not propagated at all between units. 
The remaining subsections of Section 3.3 discuss various aspects of the AutoHAZID 
system as follows: 
• The minimum data requirements for generating the plant model are outlined In 
Section 3.3.1. 
• Section 3.3.2 describes the SOG in AutoHAZID in some detail. 
• The frame-based system of equipment models, which allows inheritance and a 
hierarchical arrangement of equipment models, is described in Section 3.3.3. The 
instantiation of those equipment models, in plant descriptions, is also discussed. 
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• The hierarchy of models in the equipment model library IS introduced In 
Section 3.3.4. 
• The slots which make up the majority of the information given in the models in 
AutoHAZID, and the mechanism of inheritance operating between models in the 
model hierarchy, are described together in Section 3.3.5. 
• Section 3.3.6 describes the system which allows the basic, generic equipment 
models to be specialised, based on the values of attributes specified for the 
equipment item. This is the "attribute conditional model" system. 
• Customised models of vessels can be generated in HAZID using the Model 
Generation Tool (MGT), which is briefly described in Section 3.3.7. 
• AutoHAZID allows consequences to be classified in terms of severity, whether the 
event is a hazard or operability problem,· and in terms of a number of standard 
consequence types. This part of the modelling system is mentioned in 
Section 3.3.8. 
3.3.1 Data Requirements for the Plant Model 
The minimum plant specification is just a statement of the equipment items present, 
their types and the connections between them. This corresponds roughly to the 
minimum information provided on an ELD and to the basic information required in a 
HAZOP study. It is surprising how much useful work can be done by AutoHAZID 
(and by HAZOP teams!) using just this basic information. 
Additional information which may be presented In a real-life plant description 
includes: 
• General description of the process and its chemistry. 
• Fluid components present, and percentage compositions, throughout the plant. 
• Fluid flowrates, temperatures and pressures. 
• Physical properties of process materials. 
• Materials of construction. 
• Operating modes of equipment items. 
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• Design temperatures and pressures (permitted maximum and minimum values). 
• Operating instructions for the plant. 
This additional information is not vital to making some progress in hazard 
identification. However, if the additional information is present, less time will be 
wasted on unnecessary consideration of scenarios, so that the results of the analysis 
will be more specific and relevant. Some, but not all, of these classes of information 
are used by AutoHAZID in HAZOP emulation and are therefore (optionally) present 
in the plant model. 
3.3.2 Signed Directed Graph (SDG) 
Nodes in the AutoHAZID SDG represent variables in the plant model which can, in 
principle, have qualitative values of "+" and "_". The values correspond to deviations 
in the variable equivalent to applying the HAZOP guide words "more" and "less", 
respectively. Arcs in the SDG represent direct or reverse influences of one variable on 
another, according to whether the sign on the arc is "+" or "-", respectively. The arcs 
are usually found listed in propLinks slots within equipment model frames in the 
unit model library. 
Fault propagation is modelled quite naturally using this representation of influences 
between variable deviations. The local influence of deviations in one variable on its 
neighbours in the graph models the propagation of disturbances. Paths through the 
SDG represent potential fault propagation chains. The influence of one variable on a 
distant one ("direct" or "reverse", represented as a "+" or "-,, sign) is the product of 
the signs of all arcs along the path connecting the two variables, if such a path exists. 
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In addition to the nodes (corresponding to variables at particular places, or ports, in 
the plant), three other types of entity are used to construct SDO arcs in AutoHAZID: 
• faults represent initiating events which give rise to variable deviations in the unit 
with which they are associated. Faults are declared as textual descriptors, which 
are the strings reported in the "causes" column of the HAZOP output table. 
• consequences are the hazardous final events which are to be linked, via some fault 
propagation chain, to deviations of process variables and ultimately to faults at the 
start of fault propagation chains. Consequences, like faults, are associated with a 
particular equipment item in the plant and have a textual descriptor, which appears 
in the HAZOP report when the hazard is reported. 
• deviations are nodes with an associated HAZOP guide word ("less" or "more") 
attached to them. They are only used to specify which deviation of a node gives 
rise to a consequence in the plant. 
In addition to the simple text of a descriptor and the name of an associated unit, faults 
and consequences can (optionally) be linked to conditions for evaluation within the 
fluid modelling system. The FMS is described in Chapter 5. Therefore, in the 
discussion below the optional "Condition" part of the arc definitions is ignored. 
Arcs in the SDO can take any of the following forms, as presented in the unit model 
library of AutoHAZID, depending on their purpose: 
• arc (Node, Sign, Node, Condition) These arcs represent propagation 
of process variable deviations through the plant model. 
• arc (Fault, Sign, Node, Condition) These arcs represent the 
deviations caused by initial failures. The given node is deviated in the direction 
indicated by the sign of the arc. 
• arc(Deviation,l,Consequence,Condition)Arcs representing the 
termination of the fault propagation chain have this form. The deviation given may 
cause the consequence given. 
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• arc(Fault,l,Consequence,Condition) Used for failures directly 
linked to local consequences. 
The fonnats of each of the elements above (Fault, Node, etc.), and their subordinate 
elements, are outlined in Table 3.1 below: 
Item Description 
Node One of two formats: 
[Port, Property] - The usual form, as seen in the unit model library, where the 
unit name is not known. 
[Uni t I Port, Property] - Sometimes seen in an instance statement, in a plant 
description file, or when displaying models of equipment items. 
Sign Usually either I (indicating a "+" sign on the arc and a direct influence) or-I 
(indicating a "-" sign for the arc and a reverse influence). Other special values exist, 
and their meanings are discussed in Section 4.2.2. 
Condition A condition which can be tested by the fluid model system, to verify a fault, 
consequence or arc. If the condition is proven to be false, fault paths containing it are 
ignored. This is a means of filtering and focusing HAZOP output from the program 
and is discussed, with the FMS, in Chapter 5. 
Fault One of two formats, depending on whether the fault initiation is conditional on some 
feature of the plant, or not: 
[fault, [Deseriptor,Condition]] 
[fault,Deseriptor] 
Deviation In the format: [deviation, [DevnCode, Port]] 
Consequenc One of four formats: 
e [consequence, [Descriptor,Condition]] 
[consequence, [Descriptor,Condition),Extras] 
(consequence, Descriptor] 
[eonsequenee, Deseriptor, Extras] 
Unit The name of the equipment item to which the Node refers. 
Port The name of the port where a node or deviation is located. 
Property The name of a process variable (such as flow, pressure, composition, etc.) 
Descriptor A string in single quotes to describe either a fault or a consequence. May be 
accompanied by an integer value between I and 5, in brackets, representing the 
importance rank of that fault or consequence. This rank figure is only used at present 
to represent the frequency of a fault (I is infrequent, 5 is frequent) - the importance 
rank information on consequences is now given in the Extras component 
described below. 
DevnCode One of the "code words" for variable deviations defined in the program. These 
include "lessFlow", "moreTemp", "contamination", etc. 
Extras A set of information provided for classification of consequences, as an aid to 
filtering results, etc. Comes in the format: [Cat, Rank, StdCons] 
Cat Category of consequence, indicating whether it is a hazard (haz), operability 
problem (op) or both (haz op). 
Rank Consequence seriousness rank (from 1 to 5, with 5 the most serious). 
StdCons List of symbols giving standard consequence classes to which the particular 
consequence belongs, e.g. [le, ed, pi] . The standard consequence classes are 
explained and listed in Section 3.3.8. 
Table 3.1 : Elements of AutoHAZID SDG models 
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3.3.3 Equipment Models - Frames and Instances 
Generic equipment models in AutoHAZID are known as "frames", and their 
realisations in plant models are referred to as "instances". Both are stored internally in 
Frame objects. The frame models are loaded into AutoHAZID from a single library 
file when the program starts. Instances are created by reading a plant description into 
the program, through the parser. Each frame or instance possesses the following data: 
• A name. 
• A "parent name", which is the name of a frame from which it is derived. Frames 
are arranged in an inheritance hierarchy, described in Section 3.3.4, which allows 
closely related models to be placed together. 
• A list of slots, which specify all the information comprising the equipment model. 
These slots are more fully described in Section 3.3.5 below. 
So, all .frames and instances must be defined in terms of another frame. The one 
exception to this is the root of the hierarchy ("unit" in Figure 3.3 below), which has no 
parent frame. Inheritance operates from parent frame to child frame within the 
hierarchy, and from a frame to instances of that frame in a plant description. This 
means that the slots (and slot values) of the parent are inherited by the child. The 
inherited values may then be overwritten or supplemented by information given in 
slots in the child. Details of how inheritance works are given in Section 3.3.5 below. 
The information typically provided in frames is different to that provided in instances, 
so that the slots used are different. Briefly, frame models specify the information 
needed to define the SDG of the unit, including the ports in the unit, SDG arcs, default 
values of attributes, etc. The information given for instances of equipment models is 
related to connecting the unit to others in the plant via process port connections, 
specifying fluids and their properties in the unit, and giving values to the attributes of 
the unit. 
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3.3.4 Hierarchy of Equipment Models 
Models in the unit model library are arranged into a hierarchy, in which the principles 
of inheritance operate. Inheritance allows a model to be defined "by exception" from 
its parent, so that a child frame is the same as its parent, except for specified 
differences. A hierarchical organising structure helps to group together similar models 
and to accentuate their similarity by modelling common behaviours of equipment at 
the highest possible level. Instances of models at any level of the hierarchy can be 
used in plant models. The current hierarchy of models is shown in Figure 3.3. 
A number of guidelines were observed in organising the hierarchy. These include: 
• The hierarchy must be intuitively sensible to an engineer, as an end-user. This 
facilitates rapid and correct selection of an appropriate unit model. 
• The lower levels of the hierarchy should correspond to more detailed specification 
of equipment, the upper ones to more general equipment (e.g. a centrifugal pump 
is defined as a type of a pump, and so appears below pump in the hierarchy). 
• The designer should avoid unnecessary proliferation of models, by using attribute 
conditional model sections, as described in Section 3.3.6. 
• Future additions to the library should be anticipated where possible, and 
appropriate space provided. If necessary, extra layers should be added, to deepen 
the hierarchy. An example is the pressureRaiser model, which was created 
as a common parent of the compressor and pump models, even before the 
compressor model was added to the library. 
New models should be placed in the hierarchy nearest to those equipment models to 
which they are most closely related, functionally. The temptation to maximise the use 
of the inheritance features of the system, and define models in terms of others which 
have similar sets of arcs but which are otherwise unrelated, should be resisted. 
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Figure 3.3 : Unit Model Hierarchy in AutoHAZID 
The STOPHAZ project documentation contains further information on the hierarchy 
of models shown above (STOPHAZ Project 1997a, Appendix 4, "HAZID Libraries"). 
3.3.5 Slots and their Inheritance in AutoHAZID Models 
Slots constitute the mam body of information stored in unit models. Inheritance 
operates within the hierarchy of frames and from a frame to instances of that frame in 
a plant model. The slots of the parent are inherited by all its children, so that the 
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information provided in a child model is in the form of additions or replacements for 
slots inherited from the parent frame. 
Each slot has a name, a type and a list of values. The name of the slot does not have to 
be unique within a frame or instance, but if there are multiple slots with the same 
name, they will be reduced to a single slot at run time, giving preference to 
information supplied later. This principle of slot value resolution applies to 
inheritance between frames and instances, and to multiple slots within a single model. 
The values in slots inherited from the parent are considered to be "earlier" than, and 
therefore subject to overwriting by, the values in slots of the child. 
Slots are of three types: "is", "info" and "include". The "is" slots specify simple 
attributes of the model in terms of constant symbols (e.g. for a pump, we may have 
status is running). The "info" type slots each specify a list of values. For "is" 
and "info" slots, inheritance operates such that every slot which the parent frame has 
is inherited to the child, but if the child has a slot with the same name, then the value 
of the child slot overwrites the value inherited from the parent. 
The third type of slot is the "include" type. This type of slot has a list of items as its 
value, in the same way that the "info" slot does, but the "include" slot behaves 
differently with respect to inheritance. If the child has an "include" slot for some slot 
name, then provided the parent frame has no slot with that name, the "include" slot is 
converted to an "info" slot with the same list of values. If the child has an "include" 
slot for some slot name and there is an "info" slot with the same name in the parent 
frame, then the value list of the "include" slot is added to the value list of the "info" 
slot. The resulting list of values is put into the child as a new "info" slot, replacing the 
"include" slot. This mechanism allows additive changes, possibly specialisations of 
the SDG model, to be made to the information provided in the parent model. 
Although info and include are implemented as different sUbtypes of slot, an 
alternative view of the inheritance system is to consider them to be functional 
modifiers of the slot. In this view, info and include determine how the value of 
the appropriate slot is produced in inheritance. 
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The "is" type of slot is often referred to as an "attribute" of the model. Attributes can 
specify additional information about the type of equipment or its operation, and can be 
used as the basis of attribute-conditional models, as described in Section 3.3.6. 
Table 3.2 describes the various "info" type slots which can be used in frames and 
instances. The columns labelled "F' and 'T' indicate if the slot is normally specified 
for frames in the unit model library (the "F' column), or in plant description files (the 
"I" column). Some slots are generated automatically by the program and do not exist 
in any library or plant files external to AutoHAZID. An example is the slot named 
"location", which is generated by the fluidisation routine described in Section 5.2.2. 
Slot Name F I Description 
outports V V Specifies the process outlet ports of a model, giving either their 
names (for frames) or names plus connected port (for instances). 
inports V Specifies the names of the process inlet ports in an equipment 
model (frame). Fonnat as for outports. 
unitports V Names the internal process locations in a unit (frame), such as the 
vapour and liquid in a tank. Format as for inports and outports. 
outSignalPorts V V Defines the signal output ports (and their connectivity) for the 
instruments on a plant. As with outports above, format is similar. 
and only the connections for outSignalPorts are specified in the 
plant model. 
inSignalPorts V Defines the names of the input signal ports in the model of an 
instrument (as a frame). Same format as for inports. 
script V Specifies the templates used to construct the equipment model. 
propLinks V This slot defines the propagation model of the unit and its failure 
modes. Used in constructing the SDO of the plant. 
conditionLinks V This slot is used to selectively include certain parts of the 
equipment model into the instances when the plant model is put 
together, based on the values of certain attributes in the model. 
sigPropLinks V V Used in both frames and instances to define the propagation of 
signals in the instrument system. 
portTemperatures V Allows the temperatures of process fluids to be specified (in 0c), 
for each of the ports belonging to a process unit. 
portPressures V Allows the pressures of process fluids to be specified (in bar abs), 
for each of the_ports belonging to a process unit. 
intendedFluids V Allows the flowrates (in kglhr), component names and 
compositions of those components (in mole fractions) to be 
specified, for process fluids at each port in a process unit. 
senscdVars V This slot is used to flag the variables which are monitored by 
instruments in the plant model (indicators, alarms, sensors, etc.). 
material Intended to specify materials of construction (as a list of names of 
materials) for the plant items. Not currentk in use. 
ruleData V This slot contains the VTT fluid rules. Each rule is specified as a 
string in the list. This slot is only present in the models of fluids 
in the fluid library file. 
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Slot Name F I Description 
location Records data generated by the plant fluidisation routine, for fluids 
at various places in the plant model. Not specified in the plant or 
eauivment models. 
<generalSlot> A type of slot defined in the parser so that any named info slot 
can be created without changing the parser. This is a relatively 
(there is no slot with new development compared to the slots named in the previous 
this actual name) parts of this table. Note that there is no control over the internal 
syntax of the items in the value list, so that anything which can be 
parsed will be accepted - the programmer must take care to check 
the data appropriately when it has been read into the program. 
must_connect 
-J Defines the names of the process (inports and outports) ports 
which must be connected in the plant model. This slot is usually 
defined in the frame for the equipment model and checked against 
the actual instance found on plant. If ports are found in the 
instance which are not connected but should be, this is flagged as 
an error. This slot is an example of the <generalSlot> type shown 
above. 
comp_connections -J Specifies the pairs of ports in the model of a unit which are 
connected together for the purposes of fluid propagation. This 
slot is an example of the <generalSlot> type shown above. 
Table 3.2 : Slots in use in AutoHAZID 
3.3.6 Attribute-Conditional Modelling System 
When developing increasingly specialised equipment models in a hierarchical system, 
such as the one outlined above, there is a danger that models proliferate to cover all 
the possible combinations of optional features in similar equipment. An example is for 
models of pipe, where the pipe may be lagged or unlagged, welded or flanged, etc. If 
each possibility is addressed by a new model, many models are needed, one for each 
combination of attribute values. The solution adopted in AutoHAZID is to add a 
feature to the modelling system which allows sets of arcs and slots to be selected 
depending on the value of certain attributes in instances of the equipment. 
The condi tionLinks slot provides this feature. It allows generic models of 
equipment to be specialised in a limited way, by specifying a number of pairings of 
attribute and value, each associated with a list of slots to be added to the instance if 
the value of the attribute matches that specified. The values of the attributes are 
matched when an equipment model is instantiated in a plant. 
107 
The attribute-conditional parts of instances are processed after the plant model is 
loaded and the values of slots are resolved from inheritance and from values supplied 
by the instance itself. After the matching associated with the attribute-conditional 
parts of the models, the slots in all instances are resolved again, to integrate any 
information that has been added. Typically, an inc 1 ude slot is used to add new arcs 
to the model if the attribute condition is met. 
3.3.7 Custom Models and the Model Generation Tool 
Most equipment items in a plant can be modelled with commonly used models in the 
unit model library. However, some units may not correspond to models in the library. 
These are often vessels, made to order as "one-off' items for a particular plant. In 
these cases, a tool is needed to help the user of HAZID construct anew, customised, 
model for the equipment item. This is the task addressed by the Model Generation 
Tool (MGT) program, developed by Or. F.O. Larkin at Loughborough. 
The MGT uses an interactive question and answer session to elucidate a structural 
model of the new vessel from the user. The structural details include details of internal 
chambers, their interconnections, fluids present, etc. Additional questions are used to 
add details of equipment failure modes and consequences. The MGT uses the 
information provided to construct an SOG model of the vessel, which can be added to 
the unit model library for later use. 
Templates (see Section 3.4) are used to model the different parts of the model, and the 
content of the template library has been heavily influenced by the development of the 
MGT. Numerous templates were defined to model different types of liquid and gas 
inlets and outlets for vessels, interfaces between fluids, etc. 
The MGT is described further in the "Model Generation Tool User Manual", 
(STOPHAZ 1997b, Appendix 7). The software and its documentation were prepared 
by Or. Larkin. 
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3.3.8 Consequence Types and Ranking 
The consequences represented in AutoHAZID equipment models cover a broad range 
of undesirable events, from minor inconveniences for plant operation to major 
catastrophic events with the potential for loss of many lives. Therefore, a method for 
focussing attention on the more important consequences is important in a system 
which produces a large volume of results, as AutoHAZID frequently does. 
For this reason, a consequence classification and ranking system was devised by Prof. 
F.P. Lees and Or. FO. Larkin. Every consequence in the model library is associated 
with three types of classification information, added to the model definition by the 
model designer: 
• A default2 severity rank in the range I to 5, indicating the scale of the event, where 
I is least severe and 5 is most severe. The user may ask the program to screen out 
consequences below a certain severity, when reporting HAZOP results. The 
severity is reported next to the consequence descriptor in the HAZOP report and is 
used to sort consequences so that the most important ones are reported first. 
• A consequence class, which is a symbol defining whether the consequence is an 
operability problem (op), a hazard (haz), or both (haz_op). 
• A list of codes, each one taken from a list of standard consequence types, defining 
how the given consequence is classified. The standard consequence types are 
listed in Table 3.3 below. Every consequence should be a member of at least one 
of these classes. 
2 The rank given is a default because.! the severity of many consequences depends heavily on process-
specific parameters, such as the fluids involved, which cannot be known to the generic unit model. For 
loss of containment, AutoHAZID can adjust the default severity according to particular process details 
(if those details are given) using methods from the Dow Chemical Exposure Index Guide. 
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Standard Consequence Categories Code 
personal iniury pi 
loss of containment le 
equipment damage ed 
operating problem op 
loss of outlet flow If 
contamination of outlet flow cf 
explosive mixture em 
unintended reaction ur 
vibration vb 
ignition source ig 
device malfunction dm 
Table 3.3 : Standard Consequence Categories in AutoHAZID 
3.4Templates and Scripts for Modellinq Parts of Equipment Items 
The observation that equipment in a plant tends to be chosen from a small number of 
types led to the structural decomposition of the plant model into a number of units, 
each based on one of a limited set of models stored in a library. It is found that models 
of equipment themselves possess an internal structure, midway between the level of a 
unit and that of a single SDG arc. Moreover, the structural or functional components 
of an equipment model are taken from a limited set of possible types (e.g. heat transfer 
between two fluids, flow of a liquid into a vessel, etc.). 
In AutoHAZID, these repeated structural or functional components are modelled using 
"template models", whose definitions are read in from a library file when the program 
starts. Each template is a group of arcs which are often found together, and can be 
thought of as a model of a phenomenon or of a part of an equipment item. 
Templates can be used to build up parts of equipment models anywhere in the unit 
model library. However, since their context varies, some elements of the arcs (e.g. the 
names of ports in the unit) must be varied also. Therefore, each template is associated 
with a name, a list of arguments or parameters and a list of associated arcs. The 
arguments of the template are variables, which also appear in the arcs listed. 
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When a template is used (in a script slot in a unit model), values are given to its 
arguments. These values are substituted wherever they occur in the associated arc list, 
before those arcs are added to the SDG model of the unit, as defined by other slots 
(e.g. propLinks) elsewhere in the frame. 
This approach to "sub-component" model decomposition is limited to the addition of 
groups of arcs, typically using variable port names, as described above. However, the 
use of a library of templates does reduce the effort required to make some types of 
changes to models, significantly simplifying model maintenance. 
3.5 Methodology for Model Development 
This section builds on the description of the AutoHAZID modelling system offered in 
Sections 3.3 and 3.4, giving some guidelines on how to apply the tools just described. 
The objective is to allow for models to be developed in a disciplined and structured 
way, so that a consistently high quality of model performance may be expected. This 
method was not used for all models in the unit model library, due to time constraints. 
The proposed methodology is described in this section, in relation to an example 
which was examined in detail during the STOPHAZ project - that of modelling flow 
and pressure propagation. Firstly, a system boundary for the flow and pressure 
modelling case study is defined, in Section 3.5.1. Then, Section 3.5.2 discusses the 
"no function in structure" principle and its application to the flow modelling problem. 
The formalisation of the flow path model, in terms of the choice of variables in the 
model, is addressed in Section 3.5.3. The idea of "causal hierarchy", outlined in 
Section 3.5.4, was found useful in the flow path model, and may be of use elsewhere. 
The flow path SDG model itself is presented in Section 3.5.5, along with the list of 
assumptions which define this particular template model. 
The conventions used to model no flow and reverse flow in AutoHAZID flow paths, 
are described in Section 3.5.6. Finally, Section 3.5.7 finishes this section of the 
chapter by describing the techniques used to discover weaknesses in the models of 
AutoHAZID, and to direct their improvement. This topic is labelled as "Knowledge 
II 1 
Elicitation" because it consists partly of extracting knowledge from human experts, 
and partly of formalising that knowledge in SDG models. 
3.5.1 Flow Path System Definition 
The case study problem for modelling is to "build a model of flow and pressure 
propagation for chemical plants". A first model for flow cannot be expected to cover 
all the potential complications of flow geometry, multiple phases, non-Newtonian 
fluids, etc., so we concentrate on a limited, but commonly occurring, case. The system 
to be studied first is the simple "flow path" - a path between an inlet and outlet 
location, through which a fluid can flow. This system is typified by a rigid pipe or an 
open valve filled with a single fluid. 
The restriction assumptions, which define the system, are: 
• The model deals with propagation of flow and pressure deviations in a "flow path". 
Other phenomena, such as heat transfer, etc., must be modelled separately. 
• The flow path is an unbranched space, filled with a single phase fluid and enclosed 
by rigid walls, with one inlet location and one outlet location. 
• The fluid may be liquid or vapour. 
• Density changes in the fluid are not modelled, so that the fluid is assumed to be 
incompressible, within the scope of the flow path model. 
• The normal direction of fluid movement (flow) is from the inlet location to the 
outlet location. 
• No shaft work is done on the fluid within the flow path. 
Known variations on the above assumptions include: 
• Where the flow path is branched, so that it has either many inlets or many outlets. 
These cases are represented by the header and divider models, respectively, 
and discussed in Appendix C. 
• Where heat transfer, or a phase change, occurs between the inlet and outlet. 
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• Where the fluid flows in an open channel, as opposed to an enclosed "pipe". 
• Where shaft work is done on the fluid, or extracted from it, between inlet and 
outlet. 
3.5.2 The "No Function in Structure" Principle 
The "no function in structure" principle, as given in De Kleer and Brown (1984), 
states that: "The laws of the parts of a device may not presume the functioning of the 
device as a whole". This means that the model of a device component (such as a unit 
in a process plant) should be developed free of the context in which it will be placed. 
In practice, this is an unattainable goal, not only because it is almost impossible to 
imagine a component functioning completely free of context, but also because the 
very act of decomposition presupposes the mode of interaction or connection between 
pieces. Thus, one must at the very least state how components are connected together, 
in order to construct a feasible model of a composite device. 
The principle of locality follows naturally from the no function in structure principle. 
It states that the components of a physical system can interact only with adjacent 
components, to which they have a connection. The mode of connection between 
components therefore determines how causes and effects may propagate. 
Clearly, the no function in structure principle is particularly appropriate to unit-based 
modelling systems, such as the AutoHAZID SDGs. If the principle is violated, the 
models produced will be of limited use, and may produce erroneous results when used 
in other plants or other contexts. 
In AutoHAZID local causal input-output mappings, expressed as SDG arcs, define the 
fault propagation functions of the components. Any influences propagated through the 
model are mediated by deviations in variables present in the ports connecting units 
together. Physical "adjacency" in this system is therefore defined by stream 
connections between units. The overall behaviour of the plant model in simulation 
results from the interaction of the devices in it. The only assumed context information 
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in this model is the mode of connection between units (using SDG arcs in the plant 
model), and the variables used in those connections. 
The no function in structure principle requires that a level of decomposition, a "basic 
unit", be chosen for the phenomenon to be modelled. In the case of flow and pressure 
modelling, this is the flow path, and communication with adjacent units is achieved by 
propagation of pressure deviations. 
3.5.3 Choice and Definition of Variables 
To build a model of the fault path "basic unit", at least three things must be done: 
• Choose a formalism for implementing the models. In this case, the choice has 
already been made: it is the signed-directed graph (SDG) used in all AutoHAZID 
equipment models. 
• Decide which are the important variables in the problem area and characterise 
them. Any restrictions imposed on the type of variable, by the choice of 
implementation, should be considered. Also, the meanings of variables, as well as 
issues of how and when they should be used, should be agreed by convention. For 
flow path models, three variables were chosen: 
• Pressure, P, is the pressure at a single point in the plant. The qualitative 
values of this variable are lessPressure and morePressure, corresponding to 
the HAZOP guide words. Pressure is an entirely local property of the fluid 
present at a particular location in the plant. 
• Flow, Q, is the variable chosen to represent the bulk flow of fluid from one 
location to another in the plant. In a HAZOP study, four deviations are 
commonly used to examine changes in flow (more flow, less flow, no flow and 
reverse flow). The SDG does not permit variables with more than two 
qualitative values, so flow has only two associated deviations (moreFlow and 
lessFlow). The separate deviations noFlow and revFlow are modelled using 
other variables (see Section 3.5.6 below). Note that flow is not modelled as a 
property of a single location in the plant, but rather of the path between two 
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points. In that respect it is different from properties, such as pressure and 
temperature, which can be stated uniquely for any single location. 
• Flow Resistance, R, represents the frictional resistance to fluid flow which 
exists between the inlet and outlet locations. Resistance has two qualitative 
values corresponding to deviations (lessResistance and moreResistance), and 
can be seen as a variable similar to flow in nature, because it is a "path 
property" rather than a localised property. 
• Once the variables have been decided upon, the next task is to link them to each 
other in an appropriate way. The objective here may be to build a model 
displaying some known set of behaviours (failure modes, perhaps), or to work 
from first principles, guided by the assumptions made in the model scoping step. 
3.5.4 Causal Hierarchy in Flow Modelling 
Previous attempts to model fluid behaviour in process systems have often suffered 
from difficulty in disengaging the effects of flow and pressure. Frequently, the 
designer would worry about whether deviations in flow caused deviations in pressure, 
or vice versa. The result could be a poorly explained model (possibly containing 
circular influences between variables) in which the reasons for different parts, and the 
action to take when the model failed to produce appropriate results, were unclear. 
The practice of stating all known assumptions in a model as it is developed, should 
help to clarify the influences involved, and prevent the occurrence of confusing 
circular relationships in the model. In addition, a "causal hierarchy" is introduced 
here, which is an arbitrary convention governing the allowed causal relations in SDG 
arcs modelling flow. 
The flow modelling causal hierarchy shown in Figure 3.4 states the "can influence" 
relationships between variables. Deviations in resistance may cause deviations in 
pressure or flow, pressure deviations may cause deviations in flow or pressure, but 
flow may not cause deviations in pressure, resistance, or other flows. Outside the 
scope of the flow path, flow may cause effects on other variables, such as the level of 
liquid in a tank, temperatures in a heat exchanger, etc. Note that the causal hierarchy 
115 
stated here assumes that the flow In the flow path is steady, and that the fluid is 
incompressible - otherwise, flow may influence pressure in the system. 
Resistance \7§'8 
Flow 
Figure 3.4 : Causal Hierarchy for Steady Flow of an Incompressible Fluid 
As a result of this ordering relation, propagation of flow is no longer needed - the 
information necessary to propagate changes of flow is carried by pressure 
propagations from other flow paths. This elimination of flow propagations reduces the 
chance of confusing, "crossed" influences between flow and pressure when a plant 
model is built from a number of equipment models.) 
The idea of causal hierarchy may be useful in other problem domains where there 
appears to be a strong interdependency between variables. The modeller must decide 
carefully what the dominant causal relationships are in the system, before choosing the 
ordering of variables in the model. 
3.5.5 The Flow Path SDG Model 
Having decided the scope of the flow path model, the set of variables to be used in 
modelling it, and a principle governing how the variables may be connected (the 
causal hierarchy), the next step is to formalise the model in an SDG. The basic SDG 
for the simple flow path discussed so far is shown in Figure 3.5 below, where flow 
occurs from an inlet port, in, to an outlet port, out. In the figure, P represents 
pressure, Q flow and R resistance; the subscripts indicate the ports with which the 
variables are associated. 
J The use of pressure propagation for flow modelling means that, when adding new failure modes which 
have an effect on flow, the model builder must think of the effects on pressure which those events have. 
This ensures that effects on flow and pressure of new failure modes are added at the same time. 
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Figure 3.5 : Simple Flow Path Model 
The arcs shown above are easily used to define a flow path template which can be 
used in many equipment models. The complete set of assumptions and principles used 
in the above model is summarised below: 
o Flow and pressure are modelled in a "flow path" - an enclosed, filled space with 
one inlet (in) and one outlet (out), and a clear path between in and out. 
o The fluid in the flow path is single phase (liquid or vapour) and continuous 
throughout. Multi-phase flow is therefore excluded from this model. 
o The fluid is considered incompressible, so that changes in density are ignored. 
o Fluid in the flow path is considered to flow normally from in to out. Therefore, no 
flow and reverse flow are exceptions to this condition. 
o Pressure deviations are allowed to propagate in either an upstream or a 
downstream direction in the flow path. 
o Flow deviations are not propagated between flow paths - they are generated 
locally, for each flow path. 
o The flow path model complies with the restrictions of the causal hierarchy. These 
include the restrictions that the flow is steady, and that the fluid is incompressible. 
o The relevant variables are pressure, P, flow, Q , and resistance, R. 
o The fluid has no external work done on it, and performs no mechanical work on its 
surroundings. 
o There is no significant height difference between in and out, so that static head is 
the same at both locations. 
o The fluid does not exchange significant quantities of heat with its surroundings. 
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• Within the SDG model of the flow path, the shortest path between two nodes 
determines the appropriate influence between those nodes. This "shortest path 
heuristic" is used in all AutoHAZID models, and is discussed in Section 4.10. 
• Friction has an effect on the flow in the flow path, and the amount of friction is 
represented by the resistance, R. Partially blocking the flow path tends to restrict 
the flow path, increasing R and therefore decreasing the flow, Q. The increase in 
resistance also tends to increase the pressure upstream of the flow path and to 
decrease it downstream. 
• The driving force for flow in the path between in and out is the pressure difference 
between the two locations, which is not represented explicitly. The upstream 
pressure Pin has a direct effect on the flow and the downstream pressure Pout has a 
reverse effect. 
Wherever the above assumptions hold for a path between two locations in a piece of 
equipment, the flow path model template is used to model the pressure and flow 
propagation effects. A single equipment model may contain a number of flow paths 
connected together, with each one declared in the scr ipt slot for the unit. The flow 
paths in the plant model are linked together by a pressure propagation "back-bone", 
which forms a communication path between remote units. This seems to be an 
efficient method for constructing large models of process flow systems, as all flow 
related propagation occurs via a single network of pressure deviations. 
By varying the assumptions In the above list, one can tackle other pieces of 
equipment. Dividers and headers ("tee" pieces) are exceptions to the single inlet, 
single outlet assumption - they are addressed in Appendix C. 
The deviations no flow (noFlow) and reverse flow (revFlow) challenge the 
assumption, in the above flow path model, that fluid flows forward. These deviations 
are qualitatively different from the cases of moreFlow and lessFlow, and the landmark 
value of zero defines the domains of forward flow, no flow and reverse flow. The 
problem of no flow and reverse flow modelling is dealt with in the following section. 
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3.5.6 Modelling No Flow and Reverse Flow 
The approach used to model the deviations "no flow" and "reverse flow", in the 
AutoHAZID SDG, is to use additional nodes to represent these deviations, separately 
from the flow nodes already present in the SDG. The revFlow and noFlow nodes, 
whose deviations are also called revFlow and noFlow, are used for this purpose. By 
convention, these nodes have only one possible qualitative value, "+". A value of "-" 
associated with these nodes has no meaning. 
Two problems with this new scheme immediately present themselves. The first is that 
of ensuring that the new nodes are never used during fault propagation in such a way 
that they are associated with a value of "_". This is solved by adding checks to the 
HAZOP algorithm which make sure that deviations encountered in all fault paths are 
permitted ones. The second problem is one of model maintenance. New arcs must be 
added to all models, so that noFlow and revFlow propagate through the plant model in 
the same way that pressures propagate to cause the other deviations of flow. To a 
certain extent, the use of templates can help with this problem. 
The problem of four deviations for flow in HAZOP could have been sol ved in other 
ways, possibly using a more powerful graph representation than the SDG. However, 
the SDG was retained because it is efficient and because it is powerful enough to 
represent most of the problems tackled in qualitative models for HAZOP emulation. 
The deviations of noFlow and revFlow will now be considered separately. 
No Flow 
Flow can cease in a flow path because of two physically distinct causes. Firstly, the 
pressure difference between in and out becomes zero due to some change in the 
pressures. Secondly, the flow path may become completely blocked somehow, so that 
the flow path no longer exists. This is an interesting distinction not explicitly made 
clear in many descriptions of HAZOP. 
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The former case is not considered to be an example of the noFlow deviation in 
AutoHAZID, but instead is an extreme case of the low Flow deviation. It is thought 
likely that this form of zero flow is not distinct from the lowFlow condition in any 
meaningful way, so that the lowFlow guide word should capture all the relevant 
hazards in the HAZOP report. 
The second cause of no flow is more important for hazard identification, and defines 
the only case where noFlow takes place in AutoHAZID. Because some event has 
caused the flow path to be blocked, the plant model has changed in some way, and 
this may be an important consideration. 
Therefore, noFlow may not be caused by pressure deviations in flow paths, but must 
instead be caused directly by initiating faults, or propagated from other flow paths in 
which such a fault has occurred. The information that a blockage event has occurred is 
propagated through noFlow nodes in the SDG, upstream and downstream. 
It is important to bear in mind the special meaning applied to the noFlow deviation, 
when reading the results of HAZOP emulation, and when designing new models. 
Reverse Flow 
Reverse flow may be caused by a reversal of the pressure gradient in a flow path, for 
example by leakage out of the path, leading to flow in the opposite sense to that 
intended. However, the basic flow path modelling system in AutoHAZID, using only 
pressure propagation, cannot represent the magnitude of a pressure change. This 
means that it is difficult to judge whether a (qualitative) pressure deviation will cause 
a decrease in flow, or a flow reversal. 
In trials, problems occurred with flow path models which linked pressure directly to 
revFlow. A typical problem was where a partial blockage in a line caused the pressure 
at a point to change; the pressure deviation then propagated and caused a revFlow 
deviation elsewhere in the line. It is absurd that a partial blockage could cause flow to 
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go backwards in the same line. This is an example where the pressure propagation 
chain does not carry enough information on the magnitude of changes taking place. 
Therefore, revFlow is propagated separately from pressure in AutoHAZID, in order to 
preserve the information that a flow reversal has taken place. For the same reason, 
pressure and reverse flow are not linked at every point in the flow path chains. The 
working assumption is made that flow reversals are caused either by faults, such as 
large-scale leakages from the flow path, by pressure changes in process vessels or in 
tee pieces (dividers and headers). Ideally, points where revFlow is initiated should be 
tested for the magnitude of change which can be considered to occur (perhaps such 
tests will reveal that only lowFlow is possible in response to a particular change in 
pressure). These sorts of numerical tests can be carried out by the fluid modelling 
system, which is described in Chapter 5. 
Taking the example of a pressure increase in a vessel causing a flow reversal in an 
inlet to that vessel: pressure deviations will be propagated upstream, allowing 
lowFlow and morePressure to be predicted anywhere in the inlet line. However, 
revFlow will also be propagated upstream, along an independent propagation channel. 
This arrangement allows all possible deviations to be predicted correctly, if the 
magnitude of the pressure change is not known. 
3.5.7 Knowledge Elicitation Methods 
Once an adequate model of the links between variables in a unit has been developed, 
perhaps from first principles, failure modes need to be added to the unit model. 
Failure modes are very important parts of the model, and identifying them requires 
expert knowledge of the equipment. 
Knowledge elicitation was traditionally used in developing rule-based expert systems. 
A "knowledge engineer" would talk to a "domain expert", to extract the most 
important knowledge, rules, techniques, etc. from the expert. The knowledge engineer 
was an expert in developing expert systems and the domain expert was someone who 
knew a lot about the subject matter to be encapsulated in the expert system. This type 
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of knowledge elicitation can be very difficult, because often the expert does not use 
knowledge in any explicitly formal way, but instead relies on rules of thumb, previous 
experience, etc. to guide hislher judgement. 
The knowledge elicitation techniques outlined in this section were used to stimulate 
thought about the nature of equipment, the ways it could fail and the susceptibilities it 
may have to various conditions. The "domain experts" in STOPHAZ were typically 
safety and process engineering experts. The "knowledge engineers" were members of 
the AutoHAZID development team. Many techniques are based around the group 
"brainstorming" type of meeting, using guide words, as in the method study approach. 
Equipment failure is often caused by taking a unit outside its safe operating regime. 
Therefore, failure modes may be identified by systematically challenging the details of 
the operating regime, using a "what if?" method. This is partly what the knowledge 
elicitation techniques are designed to do. By identifying the underlying function of the 
equipment, it may also be possible to identify "enabling faults" for some items (these 
arc events not leading to immediate hazards, but which reduce the degree to which the 
equipment is protected against the consequences of some other failure). 
The following subsections cover the various techniques used to improve the accuracy 
and range of phenomena modelled in AutoHAZID. Some require an organised group 
meeting, and some are better carried out by a single model builder. 
Trial and Error in Modelling 
The usual means of evaluating library models was to test them out in case study plants 
and examine the HAZOP results produced by AutoHAZID. By examining the 
scenarios identified, an experienced model developer can quickly pin-point where an 
error has been made in a model, where an inappropriate fault propagation path has 
been produced, etc. 
This job was usually done by a member of the Loughborough team, after changes to 
the models, to verify improvement and to see that no unexpected side-effects 
122 
occurred. Output criticism was also used as a method of provoking comment from 
safety experts, to get new ideas for improvements. 
The test cases used during STOPHAZ are outlined in paper 7 of the series submitted 
for publication in the IChemE Transactions on "Process Safety and Environmental 
Protection" (McCoy et al.). 
Conventional HAZOP Studies 
The largest test case plant, analysed so far using AutoHAZID, is a benzene plant taken 
from Wells (1980). This plant was subjected to a conventional HAZOP study by two 
separate HAZOP teams early in the project, to provide a set of results for measuring 
the success of automated HAZOP. These results have been valuable, in setting targets 
for improvement during the project, though we cannot yet claim to identify 100% of 
the results produced by the human HAZOP team in these meetings. A P&ID of the 
plant, as annotated for the HAZOP study, is included as Figure 3.6. 
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Figure 3.6: Benzene Plant Test Case (after Wells, 1980)· Annotated P&ID 
124 
Equipment Modelling Seminars 
Several seminars were hosted by Loughborough, where experts from process-based 
companies in the STOPHAZ consortium were assembled to look at single equipment 
models. The objective was to encourage remarks about possible failure modes of 
equipment and thereby elicit information for improving models. 
These seminars were conducted as "mini-HAZOP" studies. A single equipment type 
would be chosen for study by (typically) two experts and a member of the 
Loughborough project team. The team would discuss the equipment item in a way 
similar to that of a HAZOP meeting, but without considering any specific installation 
of the equipment item (i.e. free of any particular plant context). 
First, the purpose of the equipment was agreed and the scope of discussions fixed, 
particularly in order to decide what not to discuss. A number of equipment ports were 
then identified as study node locations to focus on. Following the HAZOP method, 
deviations of variables at each study node were considered. The questions of how the 
deviations could arise, and what consequences they could have locally, were asked. 
In all these discussions, it was important to keep the team focussed on the equipment 
at hand, while also encouraging them to imagine the item in a variety of plant 
contexts. It was hoped that, if this could be achieved, the model which would be later 
developed from the notes of the meeting would be as general as possible. The role of 
the Loughborough team member was to take notes, and to encourage comments which 
could be easily formulated in terms of rules or arcs in the SDG. 
The minutes of these meetings were noted on sheets in a similar format to the HAZOP 
report sheets typically used during conventional plant HAZOPs. However, this format 
was very often insufficient to record all the notes which arose during the meeting, 
because much of the knowledge gleaned from our experts turned out to be in terms of 
different or more useful ways of looking at situations on the plant. An example is the 
observation that reciprocating pumps can cause problems with flow measuring 
devices installed downstream, because pulsations caused by the piston stroke cause 
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such instruments to read too high. This is an important problem which doesn't 
obviously fit into the fault path model of hazards typical for AutoHAZID scenarios. 
The modelling seminars produced material which it was sometimes difficult to 
implement in AutoHAZID because of the format of the information, or because of the 
limited stage of development of the program itself. Nevertheless, some of the 
information obtained could be used to add new failure modes to the existing models, 
and this has been achieved for a number of cases. 
Criticism of Equipment Library Models 
Another technique, similar to the modelling seminar approach in some ways, was for a 
single safety expert to examine models in the equipment model library, and to criticise 
them, pointing out what was right or wrong, what missing, etc. This was attempted in 
at least two cases, with some success. However, to provide the most useful criticism, 
the expert needed a quite deep understanding of fault propagation behaviour in plant 
models, to see how the models were designed to work together. This presented a 
barrier to effective use of the technique. Nevertheless, some useful pointers were 
identified. 
Although this method was used during STOPHAZ as an "off-line" study of models in 
the library, it could be adapted so that AutoHAZID would construct a plant model 
with a single instance of a model to be examined. Then, the user would examine the 
inputs and outputs of the model in a systematic way, using AutoHAZID results. This 
approach would also insulate the user from the internal detail of fault propagation. 
Expert Criticism of HAZOP Results for Test Cases 
At around the middle of the project, when AutoHAZID was substantially complete in 
its simpler, basic form, a reasonably formal series of test case evaluations was carried 
out. Critical input from the process expert partners in the consortium was sought, to 
find out what the shortcomings of the system were. 
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Automated HAZOPs were performed on a series of plant models, of successively 
more complex design, using AutoHAZID. The results were sent to the partners for 
comment. Ideally, comments on one test case would have been used to improve the 
performance of AutoHAZID before the next test case in the series, so that continual 
improvement of the system could be demonstrated over a number of weeks. A number 
of problems were identified and fixed quite quickly, but very often the solutions to the 
problems involved larger pieces of work, on a longer timescale. 
3.6 Conclusions 
This chapter has described HAZID and AutoHAZID in some detail, covering the 
architecture of the integrated HAZID system and the modelling system in 
AutoHAZID. The models are based on the signed directed graph (SDG), and represent 
the influences between physical variables, faults and consequences in a piece of plant 
equipment. The chapter has described all the main features of this qualitative 
modelling system, as well as stressing the importance of principled development of 
new models, illustrating this by the example of the flow path model in AutoHAZID. 
The component-based modelling approach to the plant model and the SDG includes 
many useful ideas, such as inheritance, the use of template models and the flow path 
approach to flow and pressure modelling. The chosen SDG modelling formalism has a 
natural interpretation in the way it mimics the causal nature of simple fault 
propagation chains. Luckily, it is also probably the most efficient way of doing the 
sort of qualitative reasoning required for HAZOP emulation. 
In order to manage a potentially quite large and diverse library of models, some form 
of structured development procedure, in terms of knowledge elicitation, 
implementation and documentation, should be adopted. This is particularly important 
when developing novel unit models, as these often contain new assumptions and may 
require modelling techniques not used elsewhere in the model libraries. 
The AutoHAZID program now performs efficiently on large test case plants and, now 
that the model library has been enriched by the knowledge and experience of a 
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number of process industry experts, the program produces increasingly valuable 
HAZOP results. There are still many situations, however, where problems arise, 
which it is difficult to address using the SDO model system described so far. Some of 
these problems (and possible solutions to them) are discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. 
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Chapter 4 : Some Problems with Qualitative 
SDG-based Hazard Identification 
This chapter discusses some of the problems encountered with HAZID as described in 
Chapter 3. Many of these problems are shared with other systems based on a 
qualitative modelling system, or which use a graph search model for inference. Some 
of these problems have been tackled successfully - the approaches used to solve these 
are also discussed here. 
However, some of the recognised weaknesses of HAZID have not been tackled. Some 
improvements were ruled out because they were, strictly speaking, "out of scope" for 
HAZID (the scope of application for HAZID was discussed in Section 3.1). Other 
problems were not dealt with because the effort required to do justice to them would 
have diverted attention away from more important priorities in the project. It was 
important during STOPHAZ, to keep the development of HAZID focussed on the core 
objective: hazard identification by HAZOP emulation. 
4.1 The SDG represents only two deviations 
As discussed in Section 3.5.6, the mam case where there is a problem with the 
limitation of two deviations per SDG node, is that of modelling flow deviations, 
specifically "no flow" and "reverse flow". However, it is conceivable that other 
variables, which require more than two deviations, may need to be modelled at some 
stage. 
For the four deviations of flow, the solution adopted is to allow pressure to propagate 
through the plant, causing lessFlow and moreFlow deviations, while noFlow and 
revFlow are propagated as separate variables in the SDG. Depending on the details of 
the case, this approach may well be useful with other similar problems. 
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4.2 Single Mapping Influences 
The arcs in the SDG are labelled with either a "+" or "-" sign, implying a direct or 
reverse mapping between the two possible values of the variable on the left of the arc 
and those of the variable on the right. Some influences between variables in reality do 
not conform to this dual mapping. To model these influences properly, some change 
must be made to the SDG representation. 
An example of an influence which does not readily fit into the basic SDG framework 
is seen in the nitrogen inerting system shown in Figure 4.1. A flammable and volatile 
liquid (hexane, for example) is stored in a tank. To prevent the formation of a 
flammable atmosphere in the tank, the vapour space of the tank is maintained at a 
small positive pressure with nitrogen. 
nitrogen 
supply \en! 
liquid in ----, 
cond. vap. 
L _________ J-.. liquid out 
Figure 4.1 : Nitrogen Blanket Example 
The nitrogen also accommodates changes in the liquid level in the tank. When the 
level of the liquid in the tank falls, nitrogen is added to replace the liquid removed. 
When the level rises, nitrogen containing small quantities of vaporised hexane is 
flushed out of the tank through the vent. If the level is steady, there is no net flow of 
nitrogen through the tank. 
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If the control valve for the nitrogen vent fails open, the other one also opens in 
response to the low pressure, so that nitrogen flows through the tank at a maximum 
rate. In this situation, much more hexane vapour than usual is removed and an 
evaporative cooling effect is observed - the liquid is cooled by the removal of the 
vapour, and its temperature drops. However, the relationship between flow and 
temperature does not work both ways. If the flow of nitrogen is low, no change in 
temperature can be expected. 
This phenomenon can be understood by considering that the hexane in the tank exists 
in vapour and liquid form, and the vapour will tend to equilibrium with the liquid, 
according to the equation: 
Liquid + Heat <=} Vapour 
When nitrogen flows through the tank, vapour is removed, driving the equilibrium to 
produce more vapour (i.e. towards the right hand side of the above equation). In doing 
this, heat is required to produce the vapour, and this is removed from the body of the 
liquid, cooling the liquid that remains. When very little nitrogen flows through the 
tank, the vapour-liquid system is close to equilibrium, so a negligible amount of heat 
is produced or consumed. 
A further example is the overheating problem that occurs if a running pump is not 
able to discharge its usual quantity of process fluid. In normal operation, any heat 
generated by the pump is carried away from it by a large volume of process fluid, so 
that the increase in temperature of that fluid is negligible. 
When the fluid in the pump cannot escape, however, all the energy supplied by the 
pump (including much of that which would otherwise be transferred to the fluid as 
work) goes into heating up a much smaller volume of fluid. In this case, the 
temperature of the fluid can rise much higher, possibly causing a leakage or other 
problem for the plant. 
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Here a relationship is established where low flow of fluid through the pump causes 
high temperature in that fluid. High flow through the pump has no meaningful effect 
on the fluid temperature, as an already negligible temperature rise is made even 
smaller by the change. 
This is another case where a balanced process is perturbed from its normal state, 
although here the balance point is not strictly speaking an equilibrium, but rather a 
steady state. It seems likely that wherever the "normal" state of a physical system is at 
a balance or equilibrium point, as with the nitrogen blanket and pump examples, there 
will be a problem with representing a single mapping influence within the SDG. 
4.2.1 Use of Directed Graph instead of SDG 
One approach which solves the problems of modelling single mapping influences 
described in the examples above, is to use a directed graph representation, rather than 
the signed directed graph, to model the plant. In this scheme, the nodes in the graph 
represent deviations of process variables, rather than the process variables themselves. 
Therefore, the digraph nodes do not have a range of qualitative values; they represent 
single qualitative values which would otherwise belong to SDG nodes. A sign is not 
needed on the arcs between nodes, since arcs in the digraph represent simple cause-
effect links between deviations. 
In converting SDG models to the digraph system, each SDG arc would translate 
directly to two DG arcs, in most cases. Exceptions are arcs involving revFlow or 
noFlow, which would translate to only one DG arc each. Within the DG, such 
deviations would look far less out of place than they do in the SDG. 
Representing other deviations, where no appropriate process variable relates to both a 
"+" and a "-" value, would not be a problem for the DG representation. An example 
of this is contamination, where moreContamination and lessContamination deviations 
are inappropriate, and the only sensible deviation is contamination itself. 
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The single mapping influences in the examples above would be easily represented in 
this scheme as highFlow ~ lowTemp, for the nitrogen blanket, or 
lowFlow ~ highTemp, for the pump. It seems that all such cases, where only a single 
mapping between deviations is required, can be dealt with using this digraph method. 
In the DG, tracing fault propagation through the plant just consists of finding paths 
between deviations - there is no need to take account of signs attached to the arcs 
along the path. The presence of any path between deviations in the graph indicates a 
causal link between them. 
One problem with the digraph representation is that it would almost double the 
number of arcs in any model of the plant. This mayor may not lead to problems with 
computational complexity in search. 
After some experimentation during the development of AutoHAZID, it was decided 
not to proceed with a change to DG models. Apart from the upheaval of changing 
every equipment model, and the risk associated with a new system, it was found that 
moving to a digraph makes it more difficult to detect ambiguous predicted deviations 
during search. Checking a set of paths for contradictory influences on a process 
variable (e.g. lessFlow vs. moreFlow for the same flow) is more costly, as the 
deviations no longer correspond to the same node in the graph. To get around this 
problem would require an association between deviations of the same process variable 
which would negate the benefits of the DG approach. 
4.2.2 Extra Code Numbers for SDG Arcs 
The SDG uses two labels for its arcs, usually shown in figures as "+" and "-", but 
represented in AutoHAZID as two integer values, 1 and -1. These code values 
represent dual mappings of input values to output values, where the input and output 
values are both taken from the set {-,+}. To model single mappings between input 
and output values, a minimum of four possible link types need to be defined. 
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In AutoHAZID, the single mapping influences problem is solved by allowing SDG 
arcs to be labelled by four extra code values. The numbers -2, -3, 2 and 3 were 
chosen arbitrarily to label the single mappings, as an extension to the use of -I and I. 
All six arc codings are shown in Table 4.1 below: 
Code Value Input Output 
+1 + + 
- -
-I + -
- + 
+2 + + 
-2 + -
+3 -
-
-3 - + 
Table 4.1 : Codings for Arc Influences 
The arcs which make use of the new code values are often referred to as "coded arcs", 
and the graph which includes them is strictly speaking not a signed directed graph. 
This "coded directed graph" approach has successfully solved the single direction 
influences problems mentioned earlier. In the first example an arc is added, linking the 
flowrate of nitrogen out of the vent to the temperature of the liquid in the tank: 
arc( [out2, flow] ,-2, [liquid,temp]) 
The second example contains a single link between the flow through the pump and the 
temperature of the pump outlet: 
arc ( [out, flow] , -3, [out, temp] ) 
It is worthwhile noting that, using the ±2 and ±3 mappings, it is possible to completely 
replace the dual mappings represented by the ±I arcs with equivalent pairs of coded 
arcs. In a sense, the pure SDG system is included in the more specific single mapping 
scheme, but the old SDG codes were retained for brevity, for notational convenience 
and for compatibility with existing equipment models. 
134 
Taking this approach, the risk associated with the move to a new system is reduced. 
Users can continue to use the existing SDa models, whilst deploying the new arcs in a 
small number of places first, to demonstrate their usefulness before making any large-
scale changes. This allows an overall policy of incremental upgrade, minimising 
disruption to the users, model libraries and the AutoHAZID program code. 
The system of coded arcs does not impose any great burden on the search algorithm, 
as all that is required is a small amount of extra checking when paths are verified. If a 
coded arc is found in a fault path, the input influence to the arc is determined, from 
the initiating fault and subsequent arc codes, and checked to see that it has the value 
("+" or "_") required by Table 4.1. If not, the path is rejected. This does not impose 
any significant penalty in efficiency. 
Note also that the extra codes for the arcs do not introduce any fundamentally new 
concept to the SDa models. Arcs still represent influences between variables and 
those variables are still represented by graph nodes having values from the set {+, -}. 
Further, the coded digraph is the most specific enhancement that can be made, whilst 
retaining the basic framework of the SDa and the search techniques used on it. Any 
further change, such as extending or restricting the value set for nodes in the graph, 
would break the system or be a fundamentally new addition to it. 
It would be possible to add new concepts to the system, such as particularly strong 
influences, transient effects, delays, probability ranks, etc. This could also be done by 
encoding this information in the arc labels, using extra numbers. However, doing this 
would be a fundamental change to the SDa system and could give problems requiring 
the SDa models to be replaced entirely by a newer system. This sort of change would 
involve a higher risk than the single mapping codes discussed here. 
4.3 Reasoning through unhealthy units 
AutoHAZID relies on the assumption that the single SDa model of the plant it 
constructs from equipment models is valid, even when the scenario being constructed 
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requires that a fault has occurred in the plant. Even within the equipment item in 
which the fault originates, the "healthy" SDa model is still used to predict behaviour. 
This "single model assumption" is closely related to the "single fault assumption" 
used to simplify analysis of accident scenarios in hazard identification. The single 
fault assumption is that there is only one initiating failure in the plant at any time, so 
that simultaneous independent failures are ignored by AutoHAZID. 
Under the single fault assumption, it is reasonable to assume that the only unhealthy 
equipment items are a subset of those through which the fault propagation path passes. 
The only equipment item known to be unhealthy is the one in which the initial fault 
occurred. Most fault paths considered in HAZOP initiate in one place, are propagated 
elsewhere (to healthy units) and only there, in an otherwise healthy unit, cause a 
hazardous consequence. This explains why the single model assumption usually 
produces quite good results when used for HAZOP emulation. 
Problems can arise however, when the fault propagation chain passes through a unit in 
which the initiating fault has caused some part of the model to become invalid. An 
example of this is the problem with modelling reverse flow caused by major leakage 
out of a component such as a valve. The relevant fragment of the SDa for this 
situation is illustrated in Figure 4.2 below. 
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Figure 4.2: Reverse Flow Problem for a Leaking Valve 
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The problem in this case is that the fault should give rise to a potential reverse flow at 
the outlet and downstream of the valve, but not at the inlet or upstream of the valve. 
Unfortunately, the normal model of the valve allows revFlow to propagate in both 
directions, meaning that reverse flow is predicted upstream as well as downstream of 
the valve. 
The leak event has "invalidated" the normal model of the valve, in the sense that the 
model should no longer allow reverse flow to propagate through it. AutoHAZID 
cannot model the sort of state-based model dependency implied by this situation. t 
Instead, it uses a rule in the HAZOP search engine, to detect any fault paths found in 
the graph which start at a leak fault and subsequently propagate through any two 
reverse flow nodes in the unit where the leak occurred. Leaks out of pressurised 
systems or into vacuum systems are covered by the same rule. 
This state of affairs is not very aesthetically satisfying, relying as it does on filtering 
out bad results after they are generated, using a rule which is outside the scope of the 
models themselves. But, it works well so far. It is not clear if this rule eliminates any 
valid scenarios which would otherwise be found by AutoHAZID, but it seems sound 
enough reasoning for any simple single input, single output unit. 
Note that, when air leaks into a vacuum system, the leak gives rise to revFlow at the 
inlet to the unit, rather than the outlet from it, so that the SDG model shown in Figure 
4.2 is not relevant for the vacuum case. It is still true, however, that reasoning through 
revFlow nodes when a leak into vacuum has occurred, is wrong. The different cases 
(of pressurised and vacuum systems) are handled in AutoHAZID by using conditional 
arcs, which are discussed in Chapter 5. 
I Unlike the systems developed by Pennsylvania and described in Section 2.3.4, which allow the plant 
to be remodelled automatically whenever such a state change occurs. 
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4.4 Sparse Results for HAZOP 
Early versions of AutoHAZID produced very large HAZOP report files, containing 
only very few interesting hazards. As a result, users needed a long time to analyse the 
output, to extract results of only limited value. The large size of the output reports was 
a result of the systematic nature of the HAZOP algorithm, combined with the inability 
of the program to filter important results from trivial ones. 
The results were perceived as repetitious, due to the narrow range of phenomena 
tackled by the modelling system at the time. Although all reportings of a particular 
hazard may have been accurate, they were not necessarily important or interesting new 
failure modes discovered by the program. Because all results were reported in the 
same way, the program was unable to distinguish more interesting or important 
hazards from other, less important ones. Such a filtering mechanism is one of the 
natural strengths of the human involvement in HAZOP studies and complements the 
systematic method study approach, ensuring that maximum value is extracted from 
the study. 
When ensuring the correctness of results produced by HAZOP emulation, a lot of time 
was spent examining scenarios to find the causes of any problems with them. If the 
report files had been smaller, this task would have been less laborious. 
Some of the techniques developed to tackle these problems were discussed by 
Wakeman et al. (1997), who showed significant improvements in the readability of 
HAZOP results from AutoHAZID. In newer versions of AutoHAZID, the bulk of the 
report is reduced by a number of filters, each of which can be used or not used, at the 
user's discretion. These filters are outlined below and further information is given in 
Section A.S of Appendix A: 
• Scenarios in the HAZOP results are sorted in order of the importance rank of their 
consequences. This helps focus attention on the most important scenarios first. 
• Using the consequence threshold feature allows the user to significantly reduce the 
bulk of the report, by ignoring consequences below a certain importance rank. 
138 
• The Fluid Modelling System (FMS), based on conditional fault propagation, 
allows fluid properties to be checked so that highly specific failure modes can be 
included in SDG models and spurious reporting of hazards dependent on fluid 
properties (such as fires, toxicity hazards, etc.) can be reduced. This increases the 
relevance and importance of the results. 
• Identified faults which cause deviations, but are associated with no identified 
consequences, can be eliminated froin the report. Similarly, consequences not 
associated with any identified faults can also be left out. 
• If identification of protections is enabled, the HAZOP report can be reduced by 
displaying only scenarios against which there are no protective devices reported. 
• Repetitions are tackled by removing any fault-consequence pair from the report if 
that same pair has appeared in the report already. 
• During fault propagation, each deviation is associated with a set of faults which 
cause it. If the deviation itself can cause some further deviation by fault 
propagation, then the set of faults causing the first deviation will be repeated as 
causes of the second deviation. This can be a source of significant repetition in the 
report produced by AutoHAZID. Repetition is reduced by allowing some 
deviations to be reported as causes of others in the HAZOP report, replacing the 
set of faults which cause the intermediate deviation. Fault propagation search is 
effectively stopped at that point in the longer fault propagation chain. Therefore, 
this method was known (in AutoHAZID) as the "stopping point" method. 
• AutoHAZID groups equipment items into "lines" for the purposes of examination, 
in an attempt to emulate the grouping performed by the HAZOP leader in a 
conventional study. Equipment items are examined by AutoHAZID in a line-by-
line fashion, so that the order in which deviations appear in the report emulates the 
order of examination in a conventional HAZOP. This makes the report more 
readable for users with experience of HAZOP studies. 
• A frequent source of repetition is where many similar faults are reported as causes 
of a deviation, for the same type of equipment. An example is where the deviation 
"noFlow" could be caused by the blockage of a number of valves in the same line. 
AutoHAZID allows such faults to be grouped together and reported for only one 
of the offending units, adding the string "etc" to the fault descriptor, as in 
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"valve8 etc blockage". All units grouped using "ete" must be in the same 
line (as identified by AutoHAZID) and they must be the same type. 
One of the most important ways of improving the HAZOP results is to add more 
interesting failure modes to the models. This should not be attempted on an ad hoc 
basis, but should use the knowledge elicitation and modelling techniques mentioned 
in Chapter 3. The Fluid Modelling System, as discussed in Chapter 5, can help 
improve the focus of results, as well as making possible the addition of more detailed, 
specific failure modes. 
4.5 Specific Hazards Flagged Indiscriminately 
In the most basic qualitative, fault propagation-based version of AutoHAZID, faults 
and consequences are paired up and reported solely on the basis of whether a valid 
fault propagation path can be found between them. This means that the faults and 
consequences are constrained only by their location in the plant (associated with a 
particular piece of equipment) and by the SDG which (potentially) provides a causal 
path between them. 
In reality, many hazards are dependent on other factors, such as the nature of the fluids 
in the plant, as well as the equipment items present and their connectivity. An obvious 
example is the fire hazard posed by a leak of fluid out of the process. This can only be 
a true hazard if the process fluid contains a flammable component - a leak of water 
would not pose a fire hazard. 
Clearly, if a tool such as AutoHAZID is not able to refer to information telling it 
whether the material is flammable or not, it must either report every leak as a fire 
hazard, or ignore fire hazards altogether. Therefore, information about the properties 
of the process fluids is used to decide the relevance of specific faults and 
consequences in the plant model. 
This capability has been present in AutoHAZID since an early stage. Initially, the 
information stored on fluid components included a small number of characteristics 
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which a fluid either possessed or lacked, such as "flammable", "toxic", "corrosive", 
etc. When a fault or consequence was conditional on one of these properties, reference 
was made to the library of fluid properties for each component of the relevant process 
fluid. 
Now, the fluid modelling system contains more data on the fluids present in the plant 
model, and has access to a wider variety of information (numerical as well as logical) 
on the chemical components present in those fluids. The newer system is described in 
Chapter 5. However, the objective is still to verify specific hazards by reference to 
fluid properties, in order to make the HAZOP report more interesting and reduce the 
bulk of irrelevant false positives. 
4.6 Hazards do not appear where expected in HAZOP report 
Users of the AutoHAZID program who are experts in traditional HAZOP often 
criticise the form, or order, of the results produced by HAZOP emulation. A typical 
comment is "Why doesn't the program identify this hazard next to this deviation?". 
There is probably no acceptable solution to this problem, because experts will 
disagree over where any specified scenario should be identified, which is largely a 
matter of personal taste. 
AutoHAZID's efforts to make the output table more readable (Section 4.4) partly 
cause this problem and partly improve it. Sorting process units into lines arranges the 
HAZOP results into an order which makes more sense to a human reader. However, 
filtering out repetitions in the report, which vastly reduces the volume of output, 
sometimes causes deletion of a "preferred" reporting of a hazard. 
It would be possible to apply further rules to the report generator in AutoHAZID, so 
that the program would report certain classes of hazard next to "appropriate" 
deviations. Such a facility could perhaps be customised to particular user preferences. 
However, this was never a priority during STOPHAZ, and was never implemented. 
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4.7 Change the Format of the AutoHAZID Report 
A radical approach to reducing the bulk of the results produced by AutoHAZID is to 
consider abandoning the HAZOP table as a vehicle for these results. Since the results 
are really only a set of fault paths, linking initiating faults to final deviations or 
consequences, the faults and consequences could be tabulated against one other, 
without stating the intermediate deviations. 
Alternatively, a graphical user interface could be developed, allowing the user to 
interactively browse through the fault paths with full access to the fault propagation 
chain as well as the terminal events. The fault tree is another model of how results 
could be presented. 
Although none of these ideas were developed into software during STOPHAZ, it 
seems clear that much of the effort made by users to read the results of AutoHAZID 
could be saved if they were presented in a more concise and usable format. 
4.8 Models in AutoHAZID not applicable to early HAZOP on PFD 
There is no fundamental reason why a tool like AutoHAZID cannot be used to 
perform HAZOP-like analyses at an earlier design stage, on PFD-Ievel plant 
descriptions. Although there was no serious attempt to apply AutoHAZID to PFDs, it 
is clear that identifying safety problems at this stage can save a lot of time and money. 
A PFD is essentially the same kind of input as a P&ID, with less detail on it. The main 
problem is likely to be that the models developed for HAZOP analysis of P&IDs 
concentrate on problems of components on a fairly detailed level. Output from the 
system when examining a PFD may therefore not be very interesting or informative 
due to lack of detail in the PFD description. 
There may also be a problem with PFDs in that the items on the PFD may not 
correspond to single items in the AutoHAZID library of equipment models. What is 
required is probably a set of models covering operations at the level of detail likely to 
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apply to PFDs. One issue to be addressed is how to link these models to the existing 
hierarchy of equipment models. Another is to what extent the PFD models would 
correspond to functionally distinct "modules" performing well-defined unit 
operations, specified at quite a high level, in the plant. 
4.9 Qualitative Ambiguity 
The problem of ambiguity is one that faces all qualitative modelling systems and has 
been introduced, in general terms, in Section 2.2.2. This section discusses how 
ambiguity causes problems for AutoHAZID, mainly through increased complexity in 
graph search. 
An example of the ambiguity of qualitative addition, which often occurs in 
AutoHAZID, is the problem of deciding what flow deviations occur in the branches of 
a divider or header as a result of a pressure deviation in one of the branches. To 
resolve this ambiguity requires information (possibly numerical) on components 
connected upstream and downstream. Sometimes, using higher level qualitative mass 
balance constraints can reduce ambiguity, as reported by Fanti et at. (1993). 
It should be noted that this inability to incorporate higher level constraints is due to a 
great strength of the SDO models in AutoHAZID, namely locality. It is not desirable 
to build balance constraints into otherwise completely local unit models, but some 
approach to automatically generating these sorts of constraints, at the level of the plant 
model, may be useful. 
AutoHAZID is not a rigorous qualitative simulation package. It simply attempts to 
implement hazard identification techniques, searching for evidence that a hazard is 
possible without simulating the hazard in great detail. Most of the time, ambiguity is a 
nuisance rather than a threat to the integrity of the results produced. The result of 
ambiguous models is that the program over-reports hazards which may in fact not 
exist, rather than missing out hazards. 
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4.9.1 Multiple Paths in the SDG 
The most important type of ambiguity in the SDG is related to the problem of multiple 
paths between nodes in the graph. Given two process variable nodes, A and B, 
searching the graph exhaustively may yield a number of paths, of various lengths, 
from A to B. Each of these paths can be associated with an overall effect of A on B, 
either a "+" or a "_". There is no guarantee that all the paths found will have the same 
overall influence, so they may contradict one another. 
In assessing the paths produced by exhaustive search, the first task is to eliminate 
those paths that represent "unreal", or physically impossible, scenarios. The remaining 
paths may represent "real influences" between A and B, operating via a number of 
alternative causal mechanisms. 
Further analysis of how these causal paths relate to one another is not a simple matter. 
They could be treated as simultaneous and potentially competing influences in the 
plant, or as alternative (mutually exclusive) situations, only one of which is relevant at 
a time. This level of analysis is not addressed in AutoHAZID at present. 
If possible, the real influence paths should be assessed in terms of their relative 
strengths of influence, so that the dominant influence between A and B can be 
identified. At this stage, the most dominant path may be chosen as the only one to 
proceed with, or a number of the more dominant influences could be considered. 
A number of problems arise with this theoretical model for search path evaluation. 
Most importantly, there is no secure way of deciding within the program if a given 
path represents a real or unreal influence between variables. Therefore, much of the 
effort in this area has to be put in during model design and implementation, well 
before any HAZOP search. In searching the SDG, AutoHAZID must assume that all 
paths it finds are equally "real". Secondly, the question of comparing paths to find the 
more dominant influences may be possible in theory, but is not supported by any 
existing data or models for causal strengths in the SDG. 
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In the absence of information to allow the strengths of influences to be determined 
and compared, the path which represents the worst case from a safety point of view 
can be chosen. Frequently, however, identifying the worst case is not possible until the 
expansion of all fault paths has been completed, which means that the computational 
costs of searching the SOG cannot be reduced in this way. 
The simplistic approach to the problem of mUltiple paths used in AutoHAZID is to 
take the set of paths produced by exhaustive search and eliminate all but the ones of 
shortest length in terms of number of SOG arcs. The resulting set may still contain 
more than one path, and these paths may themselves predict contradictory influences 
between the variables A and B. From the point of view of qualitative hazard 
identification, however, all that matters is the overall influence between the variables. 
If this is still ambiguous, AutoHAZID must proceed with the assumption that both 
influences are possible. This may cause problems with the credibility of the results 
obtained, of course. This "shortest path heuristic" is discussed further in Section 4.10 
and, elsewhere, by Chung (1993). 
4.9.2 Cyclical Paths 
If the nodes A and B are the same in the above discussion, then the paths produced are 
cycles in the SOG. Sometimes, these represent the influences that a deviation in one 
variable has on that variable itself, but this is not always the case. Because the 
presence of cyclical paths in the SOG is ignored by the search algorithm used in 
AutoHAZID, models are very often designed to take advantage of this feature. In such 
cases, no cyclical influence is intended by the model designer. 
An example is the frequent use of one variable to propagate deviations in both 
upstream and downstream directions using the same set of nodes. This situation is 
illustrated quite well in Figure 4.3 in Section 4.10, where flow nodes are chained 
together by pairs of arcs forming tight cyclical paths in the SDG at each point along 
the chain. Making use of such an arrangement is practical, provided that the algorithm 
used to search the graph ignores the presence of cycles. 
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Real plants certainly do include real cyclical influences. They are in operation in every 
feedback loop in the plant, including many of the physical processes as well as the 
control loops which maintain the plant at steady state. 
Cyclical paths are ignored in the search procedure in AutoHAZID because they 
potentially lead to fault paths of infinite length. It is also rather difficult to deduce 
anything from the presence of a cyclical path unless some of the numerical properties 
of the feedback system are understood, so that questions of dynamic behaviour and 
stability can be answered. 
In other work, feedback loops (particularly control loops) have formed an integral part 
of the decomposition of plant models, in Shafaghi et al. (1984), for example. There 
may be some value in identifying feedback in the plant in order to simplify the 
analysis of behaviour, but this idea has not so far been developed within AutoHAZID. 
4.9.3 Ambiguous Predicted Flow Deviations 
Within the flow path modelling system in use within AutoHAZID models, pressure 
deviations can give rise to changes in flow. However, it is often impossible to check 
whether reverse flow (revFlow) or simply reduced flow (lessFlow) are possible in a 
given scenario, because of lack of specific (numerical) information about the cause. 
At other times, both deviations are genuinely possible given the situation as specified. 
In either case, ambiguous predictions are produced. 
One must bear in mind also that deviations of process variables are defined in terms of 
their sufficiency to cause some final consequence. The sufficiency of each deviation 
can only be judged in the context of a complete fault path, and may depend on the 
magnitude of the deviation or on other factors, including the nature of fluids in the 
plant. Therefore, the sort of uncertainty shown when we cannot decide which of 
revFlow or lessFlow occur, is an example of the more general problem of deciding the 
magnitude of deviations in a fault path. The issues of reasoning with fluid properties 
and the quantitative magnitudes of deviations, in order to assess the sufficiency of 
fault paths generated by SDO search, are discussed further in Section 5.3. 
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4.10 Shortest Path Heuristic Not Sound 
The shortest path heuristic is a rule that considerably simplifies the job of simulating 
fault propagation in the SOG. It states that the shortest path between any two nodes in 
the SOG is the dominant one and should therefore be taken as the effecti ve path of 
influence in the model. 
This means that when AutoHAZID expands paths by backwards chaining search, to 
find the causes of a variable deviation, it takes notice only of the shortest path leading 
from a particular node or fault to the deviation of interest. The program may find more 
than one path with the same length, so all of these are accepted as equally valid, but 
all longer paths are rejected. 
The shortest path heuristic does away with most of the ambiguity in influences 
between variables in the plant model, but sometimes two or more shortest paths can 
be found, including paths with differing overall influences. In this case, AutoHAZID 
reports that both deviations of the final node can be caused by the initial cause. 
In addition to its effect on ambiguity, the shortest path heuristic helps to control the 
complexity which would otherwise affect the efficiency of search. The problem is that 
we have no reliable theoretical foundation or guidelines to support the use of the 
heuristic, just the observation that it works most of the time. Interestingly, there are 
very few problems where the shortest path heuristic produces an answer which is 
actually wrong. An example is shown in Figure 4.3. 
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Figure 4.3 : Problem Plant for the Shortest Path Heuristic 
In this constructed example problem, liquid is being pumped out of the tank tl using 
pump pi, through the valve v I. A spill-back line is shown from the divider dl, taking 
a proportion of the liquid back to the tank. Other inlets and outlets from the tank are 
not shown in this example. Considering how the level in the tank is affected by the 
valve v I failing open, it is most likely that the flow downstream of d I increases, 
causing the level in the tank to drop. However, depending on what units are connected 
downstream of the divider d I, the flow could also remain constant. 
The plant SDG in Figure 4.3 is simplified to show only flow (Q) and its effect on level 
(L) in the tank tl. For clarity, this example does not use the flow modelling technique 
described in Section 3.5, but similar examples have been used to demonstrate the 
occurrence of the same problem with AutoHAZID models which do use the flow path 
templates. 
In searching backwards from the level node, two paths are discovered which lead back 
to the fault, "vI fails open". One depends on upstream propagation of flow deviations 
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through v I and p I, to t I at the main outlet of the tank. The other path propagates flow 
downstream via v I and the divider d I, through the spill-back line and into the tank t I. 
The former path is the correct one, leading to a low level in the tank - what we would 
expect if the valve were to open fully. However, the propagation path via the spill-
back line is the shorter one (5 arcs, compared to 6 for the other path), so it is the one 
which is reported. That is, in this example, the valve failing open is reported as a 
cause of an increase in the tank level. 
In AutoHAZID, this problem is solved using rules which are activated by the HAZOP 
algorithm itself. The rules look out for situations where a path has been found which 
propagates deviations through the "feedback" section of a loop, from an event in the 
"forward" section of the loop. If such a path exists, in conjunction with another path 
having a contradictory influence and not using the feedback section of the loop, then 
the longer path is adopted in preference to the potentially erroneous shorter one. 
The use of ad hoc rules for fixing problems like this is not very palatable, especially 
when they are resident in the inference engine part of the system, rather than 
embedded in the model system. It may be that there is little option in this case, 
because of the non-local nature of the problem - the real behaviour of the tank level 
depends on a mass balance over the elements of the loop which cannot be expressed 
in the unit models at a local level. 
One reason for the success of the shortest path heuristic is that models are usually 
designed in the knowledge that the heuristic will be applied. That is, the modeller 
makes the assumption that the shortest path is the most valid, as well as the most 
efficient, link between nodes in the SDG. Therefore, good practice in modelling 
means using the minimum number of arcs necessary to represent the infl uences 
present in the unit, without allowing false influences to be created in the model by 
unintended paths. 
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Even assuming that models are constructed using the best practice in modelling, the 
question still remains: "Why does the shortest path between two nodes in the plant 
SDG usually represent the correct causal influence between them?" 
To look at the problem in more detail, the first thing to note is that the plant SDG 
consists of a number of mini-SDGs, representing equipment items connected by links 
which correspond to stream connections between the equipment items. All the stream 
connection links are parallel sets of SDG arcs connecting variables in one unit to the 
same variable in another unit. The "cross-over" between variables, representing 
interesting physical influences, takes place within the units themselves. 
Next, we observe that the shortest paths between node pairs within the same unit are 
likely to be correct because the models were designed in this way, with all variables 
visible to the model builder at the same time. It should be part of the methodology 
used whenever constructing or updating models of equipment, that every distinct pair 
of nodes in the model is checked to see that there is at most one shortest path between 
them. The influence represented by this shortest path must also be correct (or at least 
feasible), and appropriate for the model. 
Given these observations, we can go on to examine how alternate paths between two 
nodes, aj and bj , arise in the plant SDG. If aj and bj are present in the same unit, then 
the shortest path must be the correct one, as the model builder made it so. 
If aj and bj are in adjacent units, then these units are connected by a stream, 
represented by a parallel set of arcs, each arc linking a propagation variable in one unit 
to the same variable in the other unit. The simplest case is shown in Case I of Figure 
4.4, where node al in unit A is connected to a2 by a shortest path of 0 or more arcs. a2 
in unit A connects to bl in unit B via a single arc, and bl is connected to b2 via a 
shortest path of 0 or more arcs. 
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Figure 4.4 : Propagation Paths between Units 
Since the shortest path between nodes in the same unit is designed to be the only valid 
influence between those variables, the path between al and bz in Case I must be a 
valid one. For a particular variable (e.g. pressure, temperature) propagating between 
units A and B (as represented by [a,-b1l in Case I above), there is only one arc 
linking the two units. Thus, there can be a maximum of one path per propagation 
variable linking the nodes present in adjacent units, and this path is valid. 
This does not prevent there being another path between al and bz, via some other 
propagation variable, as shown in Case IT. Each path is a feasible causal influence, by 
virtue of the argument for Case I above, but there is no guarantee that [al-az-b1 -
bzl and [a,-arbrbzl will be the same length. 
If the two nodes are separated by any number of intervening units in series, as in 
Case m, there are at least two subclasses to consider. Firstly (Case mal, if there is no 
ISl 
b2 
cross-over within the intermediate unit C, then propagation goes straight through C 
and the system is equivalent to Case I. Secondly, if the propagation crosses over from 
one variable to another within unit C, as in Case llIb, the path [Cl -c31 is still a valid 
shortest path and a valid path in C between those nodes, by virtue of the same 
argument as before. Therefore, the path [al-a2-cl-C3-brb21 is valid. 
Systems where there is more than one unit interposed between units A and B can be 
dealt with in the same way as Cases ma and llIb. Case mc shows that, as units are 
increasingly separated, there is more scope for ambiguity. In this case there are four 
possible paths between a) and b2, all of which can be shown to be valid. Not all of 
these will necessarily have the same length or path influence, so some will normally 
be neglected using the shortest path heuristic. 
A similar argument to that used with Cases ma, llIb and mc, can be used for the 
example of Case IV, which is similar to the example problem of the tank in Figure 4.3 
above. The propagation paths via unit C and via unit D are both equally valid as far as 
the information in the SDG models is concerned. 
Thus, to make an informed judgement of which paths are appropriate, all possible 
paths should be examined, and information outside the scope of the pure SDG model 
is required. The information required should support the evaluation of which paths are 
most "relevant". This question could involve some evaluation of the relative strengths 
of causal influence in candidate paths, or assessment of time-based aspects of the 
system, such as transient behaviour and ordering of the events which may occur, rate 
information, etc. As mentioned in Section 4.9.1, causal analysis of this depth was 
never attempted in AutoHAZID. 
It should be noted that preliminary results with AutoHAZID indicate that the shortest 
path heuristic can be made into an "option" without too many computational 
penalties. Comparing the results of running the program on the test case plant reported 
by Lawley (1974) reveals that without using the shortest path heuristic, the HAZOP 
report produced is not much more bulky, and the HAZOP run time is only doubled. 
152 
Analysing the Lawley results file reveals that the only problems caused by the loss of 
the shortest path heuristic concern the flow path templates used in the plant. The flow 
path allows two conflicting paths linking pressure and flow, one of which is 
eliminated by the shortest path heuristic. Therefore, the predicted flow effect due to a 
pressure deviation sometimes operates in the wrong direction. The use of the shortest 
path heuristic has been effectively designed into the flow path template (see 
Figure 3.5). Unless an alternative flow path model can be produced without multiple 
internal paths, it is impractical to discard the shortest path heuristic.2 
4.11 Computational Complexity 
The problem of complexity has been described in general terms in Chapter I. It is not 
clear whether the complexity of the search space examined by AutoHAZID is 
exponential, or less complex than that (e.g. polynomial). This judgement is dependent 
on the nature of the SDG, which in turn is ruled by the connections in the plant model 
and the models of equipment items in it. 
It is easy to see that an upper bound on the branching factor for any given plant can be 
identified, as the maximum branching factor in units within the plant. For a range of 
plants of various sizes, using the same library of unit models, the maximum may be 
identified as the maximum branch factor of nodes in equipment items modelled in the 
library. Therefore, the branching factor has an upper bound which is not dependent on 
size of the plant model, so that the search procedure is definitely not "super-
exponential". 
Considering the topology of typical plants, and the corresponding SDa topology, it 
seems that much of the plant consists of straight-line propagation, without much 
branching. Most branching occurs within major equipment models. This suggests that, 
2 If the flow path template were the only case where multiple internal paths occurred, then it might be 
possible to discard the shortest path heuristic, if some means were provided to filter out the ambiguities. 
Tu date, we do not know how widespread multiple internal paths are, so the wisdom of making such a 
change is doubtful. 
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even if the complexity of search in the graph is exponential, the overall branching 
factor per arc should be quite low. 
Some figures for average branching factor calculated from the arcs forming plant 
models of two example plants, are given in Table 4.2 below. The branching factor in 
both forwards and backwards directions has been calculated as follows. Firstly, the 
number of nodes in the SOG having at least one branch in the appropriate direction, is 
counted (this is the "number of nodes" figure). Then, the total number of branches 
offered from these nodes is counted, and divided by the number of nodes, to 
determine an "average branch factor" for the appropriate direction. 
Lawley Plant Benzene Plant 
Forwards Branch Factor: 
Number of Nodes 690 2662 
Average Branch Factor 1.80 1.66 
Backwards Branch Factor: 
Number of Nodes 639 2548 
Average Branch Factor 1.94 1.73 
Table 4.2 : SDG Branching Factors for Example Plants 
These calculated figures seem to indicate that, if the search is exponential, the 
branching factor for search in either forwards or backwards directions is about 2. It 
seems likely that the complexity in the search that actually takes place during HAZOP 
is not actually so severe, because whereas these branching factors would imply quite a 
severe limitation on the size of the plants that can be analysed, such a limit has not 
been encountered so far. 
It is also worth noting that the variables in the plant SOG form weakly connected sub-
networks for propagating deviations between units, and are not inter-linked at every 
point. Indeed, the only points of contact between (say) temperature propagation and 
pressure propagation may be at major units where a significant unit operation occurs. 
For this reason, the average branching factors given above may not be representative 
of the SOG search required in HAZOP emulation. 
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The problem of complexity in AutoHAZID SDG search can be tackled in a number of 
ways: 
• Particularly important, for reducing the potentially enormous branching factors 
which could make search much more difficult, are sensible conventions for 
modelling which eliminate unnecessary cross-linking between variables. If 
possible, branching fault paths should be limited to modelling phenomena within 
complex units, rather than being a commonplace feature of the fault propagation 
pathways throughout the plant model. 
• The AutoHAZID HAZOP emulation algorithm was rewritten, to cut down on the 
amount of repeated search work that was being done with the old version (see 
Appendix B). The search for causes of HAZOP deviations is now a two-stage 
process: let L) be the list of nodes corresponding to variables of interest in the 
HAZOP study. In a first stage, AutoHAZID expands paths for causes of deviations 
in the node, as far as the nearest other node also in L). When this has been done for 
each node in L), the program takes the partial paths produced by the first stage and 
combines them into full paths from faults to final deviations. This algorithm 
considerably reduces the search required for HAZOP. 
• The shortest path heuristic can help to reduce the amount of work done in the 
second stage of the HAZOP search algorithm, and the number of resulting 
completed fault paths. This works by removing partial paths where they share the 
same starting point as other shorter partial paths for the deviation being examined. 
As discussed in Section 4.10, the shortest path heuristic is not a particularly sound 
rule of inference, but it does seem to work effectively and has been in operation for 
the whole time that AutoHAZID has been in development. 
• The HAZOP search is usually exhaustive and finds all the paths in the SDG, no 
matter how long they are. AutoHAZID can also operate in a mode where a fixed 
limit to the length of the fault paths is prescribed. In this mode, as soon as a path 
reaches the specified number of arcs in length, the algorithm does not attempt to 
expand it any further. Good results can be obtained with this (non-rigorous) 
method, but there is a small possibility (in theory) that some relevant hazard 
scenario may be overlooked. 
155 
• The SDO can be pruned to remove arcs which are not required by the HAZOP. 
This reduces the number of arcs present and therefore reduces the time taken to 
look up nodes in the SDO. Under certain conditions, pruning the SDO can also cut 
the amount of search done, if it can be shown that such search will produce no 
results of interest to the HAZOP study requested. There may be no consequences of 
interest in a particular part of the graph, for instance, which may justify removing 
arcs from the SDO. 
4.12 Concluding Remarks 
The strengths of the SDO are related to its weaknesses. Computational efficiency is 
achieved by using a representation based in the middle ground of representational 
strength, between simple digraph models and some more highly structured model of 
causal mechanism in the physical plant. It is a weak but efficient representation. 
Very frequently, the way an equipment model is constructed is the cause of the 
problems encountered with it. In these cases, all that may be required to side-step the 
problem is a rethink of the approach used in producing the model. This can only be 
done on a case-by-case basis and the evidence in favour of a large scale redesign of 
the system, to solve numerous problems of a fundamental nature, must be 
accumulated over some time, to justify such a redesign. 
Fluid models will be used to focus the applicability of the output generated by the 
program. The problem is the quantity and paucity of output from the simple SDO 
model, where scenarios In reality may be valid only for specific 
conditions/circumstances in the plant. Additional expertise is needed, to improve the 
judgement of AutoHAZID by tempering the qualitative fault propagation with 
quantitative calculation or estimation. This may be achieved by links to the physical 
properties calculation packages, or making arcs in the SDO conditional in places. 
The next chapter addresses the inherent limits of the purely qualitative approach and 
proposes a method for making use of quantitative information related to fluids in the 
plant, which is implemented in the fluid modelling system. 
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Chapter 5 : Conditionality in Fault Path 
Modelling and the Fluid Modelling System 
Chapter 4 (in particular Sections 4.1, 4.3, 4.5, 4.9 and 4.10) has demonstrated that, for 
many important hazard identification problems, the qualitative SDG models of 
AutoHAZID are insufficient. This is an inherent limitation of the SDG, which allows 
the representation of only qualitative information in the AutoHAZID models. 
This limitation is addressed in AutoHAZID using the fluid modelling system, which is 
described in this chapter. First of all, the issue of how to improve the results produced 
by AutoHAZID, is discussed, in Section 5.1. The approach chosen is to add more 
specific faults and consequences to the models in the SDG, and to control how these 
are reported in the HAZOP report by adding conditions to arcs, faults and 
consequences in the SDG. By verifying the conditions present in completed fault 
paths, using properties of fluids present in the plant, the validity of generated 
scenarios can be checked. 
The fluid modelling system is described at length in Section 5.2, which explains the 
approach of fault path validation and the system of functions and predicates which 
implements this validation method. Section 5.2 also describes how the different 
subsystems making up the FMS are integrated. 
An interesting appliStion of the FMS is to monitor the quantitative limits on 
deviations in fault paths. This allows some scenarios to be ruled out because the 
deviations present can be demonstrated as not severe enough to cause the final 
consequence. This approach is illustrated in Section 5.3 using five case study 
problems. The chapter concludes with some overall comments on the FMS, problems 
encountered with it, and possible improvements for the future. 
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5.1 Improving on Fault Propagation 
AutoHAZID uses "simple" fault propagation, where a fault is linked to a consequence 
by a linear strand of deviations, to formalise cause and effect in the development of a 
hazardous scenario. Real scenarios often do not match exactly with this model, so that 
the fault propagation method does not capture all details of the real situation. In such 
cases, careful analysis of the scenario is required, to ensure the most important 
features of the problem are captured in the model. An appropriate modelling 
methodology can help ensure completeness, as discussed in Section 3.5 and (later) in 
Section 6.4. 
A difficult class of problems for the qualitative SDG system is where, at some stage, a 
combination of events or conditions is required for the scenario to develop. This 
"conjunction" of events corresponds to an "AND" gate in the fault tree for the 
development of the scenario. The basic SDG does not represent this sort of ("AND 
logic") step at alI.I 
If, for a recognised hazard scenario, no acceptable model can be constructed within 
the existing modelling system, one must consider what approach should be taken: 
• Proceed with an unsatisfactory model. In this case, the hazard may be reported 
indiscriminately and the program may produce misleading output because it cannot 
apply the hazard model selectively enough. 
• Abandon the new scenario and do not model it at all. This reduces the value of the 
results produced, because a hazard which may exist in some real plant cannot be 
identified by the HAZOP emulator. 
• Enhance the model representation, by improving or replacing the SDG. This is a 
costly option, in terms of rewriting program code and equipment models. 
Forethought and planning are essential to avoid wasted effort and ensure an elegant 
and efficient solution to the problem. Often, new functionality can be added as an 
I AND is sometimes presumed in modelling certain situations. For example, we may assume that 
alarms are ignored when identifying hazards and modelling their development. 
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optional feature, so that existing models can still be used. This approach reduces 
the risk associated with a change. 
Some idea of how the SDG might be improved can be gained by analysing how 
existing models tend to fail when used for hazard identification. The usual signs of 
poor quality models are incorrect hazard identification and sparse reporting of 
interesting hazards in an otherwise uninteresting report, as discussed in Section 4.4. 
Incorrect hazard identification, giving rise to an increased number of "false positive" 
results, may be due to: 
• Incorrect fault propagation arcs. Where a particular arc in some equipment 
model can be identified as incorrect, the arc can be removed, or the equipment item 
can be remodelled in a different way. This sort of problem is detected by 
examining the HAZOP results critically and analysing the fault paths giving rise to 
suspect results. A number of tools provided in the AutoHAZID program itself can 
be used for this task. 
• Incorrect fault propagation paths that are locally sound. Sometimes, one finds 
that every link in a fault propagation chain is locally valid, that each arc relates a 
variable to its neighbour in a valid way, but nevertheless the whole chain does not 
predict a real effect. This can occur because some higher level constraint, such as 
heat or mass balance, is not captured in the arcs concerned. Problems of this nature 
can be difficult to solve using localised causal relations, such as the arcs of the 
SDG, because the SDG does not carry much information between nodes. 2 
• Indiscriminate reporting of hazards. Some hazards can appear everywhere in a 
HAZOP report. This may be due to a fault or consequence being modelled as 
generally applicable, where it actually has a more limited scope in reality. In this 
case, a restriction/check on the applicability of the fault or consequence is needed. 
2 An example of a problem where the application of high level constraints resulted in the solution to an 
ambiguity problem. is discussed in Fanti et al. (1993). This was a case where local qualitative mass 
balances were not sufficient to unambiguously specify a system state, but higher level balance 
constraints solved the problem. 
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The most important issue to be addressed by any improvement to the SDG system is 
how to enrich the range of failure modes represented in equipment models. It must be 
possible to model highly specific faults and consequences within unit models, and to 
manipulate them so that they are only reported when relevant within the plant being 
examined. Therefore, the applicability of new faults and consequences should be 
made conditional on the context within the plant that makes them relevant. 
The aim is to eliminate "blanket" reporting of hazards, by verifying the accuracy of 
fault propagation paths as far as possible. In this way, AutoHAZID can reduce the 
number of false or irrelevant hazards identified and it should become possible to 
model more interesting failure modes and hazards within the system. As a result, the 
number of interesting items in the HAZOP report should increase and its size should 
decrease, improving the richness and usefulness of the results produced. 
Some terms will be used in the following discussion, which it may be helpful to define 
here: 
• The objective is to enable AutoHAZID to produce highly focussed results, where 
all the hazardous scenarios reported are relevant and interesting in the context of 
the plant being studied. 
• To do this, it is necessary to add more specific faults and consequences to the 
equipment models. Such faults and consequences provide more detail about the 
events concerned, compared to the generic faults and consequences often seen in 
AutoHAZID results. For example, one might consider reporting a "flammable leak 
to environment", rather than simply a "leak to environment". 
• In order to prevent these more specific faults and consequences being reported 
indiscriminately, conditions are attached to faults, consequences and propagation 
arcs in the SDG. Such conditions must be satisfied (where present) for an arc to be 
valid in a fault path. 
• Conditionality is the property possessed by arcs, faults and consequences which 
have conditions attached. Such arcs, faults and consequences can be referred to as 
conditional. 
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The factors of most use, in determining whether a hazardous scenario is feasible, are 
related to the types of fluids present. Luckily, information on the main fluids present 
in a plant is usually available in the process description for that plant. 
Therefore, the first attempts to make SDG models in AutoHAZID conditional 
focussed on fluid-related factors, applying optional conditions to the faults and 
consequences in unit models. Using these conditions, the relevance of a fault or 
consequence could be checked when it was processed in a fault path. Once conditions 
had been applied to faults and consequences, it was a short step to allowing fault 
propagation between nodes to become conditional too. 
Using the present "fluid modelling system" (FMS) to evaluate these conditions, 
scenarios in the basic SDG models can be tested during the HAZOP search, reducing 
ambiguity. The particular case of checking the magnitude of deviations in propagation 
chains, to reject infeasible chains, is discussed in Section 5.3. 
In designing the FMS, care was taken that the library of qualitative equipment models 
could still be used in AutoHAZID without change. This means that conditions are 
optional - changes to models are made as and when new conditions are added to 
existing arcs, or new arcs are added. Also, the (highly efficient) graph search 
algorithm was not removed. It is used to produce fault paths in the SDG, which are 
then evaluated by the FMS. Conditions are evaluated whenever they are encountered 
in a fault path, and if any condition is found not to be valid, the fault path is removed. 
The HAZOP reports produced by AutoHAZID are more focussed as a result of this 
filtering. 
This form of conditionality in the SDG is important for any hazard identification 
system which attempts to model potentially complex hazardous scenarios. The FMS, 
described in the next section, uses information about units in the plant model, fluid 
properties and quantitative data to verify the correctness of fault paths produced by 
search on the SDG. 
161 
5.2 The Fluid Modelling System 
The earliest attempts at making the SDO conditional in AutoHAZID involved simple 
properties of the fluids present in the plant model. The names of fluid components 
were specified in lists associated with particular units in the plant, thereby identifying 
which fluids could be present where in the plant. These named fluid components 
corresponded to pure compounds for which the early AutoHAZID system could look 
up data in a "fluid model library" . 
The early fluid model library (which is still a subsystem within the current FMS) 
included a few properties which a compound mayor may not be deemed to possess. 
For example, the consequence' environmental contamination' is relevant 
only if the fluid present in the equipment is toxic. Properties of the fluids in the 
system, such as toxicity and flammability, were defined in this early work and some 
consequences were made conditional on the fluid in the equipment item having a 
certain property. For instance, if no component of the fluid in a unit had the property 
toxic, then the consequence' environmental contamination' would not 
be reported within that unit. 
This early system did not allow specification of where in a piece of equipment the 
given fluids were to be found, and it used a very simple algorithm for propagating 
information about expected fluids to other units. All fluid components in a unit were 
passed on to downstream units, which led to problems in heat exchangers, for instance 
- the program predicted that the shell and tube-side fluids would mix and that all 
downstream units would receive the same mixture. The present FMS associates fluids 
with ports in the equipment items, so that the fluids in the shell and tube sides of a 
heat exchanger are kept distinct unless an interface failure occurs. 
The FMS is now quite a general-purpose rule system, which maintains information 
about currently applicable fluids at each point in a fault path, as well as allowing 
calculations to be included in rules. The sort of rules in the FMS include, but are not 
limited to, reasoning about numerical properties of the fluids present. Systems are 
included for dealing with logical operations, arithmetical comparisons and, most 
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importantly, a number of different software systems for answering queries about fluids 
are integrated into one system. 
Fluid Library 
ASPEN 
Properties Plus 
Hyprotech 
HVSVS 
Plant Model 
properties of pure 
compounds, parameters 
tor calculations 
equipment attributes, 
fluid data, etc. 
properties of 
mixtures 
predicate 
checks 
Figure 5.1 : Fluid Modelling System and associated Information Sources 
A schematic view of the FMS subsystems and some of their associated data sources, is 
given above, in Figure 5.1. The various elements of the system will be described more 
fully in the sections which follow: 
• Section 5.2.1 outlines the principle of fault path validation, which forms the basis 
of what the FMS does. 
• The propagation, through the plant model, of user-supplied information about 
fluids is described in Section 5.2.2. 
• Rules in the FMS make use of predicates and functions, which are described in 
Section 5.2.3. 
• Section 5.2.4 outlines the types of information needed by the FMS to evaluate 
predicates and functions, including details of the "current fluids" in the plant. 
• The integrated subsystems of the FMS are discussed in' Section 5.2.5, which 
describes the evaluation of predicates and functions, as well as examining some 
operating system issues in the HAZID system. 
• Section 5.2.6 describes the information stored in the fluid library, a precursor to the 
FMS which is still used a~ an information source on fluids. 
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• The calculation of fluid properties, by external packages and within AutoHAZID, 
is the subject of Section 5.2.7. 
• The reactivity group-based system for detecting fluid compatibility problems has 
an interface in the FMS, which is described in Section 5.2.8. 
5.2.1 Fault Path Validation 
The chains of influence produced by SDG search during HAZOP emulation are 
known as "fault paths". They are validated by checking conditions attached to the 
faults, consequences and arcs, using calculations, qualitative and quantitative 
information. Rules are therefore defined to specify the checks to be performed. 
The validation checks are activated in the HAZOP algorithm by the function which 
verifies completed paths produced by the search algorithm: acceptable-path ( ). 
The meaning of each condition is such that, if it is proven to be false, then the arc 
which contained the condition is no longer considered to be valid and the fault path 
containing that arc is removed. If the FMS cannot prove a condition to be false, even 
if this is due to a lack of data, then the condition is deemed to be true - this is to 
ensure that scenarios aren't rejected unless it is known for sure that they are not 
feasible. 
It is also possible to associate a list of conditions (rather than a single condition) with 
a fault, consequence or arc, so that all conditions in the list must be satisfied for the 
fault, consequence or arc to be valid. 
Validation proceeds by taking the fault path as a whole and evaluating the condition 
(if any) attached to the fault at the start of the path. If this condition fails, the fault 
path is rejected. Otherwise, each arc in the chain is examined in turn, and any 
conditions present are evaluated, until the last link in the chain is reached. 
In general, the last arc in the chain need not be connected to a consequence - the same 
validation technique is used to check partially constructed paths during HAZOP 
emulation, and paths created by "causes of a deviation" queries raised by the user. If 
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the last arc in the fault path does link to a consequence, however, then any condition 
on the consequence is evaluated as a final step in the validation check. If all these tests 
succeed, then the path is accepted, otherwise it is rejected. 
5.2.2 Fluid Information and its Propagation 
Infonnation loaded into AutoHAZID from the plant description may include details of 
the intended fluids in the plant, either within individual equipment items or flowing 
between them. The system has been designed to respond in the absence of fluid 
infonnation, but nonnally this infonnation would be specified. 
The fluid infonnation is associated with ports, which may be defined as inputs to a 
unit, outputs from it, or internal locations within the unit. The following infonnation 
may be given: 
• "Amount" of fluid. For streams between units, this is the flowrate, in kglhr; for 
internal ports it is the inventory of the fluid, in kg. 
• Names of chemical components in the fluid and their mole fractions. 
• Pressure, in bara. 
• Temperature, in cC. 
This infonnation is presented to the program in intendedFl uids, 
portPressures and portTemperatures slots in the plant model. 
in tendedF 1 uids slots provide infonnation about the "amount" and composition 
of the fluid in question. Within the program, this information is stored in Location 
objects, one for each port in the unit where some infonnation is known. The 
Location class is described in Appendix D. Any fields which are not known within 
the Location objects are given a special undef_number value. 
Fluids do not have to be specified for every place in the plant model. A procedure 
known in AutoHAZID as "fluidisation" is used to infer, from the data given, other 
infonnation about the fluids in the plant. By propagating information about fluids 
forwards in the plant wherever possible, using rules for managing incomplete data, the 
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maximum use can be made of the information given, and data will then be available 
wherever the fluid identity has been inferred. 
The connectivity of the plant, which determines where fluid can go and where it 
cannot, is defined in terms of [uni t, port 1 locations linked by SDO arcs 
propagating the variable composi tion. This variable was chosen because it seemed 
that, of all the variables in the models, composition most closely mirrored the 
propagation of fluids themselves. In particular, composition is (usually) only 
propagated in one direction - the downstream direction of flow. The connectivity 
information extracted from the SDO is stored in a Net object. 
When fluidisation finishes, Location objects corresponding to all the places in the 
plant where something is known about the fluids present are put into info slots with 
the name "location". This information is referred to in later analysis by the FMS. 
A number of principles are observed when propagating fluids throughout the plant: 
• Data may only be propagated between ports which are directly connected by a 
single link in the fluid connection network. 
• Fluid propagation never overwrites the information specified in the plant model, so 
that information may only be propagated from Location Ll to Location L2 
if the relevant property is known at Ll and not known at L2. If properties are 
unknown, they are stored with the value undef_number. 
• Propagation of flowrate information is considered separately from pressure, 
temperature, composition and component names. This is because flows can be 
added together at branch points, whereas the other properties cannot. 
• Non-zero flowrates may be propagated directly downstream in unbranched lines. 
• Flowrates in dead-end sections of the plant must be zero. If any non-zero flows are 
found in dead-end parts of the plant, they are reported and fluidisation fails. In this 
case, the fluid information is not propagated in the plant model at all. Units which 
comprise legitimate inlets or outlets for fluids in the plant are labelled in the unit 
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model library and checks are defined to decide whether a dead-end exists upstream 
or downstream of a given location. 
• Flowrates can be summed at branches, so that if both inlet flows to a header are 
known, then the outlet flow is calculated. Similarly, if two of the flows at a divider 
are known, then the third is calculated. Whenever performing such a mass balance, 
the program checks for dead-end legs in the branch, assigning zero flowrates if 
appropriate and indicating an error if an impossible situation is found. 
• Properties other than flow can be propagated to points immediately downstream in 
the plant (excluding places where two or more fluids are mixed together) if the 
relevant property is not known at the downstream point. 
• Where two streams come together, for example at a header, if one of the inlet legs 
is a dead-end line upstream (with a zero flowrate) then all fluid properties may be 
propagated from the other inlet to the outlet. 
• If both inlet legs of a header have a non-zero flowrate, then the only data which 
may be inferred for the outlet are the flow and the list of names of components. The 
latter is found by the union of the lists of components given at the inlets to the 
header. Suitable calculations, or calls to flowsheet simulator packages, could be 
used in the future to estimate the other properties of the fluid mixture. 
• If an internal port in a unit is connected to an output port and there is some property 
(other than flow) which is present in the output port but absent in the internal port, 
then that information can be propagated to the internal port. A small weakness with 
this "fluid rule #1" is that there is no check for contradictory data in other output 
ports attached to the same internal port. Therefore, inconsistencies in data are not 
detected at such branchpoints and the first data found will be propagated. This 
problem is illustrated in Figure 5.2, for the outlet temperatures of a fluid leaving a 
vessel. Future improvement in this rule is quite straightforward. 
• If, for a pair of two internal ports within the same unit, each port is directly linked 
to the other in a cyclical formation, then data for pressure and temperature which is 
known for only one location can be propagated to the other location. This rule is 
applicable for the ports vap and liq in Figure 5.2 if, when the temperature of 
1 iq has been determined, the temperature of vap remains unknown. In this case 
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the rule would assign the same temperature value to vap as to 1 iq. This 
"fluid rule #2" can only be used where other propagation methods have failed. 
T unmown T =50 degC 
Ordinary Caoo: 
Temperature value will be 
propagated from oul2 to liq 
(and from there to oUll). 
T =60 degC T =50 dogC 
Problem Case: 
Temperatures of oull and oul2 
conflict. One will be propagated 
to liq (the first one found). 
Figure 5.2 : Inconsistent plant data cause problems for fluid rule #1 
The principles outlined above seem fairly sound, and have produced good results in 
case study plants and units studied so far. However, there are areas where the default 
behaviour of the algorithm, when no data is given, could cause problems. Examples 
include the case where no discharge pressure is given for a pump, or where no outlet 
temperature is provided for a heat exchanger. In these cases, the inlet fluid data are 
propagated through the unit, because the algorithm presently makes no check that 
some expected data in the unit are missing. 
5.2.3 Functions and Predicates 
The validation tests introduced in Section 5.2.1 above rely on a system of predicate 
and function definitions in the fluid modelling system. These allow the FMS to 
integrate various different subsystems, used for deciding whether a condition IS 
correct or for locating or calculating physical property information about the plant. 
The term "predicate" is used here to describe a logical condition which evaluates to 
either true or false. The predicate has a name (sometimes referred to as its 
"functor") and a number of arguments (or parameters), which define information 
needed by the system in order to decide whether the predicate is true or not. 
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An example of a predicate is flanunable (Port), which is used to decide whether 
the fluid present at a given port in the plant model is flammable or not. Here, Port is 
a variable (symbols with initial capital letters are variables, as in the Prolog language) 
which can be given a value, such as 'out'. When the arguments of the predicate are 
given values, the FMS can evaluate the condition and return an answer (true or 
false). Predicates may sometimes be defined without arguments, in which case the 
brackets are usually omitted. 
The FMS also allows the definition of "functions". These look similar to predicates in 
that they involve a name and a list of arguments given in brackets, but they return 
values which may be of any type in general. Each function returns a particular data 
type, but this can be anything which fits in with the types defined for the DObj ec t 
class. These types are listed in Appendix D and include constants, integer and real 
numbers, lists, strings and "structures", similar in form to predicate calls. The FMS 
functions allow the person defining predicates to do a limited amount of computation3 
using function calls within the predicate definition. 
An example of an FMS function is get_f 1 uid (Port) , which consults the plant 
model to find the fluid at the given port location and returns the data known about the 
fluid in a specific structure. The structure used corresponds to the data stored in the 
Location object class. Another example is vapour-pressure (Fluid), which 
takes an argument in the same format as that returned from get_fluid (Port) and 
returns the vapour pressure of the fluid at its temperature and pressure (these data are 
provided within the Fluid argument). 
Within the FMS, some special predicates and functions are defined which can be used 
in a shorthand form as "infix" operators. These correspond to the commonly used 
operators for arithmetic and logical operations and numerical comparisons, and can be 
used in between the items on which they operate. In addition to their infix form, each 
3 The computation possible within the FMS is limited in the sense that iterative loops and recursion are 
not permitted. 
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operator has an appropriate "longhand" fonn, using the convention that the name of 
the function or predicate starts with the prefix "op_". 
Operators make the definitions of predicates and functions far more readable to the 
user than otherwise might be the case. They are listed in the table below, which gives 
the "infix" fonn, its "longhand" equivalent and the operator precedence which applies 
to that operator. 
"Infix" "Longhand Operator Description 
operator form" Precedence 
* op_rnult 12 Arithmetic multiplication. 
/ op div 12 Arithmetic division. 
+ op add ID Arithmetic addition. 
- op_sub ID Arithmetic subtraction. 
< op_lt 8 Numerical 'less than'. 
> op gt 8 Numerical 'greater than'. 
<- op le 6 Numerical 'less than or equal to'. 
>- op_ge 6 Numerical 'greater than or equal to'. 
-- op_eq 4 Test for equality. Requires that both 
3!guments evaluate to the same value. 
!- op ne 4 Test for inequality. 
&& op_and 3 Logical AND. 
II op or 2 Logical OR. 
- op_assgn I Assignment of a term to a variable. The 
term on the right side of the operator is 
evaluated and its value is assigned to the 
variable on the left side. 
Table 5.1 : "Infix" operators in the Fluid Model System 
The precedence of an operator detennines with what priority it binds to the tenns on 
each side of it. An operator with a high precedence number is considered to bind to 
terms on its left and right sides before operators of lower precedence within the same 
fonnula. This idea (of precedence) is most familiar in connection with the addition 
and multiplication operators in algebra, where "3+5x6-5" is interpreted as 
"(3+ (5X6)) -5", for example. 
The details of how competing operators are bound to their arguments when reading 
fonnulae into the program, as well as the processing of parentheses (brackets), are 
dealt with in the parsing codes developed for the program in newparse. cpp. These 
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functions allow data compatible with the DObj ect class to be read directly from 
strings of characters, stored in Str objects. 
The functions and predicates used in the arcs of the SDG are defined in the start of the 
unit model library, using predicate () and function () statements. These 
specify the name and arguments of the function/predicate as a "functional prototype" 
format, containing dummy variables for each of the arguments. Also specified is a 
type string, which maps the function or predicate that is being defined onto a specific 
system which is able to evaluate it: 
• "C" - If the type string is the letter C, the function or predicate is defined within 
the AutoHAZID program. Thus, when it is evaluated, the query goes to a specific 
C++ function in the program which produces the appropriate result. 
• "V" - If the type string is a V, the query is handled by the fluid rule system, 
developed in STOPHAZ by VTT. This has a separate handler function which 
maps these queries to rules in that subsystem of the FMS. Only predicates may be 
specified in this way. 
• "D" - If the type string is D, then the function or predicate is defined in terms of 
other functions or predicates, and the definition is given following the type string. 
This definition takes the form of a list of functions or predicates to be evaluated, 
to determine the value of the function or predicate being defined. 
The func t ion and predicate statements in the unit model library are read into 
the program at start-up, and are stored in two lists for later reference by the FMS. 
Using these lists, the FMS can access the types and definitions of all known functions 
and predicates in the program. If a term, in either a unit model or a predicate 
definition, does not match with the "prototype" pattern stored for some item in these 
lists, then it cannot be evaluated as a FMS function or predicate. 
A full record of the functions and predicates so far implemented in the fluid model 
system, is given in Appendix E, which attempts to give a very short summary of the 
items, and also classifies each of them into one of a number of groups: 
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l. Logical operations 
2. Mathematical operations 
3. General-purpose operations 
4. Plant, fluid and fault path data access 
5. Limit data access 
6. Combining fluids (including compatibility checks) 
7. Properties of single fluids 
8. Consequence evaluation 
9. Contamination 
10. Design parameter checks 
11. Miscellaneous physical checks 
12. Leakage checks and limitations 
13. Checks on VLE pressure limitations 
14. Pressure deviation limits corresponding to resistance changes in flow paths 
5.2.4 Information used in Fault Path Validation 
In evaluating the predicates attached to the faults, consequences and arcs of a 
candidate fault path, the FMS uses two forms of information: 
• The name of the predicate and values for its arguments are given in the condition 
as it appears in the unit model or in the fault path. These allow the form of the 
predicate appearing in the fault path to be matched against the definitions of known 
predicates stored in the program. 
• A set of "context information" is also used in evaluation. This consists of data 
which are required so often that they are best supplied routinely by the FMS. 
The same two types of information are also used to evaluate the FMS function calls 
which may appear in the definitions of type "D" predicates. 
Since conditions are most often used to validate fault paths, the fault path object (class 
FPa th, described in Appendix D) stores most of the context information needed for 
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FMS evaluation. The procedures for updating context information in FPath objects 
are also called from the code which validates the fault path objects: 
• FPa th stores a full list of the arcs in the propagation path. This allows access to 
the initial fault and final consequence, if required, during validation of any part of 
the path. 
• The "current fluids" present at each point in the fault path are stored, as well as 
information on the limits of process variable deviations for those fluids. The latter 
information is used to solve the problems described in Section 5.3. 
• Some information is stored on the classification, categorisation and ranking of the 
fault path. This information is calculated using methods and rules developed by 
Prof. Lees and Dr. Larkin within the STOPHAZ project. 
In addition to the above "context" data, the name of the unit in which the condition 
currently being examined is resident, is also used. This data is not stored in the 
FPa th object, as the FPa th usually refers to a number of process units along its 
propagation path, and so cannot be readily associated with one single unit. 
An important distinction in the FMS is between "nominal fluid data" and "current 
fluid data". The nominal fluids are the fluids in the plant under normal operation (i.e. 
in the absence of deviations). This information contains fluid data provided in the 
input model loaded into AutoHAZID, plus the information inferred by the 
"fluidisation" routine described in Section 5.2.2. 
"Current fluid data" is a term used here to denote the conditions of fluids in the plant 
when a fault has occurred, i.e. at points along the fault path currently being examined. 
This information is derived from nominal fluid data, with property differences arising 
from contamination events or deviations in temperature and pressure, for example. 
Fault path validation requires that the conditions at each link in the chain be evaluated 
in relation to fluids which are expected to be present at the relevant locations in the 
supposed fault scenario, rather than fluids which would be present there in normal 
operation. Thus, each FPa th object maintains a list of Location objects to store 
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this current fluid data. The current fluid data associated with ports can be examined or 
changed by the program during validation. 
It is important to take account of the differences which may arise between nominal 
and current fluids during fault path validation, when determining how current fluids 
information propagates forwards in the plant. Differences may arise due to 
contamination event~, or due to deviations in the values of process variables. 
AutoHAZID includes a prototype system to track the limits in numerical deviations of 
pressure and temperature during scenario development. This method is outlined in 
Section 5.3. 
5.2.5 Integration of Fluid Model Subsystems 
The fluid modelling system (FMS) provides a uniform way for AutoHAZID to make 
use of the various software subsystems developed by different partners in STOPHAZ, 
using predicate conditions on arcs in the SDG. Some of the queries handled by the 
FMS are directly related to fluids and their properties. Others relate to plant model 
data and some have a more general-purpose nature, providing the arithmetical and 
logical "glue" which allows complex checks to be formulated. 
An additional complication is that AutoHAZID has been developed for use in both 
UNIX and Windows. Some parts of the system are not available in UNIX, and some 
external parts of the software system in a Windows environment may not be available 
at run-time, so the FMS must deal with this in producing the best available answer. 
A sensible integration strategy should make the best use of available subsystems and 
data in answering fluid queries. If the FMS is not able to determine a predicate, it 
~hould default to returning an answer which enables HAZOP emulation to be 
completed, and only allows hazards to be rejected if they can be proven not to be 
feasible. 
174 
The subsystems involved in the FMS are outlined as follows: 
• An important internal part of the FMS, implemented by C++ functions, is the set of 
general purpose operations in logic and arithmetic, including the operators 
described in Section 5.2.3. These allow convenient expression of the checks and 
evaluations needed to formulate FMS conditions. 
• A number of properties of pure compounds are provided in the fluid library and 
read into AutoHAZID when it starts. This is the earliest version of the fluid model 
still in HAZID and is described in Section 5.2.6. 
• Physical properties of mixtures and pure compounds are determined by calling on 
external packages such as Properties Plus or HYSYS, via a "Properties Package 
Link" (see Section 5.2.7). 
• Alternatively, some properties of mixtures may be estimated by calculations within 
AutoHAZID, using data provided in the fluid library. 
• The fluid rule system developed by VTT is an internal part of AutoHAZID, but 
was not developed at Loughborough. It is implemented as a subsystem for 
resolving predicate tests within the FMS. 
• An external information source is used for the fluid compatibility checks developed 
by VTT, as outlined in Section 5.2.8. The data required is accessed through the 
functions of the database API and consists of a "reactivity group matrix", giving 
information about adverse reactions between fluid components. 
• The internal model of the plant, constructed from the data read into AutoHAZID 
from plant descriptions and the unit model library, is an important source of 
information for resolving the FMS queries. It includes details of the fluids present 
in the plant and of the attributes of various units. 
5.2.5.1 Outline of Function and Predicate Evaluation in the FMS 
As noted above, the evaluation of a function or predicate in general relies on context 
information in addition to its arguments. Therefore, the C++ functions which evaluate 
these terms have a common list of arguments which communicates the context 
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information between them. This common list is shown below for the function 
eval ua te ( ) , which is used to evaluate both functions and predicates: 
DObject evaluate ( 
const DObject& Dl, BindList& BLl, FPath& FPl, const Str& UName) 
In the above, the function or predicate to be evaluated is the argument 01. A list of 
variable bindings currently in force is given in BLl - the first thing that happens when 
a term is evaluated is that the bindings list is applied to 01. The 'FPath object FPl 
represents the fault path in which the function or predicate call occurs. It can be used 
to access the data on current fluids or on the arcs in the fault path. The contents of 
FPl may be changed by the evaluation, particularly the list of current fluids. Lastly, 
the argument UName gives the name of the unit in which the function or predicate is 
evaluated. 
The "handler functions" which make up the system for evaluating FMS conditions, 
are outlined in Figure 5.3 below. The purpose of these functions is to determine the 
appropriate subsystem for resolving a query and to manage the call to that subsystem, 
providing arguments as required and handling returned values. The figure below 
shows only the relationships between the handler functions (in tenns of which 
functions call which others) and omits the many functions which do the work of 
evaluating functions and predicates of the FMS. 
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Filler:;ConditionHolds() 
Filler::SatisfyWithContext() 
Figure 5.3 : Evaluation "Handler Functions" in the Fluid Modelling System 
A brief summary of each of the main functions shown above, is given below: 
• acceptable-path () - This is the function used to validate every one of the 
fault paths generated by graph search in the HAZOP algorithm. 
• predicateEvaluation () - All types ("C", "V" and "0") of predicates are 
evaluated by this function. In the case of type "0" predicates, all the terms in the 
definition list for the predicate are tested, by recursively calling 
predicateEvaluation () - each evaluation must return true for the 
predicate to succeed. 
• test_cpp-predicate () - The vanous predicates evaluated by C++ 
functions are handled by this function. Most of the C++ functions called are 
defined in the file uni tda ta. cpp. 
• test_vtt-predicate () - This function deals with type "V" predicate 
queries passed to the VTT developed fluid rule system. The details of the 
processing that goes on in this subsystem are beyond the scope of the work 
described here, and will be described elsewhere by Perttu Heino of VTT 
(Heino, 1999). 
• evaluate () - This is the general purpose evaluation function, which deals with 
evaluation of all types of intermediate FMS predicates and functions. It is called 
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by various C++ functions which evaluate type "C" functions and predicates, as 
well as the links shown in the figure above. Whenever an expression in the 
parameter list of some predicate or function requires evaluation, this is the 
function that is used. If it finds that a term cannot be evaluated as a function or a 
predicate, it returns the term unchanged. 
• functionEvaluation () - This function manages the evaluation of FMS 
functions of types "C" and "D" (FMS functions of type "V" are not supported). In 
the case of a type "D" function, each term in the definition list of the function is 
evaluated in turn (by calls to eval ua te ( ) ) and the return value of the function 
is the result of evaluating the final term. 
• cpp_functionEvaluation ( ) - FMS functions of type "C" are evaluated by 
this function. It manages calls to a number of C++ functions, defined in file 
fns .cpp. 
The FMS is accessed at present from only two places. The first is the fault path 
validation code which operates during the HAZOP analysis of a plant model. This 
results in calls to the predicateEvaluation () function originating ultimately 
from the function acceptable-path (), as shown in Figure 5.3. 
The second point of access to the FMS is a user option ("Evaluate a 
function/predicate") on the main menu in AutoHAZID, defined in the C++ function 
opt_doEvaluation (). This option requests a term from the user for the program 
to evaluate as a function or predicate, as well as an appropriate unit in whose context 
the term is to be evaluated. The original term, and its evaluation, are displayed to the 
user after evaluation has been attempted. This menu option makes use of the general 
FMS evaluator function, evaluate () . 
Functions may be embedded in a predicate by appearing as values in the argument list 
of a predicate, or by appearing in the body of the predicate in an assignment or 
comparison statement, such as: 
P = vapour-pressure(Fluid) 
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In the latter case, the function call appears as the second argument of the assignment 
operator (op_assgn(P,vapour-pressure(Fluid) », so the two cases are 
actually equivalent. Function evaluation therefore occurs when the arguments passed 
to a predicate are being evaluated. 
5.2.5.2 Operating System Dependencies and Availability of Software Packages 
AutoHAZID is written so that it compiles equally well for Windows and for UNIX. 
Wherever some part of the program needs to be different under Windows, compared 
to UNIX, "conditional compilation" selects the appropriate part of the code to 
compile. As far as functions and predicates in the FMS are concerned, however, the 
main issue is the availability of external software packages in Windows and UNIX. 
Compatibility checks for fluid interactions (see Section 5.2.8) are not available in the 
UNIX version of AutoHAZID because the reactivity group table is present in the PC 
based database used to store plant descriptions from the Graphical Tool. Therefore, 
the UNIX version of AutoHAZID always produces a blank report in response to calls 
to the FMS function compatibility_check (Fl, F2). Compatibility checks are 
available for all versions of AutoHAZID under Windows. 
The availability of an external package in which physical property calculations can be 
done (see Section 5.2.7) is determined at start-up when the program may attempt to 
link to a particular package as directed in its configuration file. The user is notified of 
whether a properties package was detected by the program and if a link was 
successfully made to it. 
When a property package link is active in AutoHAZID, the function 
physical-property_request () attempts to evaluate queries using that 
package. If no link is present, or if an initial query to the external package fails, the 
function uses any appropriate C++ based routines in AutoHAZID to evaluate the 
query. 
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The availability of the properties package links is determined by the following 
considerations: 
• If the operating system is UNIX, links to these packages do not exist in the current 
version of AutoHAZID. 
• If the operating system is Windows 3.1, then the packages cannot be accessed 
because they rely on library functions accessed in 32 bit libraries, and Windows 3.1 
is a 16 bit system. 
• If the operating system is Windows NT or Windows 95, which are 32 bit systems, 
then the physical properties packages can be accessed from AutoHAZID, provided 
the following conditions are satisfied: 
• The user has one of the packages installed, HYSYS or Properties Plus. 
• All the libraries (. DLL files) required for the package are resident in the 
same directory as the AutoHAZID executable files (HAZ 107 . EXE and 
HAZID. EXE). 
• The configuration file, hazpaths. dos, is set up correctly, with the 
variable PropPackageType set to either ASPEN or HYPRO and the 
appropriate variable (ASPEN_DLL or HYPRO_DLL) set to point to the 
library file for the package which is to be used. 
The system for deciding physical properties requests is discussed in Section 5.2.7. 
5.2.6 Fluid Library Information 
Physical data on pure compounds are stored in a fluid library file and read into the 
program at start-up. These data are stored in Fluid objects and can be accessed later, 
when required to answer a FMS query. Additionally, the fluid library is used to store 
parameters required for calculations to estimate certain physical properties, such as 
Antoine constants to estimate vapour pressure. A third use of the fluid library is to 
store data on reactivity groups needed by the compatibility checking code for 
determining unwanted fluid interactions (see Section 5.2.8). 
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Since the fluid library only contains information on specific pure compounds, it is of 
limited use when applied to determining accurate property values for mixtures. 
However, if appropriate "safe" assumptions are used in combining data on pure 
compounds, then good use can be made of the information available. 
The data stored in the fluid library, for each pure compound, are: 
• CAS Number. 
• Average Molecular Weight, g/mole. 
• Freezing Temperature, QC. 
• Decomposition Temperature, QC. 
• Flashpoint Temperature, QC. 
• Autoignition Temperature, QC. 
• Lower Flammability Limit, (%v/v). 
• Toxicity Classification, measured on a scale of 0 to 3, where the classes have the 
following meanings: 
• 0 Non-toxic (e.g. air, water) 
• I Slightly toxic (e.g. nitrogen, which can asphyxiate) 
• 2 Toxic (e.g. toluene) 
• 3 Very toxic (e.g. benzene) 
• Latent Heat at normal boiling point, J/mole. 
• Boiling Temperature at atmospheric pressure, QC. 
• List of three Antoine Constants for vapour pressure estimation. 
• Liquid Density, kg/m3. 
• List of four constants for the evaluation of vapour heat capacity, J/mole. 
• ERPG_3 value, a measure of toxicity for the Dow exposure index, mg/m3. 
• Liquid heat capacity, J/kgQC. 
• List of four reactivity group codes, for use in the compatibility checking routines 
(see Section 5.2.8). 
Some of the data in this list are used in calculations of physical properties which can 
be used as alternatives to the external packages discussed in the following section. 
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5.2.7 Physical Properties Calculations 
During the STOPHAZ project, links from AutoHAZID to external packages were 
explored, to provide access to the physical properties data and calculations typically 
used in flowsheeting packages. Links to Aspentech's Properties Plus and Hyprotech's 
HYSYS packages, were explored. The link to Properties Plus was successfully 
demonstrated during the project. 
The interface to the properties packages was specified by ASPEN, in conjunction with 
Loughborough University. ASPEN developed the library of functions which provides 
common access to the routines in individual calculation packages. 
The following are the property calculations specified by ASPEN: 
• Physical State (C) 
• Average Molecular Weight (C) 
• Boiling Temperature Range (C) 
• Freezing Temperature (C) 
• Vapour Pressure (C) 
• Viscosity 
• Density (C) 
• Enthalpy 
• Specific Heat (C) 
• Latent Heat of Fusion 
• Latent Heat of Evaporation (C) 
• CAS Number 
• Phase Temperatures (for the given pressure, these are the temperatures where 
changes of physical state will take place). 
• Phase Pressures (for the given temperature, these are the pressures where changes 
of physical state will take place). 
• Flashpoint Temperature 
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• Autoignition Temperature 
• Lower Flammable Limit 
• Upper Flammable Limit 
Access to the physical properties packages is provided through FMS functions and 
predicates in the same way as for other properties. Some of these properties can be 
calculated either in external packages or in C++ functions relying on data in the fluid 
library. These are indicated by a (C) in the above list. 
Calculations for various types of flash were also specified as part of the physical 
properties system. So far these have not been used within the FMS. 
The fluid properties provided by the external packages allow better estimation of the 
properties of mixtures than is the case with the data provided in the fluid library, or in 
calculations carried out within AutoHAZID itself. It is also likely that the level of 
quality and consistency provided by using external data is better than using ad hoc 
properties based in the C++ code itself. 
5.2.8 Compatibility Checks for Fluids 
Unwanted interactions can occur within the plant, particularly when fluid compounds 
are mixed together, either deliberately or inadvertently. These sorts of interactions 
depend mostly on the nature of the fluids which come together and are not particularly 
affected by the process equipment in which they occur.4 Therefore, the plant models 
represented by the SDO are not very useful for modelling the wide range of 
phenomena caused by such interactions. 
Part of the STOPHAZ project involved building a software module within 
AutoHAZID for predicting the effects of unwanted interactions in the plant. To 
predict these effects requires knowledge of which compounds are present. This 
information is available through the fluid information in the plant model. 
4 Of course. the consequences of such tluid interactions may depend on where in the plant they occur. 
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Detecting interactions requires some knowledge of the effects of mixing chemical 
components together. An attempt to capture this knowledge was made in STOPHAZ, 
using a reactivity group tagging scheme for classifying chemical species, combined 
with a compatibility table method for predicting the effects of mixing species together. 
Each chemical species in the fluid is associated with up to four numeric identifiers 
that label it as belonging to a certain group of chemicals, having certain properties. 
Members of the same reactivity group will tend to behave in similar ways when mixed 
with chemicals belonging to another particular group. This is the basis of the 
"compatibility table" which tabulates the reactivity group identifiers against each 
other and records a set of effects in each cell in the table, which are the consequences 
of mixing chemicals from the corresponding two groups together. An example of the 
type of compatibility table used is given in Figure 5.4 below. The effects recorded are 
taken from the following standard set of consequence types: 
• heat generation caused by component interactions 
• gas generation caused by component interactions 
• toxic interaction between components 
• flammable interaction between components 
• explosive interaction between components 
• violent polymerisation due to component interactions 
• solubilisation of toxic substances due to component interactions 
• possible unknown hazard due to component interactions 
By examining the components of a fluid, one can predict the possible interactions 
which will occur due to the chemicals present. This is the basis of the compatibility 
checks carried out in the FMS whenever two fluids are considered to mix together in 
the HAZOP algorithm. The checks are carried out by the FMS function 
compatibility_check, which calls a function written by VTT. The VTT code 
consults a table of reactivity groups and produces a report consisting of a list of effects 
taken from the list above, each one associated with a pair of component names, 
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identifying the species responsible for the interaction. This report object is added to a 
global report using the FMS function, add_to_compat_report, so that all the 
compatibility check results produced during HAZOP can be collected into a single 
report. 
The collected report is appended to the end of the main HAZOP report, rather than 
integrating the results into the HAZOP table at the point where they were produced. 
This is because of the many problems of storing reported interactions in association 
with the fault path from which they originated, and reporting these clearly within the 
HAZOP table. The compatibility report declares the fluids which mixed (including 
their locations in the plant), the interactions produced by mixing and the fluid 
components responsible for those interactions, for each mixing event considered. 
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5.3 Reasoning using Numerical Limits on Deviations 
Fault propagation often produces paths which are not credible, because the magnitude 
of deviation required to cause a final consequence cannot be realised within the 
scenario produced by the fault concerned. To tackle this problem, a method has been 
developed within the FMS to model the propagation of numerical limits on the size of 
deviations in process variables. 
This means that maximum and minimum limits for deviations caused by certain faults 
are available for propagation through the fault path. Conditions can also be attached to 
deviation-consequence arcs, so that the magnitude of the deviation is checked against 
some limit, to test if it is severe enough to cause the consequence. 
The aim is to capture some of the more usual commonsense rules which a human 
team would use in a conventional HAZOP study. An attempt to identify some of these 
rules has been made (by myself and Prof. Lees) in the meeting documented In 
Appendix F. The rules so far implemented in the FMS, for limiting the size of 
pressure and temperature deviations, are listed in full in the table given in 
Appendix E. A subset of these will be discussed in the following subsections. 
In the FMS, Location objects are used to communicate information about current 
fluids in the plant during fault path validation. The system for maintaining 
information on numerical limits of deviations makes use of the Notes field of the 
Location object, to manipulate limit values using functions and predicates in the 
FMS, such as get_max_temperature (), set_min-pressure (), etc. 
The following subsections illustrate how reasoning with numerical limits works in 
relation to a number of case study problems. These examples show possible strategies 
for implementing solutions to complex plant modelling problems in the FMS 
generally, not just in relation to numerical limits on deviations. It is important to note 
the way a semi-formal analysis of the scenario is used as a starting point for 
considering how that scenario could be formalised in the rule system. 
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5.3.1 Example 1 : Design Pressure for Pumps and other Units 
High pressure can cause the casing of a pump to rupture. but the high pressure is only 
considered relevant if it rises above the design pressure of the pump. This can often 
only be achieved by specific causes. possibly including dead-heading the pump. which 
occurs when there is a complete blockage in the discharge side of the pump. 
corresponding to a noFlow deviation. 
As an example of the use of design pressure checks In the models. consider the 
following arcs. taken from a pump model: 
arc([deviation, [morePressure,outJ],l, 
[consequence, ['possible casing overpressure rupture', 
exceed_design-pressure(out)]]), 
arc ( [out, nOFlow] ,1, [out, pressure1, 
assign_max-pressure(out, full_dh-pressure(in,out»)) , 
The predicate exceed_design-pressure (Port) checks the maximum 
pressure for the given port against the maximum design pressure (in the attribute 
"max_allowable-pressure"). to see if the design pressure is exceeded. This 
check is used to validate the overpressure rupture consequence. A similar predicate. 
exceed_design_vacuum (Port) checks the minimum pressure of a unit against 
the minimum allowable design pressure. to check for the possibility of vacuum 
collapse. These two predicates can be used for any unit. not just pumps. It is a 
convention of the plant database that design pressures and temperatures are stored in 
the attributes max_allowable-pressure. min_allowable....Pressure. 
max_allowable_tempera ture and min_allowable_ tempera ture. 
The arc linking noFlow to pressure represents the rIse In pressure caused by 
completely blocking the pump discharge. The maximum pressure in this case is the 
dead-heading pressure of the pump. added to the operating pressure at the inlet. and 
this limit is set by the assign_max-pressure () predicate attached to the arc. 
When the two arcs are present in a fault path. validation succeeds only if this limit 
pressure is sufficient to exceed the pump's design pressure. 
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Note that, in the absence of infonnation detennining the size of a pressure deviation, it 
is necessary for AutoHAZID to report overpressure rupture as a potential consequence 
wherever morePres sure could occur. Clearly, when there is no information 
available for the fault path on the size of the pressure deviation, the program must 
cautiously predict that the consequence could occur. 
5.3.2 Example 2 : Atmospheric Pressure is (approximately) 1 bara 
When a pressurised vessel leaks to atmosphere and the pressure inside it drops, the 
minimum pressure reached is about I bara. Similarly, when a vacuum system leaks 
and air goes in, the pressure inside it rises to a maximum of around I bara. 
These observations are of course, quite trivial, but it was necessary to introduce limits 
on pressure deviations caused by leaks, to reduce the number of spurious results in the 
HAZOP report. Leaks are identified as causes of pressure deviations in many places in 
the HAZOP reports produced by AutoHAZID. Pressure deviations are also frequently 
associated with equipment damage (e.g. vessel rupture, vacuum collapse). 
Therefore, unless pressure limits are considered and handled correctly, leaks out of a 
process can be quoted as causes of vacuum collapse in a vessel, and leaks into a 
vacuum system can be quoted as causes of overpressure rupture. In reality, unless the 
pressure deviation crosses one of the design limits of the system, no mechanical 
damage will actually be caused. 
In order to prevent spurious output, I bara is therefore stated throughout the model 
libraries as the numerical limit on pressure deviations caused by leakage faults. When 
this infonnation is propagated to a pressure damage consequence for the plant, the 
limit can be compared to the design pressure of the vessel (as described in Example I 
above) and the fault path can be found to be invalid. 
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Two predicates have been developed to deal with these features of leaks. They are 
pressureLeak (Port) and vacuumLeak (Port) shown below. These have 
been attached to leak faults throughout the library: 
predicate (pressureLeak(Port) , -0·, 
[ pressurised(Port), 
assign_min-pressure(Port, 1.0) 
J) • 
predicate(vacuumLeak(Port),-D-, 
( vacuum(Port), 
J) . 
assign_max-pressure(Port, 1.0) , 
% Put air into the system, too 
add_air_contaminationCPortl 
Notice that the above predicates test that the process is under pressure (or vacuum) 
before they apply any limit to the pressure deviation. Therefore, the faults to which 
these predicates are attached will only be considered where the process operates under 
pressure or under vacuum respectively. Also, leakage into a vacuum system not only 
increases the pressure, it also contaminates the process with air (which will often be 
more significant, from a safety point of view, than the pressure change). 
5.3.3 Example 3 : Pressure Limits When Valves Open 
The flow path model uses the idea of flow path resistance to model blockages in pipes 
and the effects of a valve being opened or closed. Resistance therefore has an effect on 
the flow through the unit and the pressures at its inlet and outlet. 
When a control valve fails open or closed, there will be certain limits on the pressure 
and flow deviations caused by the failure. If the valve fails closed, the upstream 
pressure will rise and the downstream one fall, but it is not very easy to determine 
limits for the pressures in this case, without using information from equipment 
attached upstream and downstream of the valve. 
When the control valve fails to an open position, the resistance falls to a minimum of 
zero, and the flow rises to some maximum value which is not readily determined 
without analysing the overall flow system in some detail. The pressures also change in 
response to the valve opening - the upstream pressure drops and the downstream 
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pressure rises. However, a change in the resistance of the valve flow path never causes 
a pressure reversal, so that limits can be stated for the pressure changes which occur. 
The downstream pressure at the valve rises, and an upper bound for this variable is the 
maximum value of the upstream pressure. By a similar argument, the upstream 
pressure falls to a minimum value determined as the mInImum value of the 
downstream pressure. In reality, for zero resistance, the pressures would equalise at 
some value between these two pressures, dependent on the overall context of the valve 
in the flow system. 
This is illustrated in Figure 5.5 below, where the shaded areas delimit the possible 
pressure profiles in the case of the valve in a normal position Ca) and fully opened Cb). 
The error bars on valve inlet and outlet show the minimum and maximum pressures, 
which define the range over which the equalised pressure could exist in the fully open 
case. 
'--v_e_s_s_el_1--'t------I~~C><lI------1~~1 Vessel 2 
(b) 
Pressure profile 
with vall.e in 
normal position 
Pressure profile 
with vall.e open 
Figure 5.5: Pressure Profiles Around a Valve 
It seems likely that this sort of reasoning about control valve failures can be applied in 
any flow path, wherever the resistance drops. Therefore, we can use the following two 
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FMS predicates to establish limits on pressure deviations resulting from changes 10 
resistance within flow paths5: 
5 Notes: 
f' 
'f 
Predicate to impose a limit on the pressure rise caused to a downstream 
port fluid by a change in the resistance of the flow port connected 
upstream to it. The max. pressure attainable when the resistance drops is 
the Max upstream pressure in the flow path, or the nominal upstream 
pressure, if there is no Max. value. 
This scenario corresponds to a valve opening full-bore, for instance. 
predicate (res_dsp_lim(USPort, DSPortl, ~D·, 
( Fl get_fluid(USPort), 
J I. 
f' 
'f 
PI = get_max-pressure(Fll, 
P2 = cond«Pl == undef_number), get-pressure(Fl), Pl), 
assign_max-pressure(DSPort, P2) 
Predicate to impose a limit on the pressure drop caused to an upstream 
port fluid by a change in the resistance of the flow port connected 
downstream of it. The min pressure attainable when the resistance drops is 
the min downstream pressure in the flow path, or the nominal downstream 
pressure, if there is no min value. 
This scenario corresponds to a valve opening full-bore, for instance. 
predicate (res_usp_lim(USPort, DSPort), MO-, 
[ FI get_fluid(DSPort), 
J I. 
PI = get_rnin-pressure(FI), 
P2 = cond«PI == undef_numberl, get-pressure(FI), PI), 
assign_min-pressure(USPort, P2) 
(a) The predicate names correspond (approximately) to "resistance determined downstream pressure 
limit" (for res_dsp_lim) and "resistance determined upstream pressure limit" (for 
res_usp_lirn). Inventing short and descriptive names for predicates is often very difficult! 
(b) The predicates include use of a "conditional" function, cond(X, Y, Z), which tests the condition 
x; if X is true, cond() takes the value ofYand if false, the value ofz. 
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These predicates are attached to the arcs in the f lowpa th template, where there is a 
resistance effect on the appropriate pressure node (upstream or downstream), as 
shown in arcs 5 and 6 below: 
% Flowpath from X to z, where Y is used to label 
% flow and resistance nodes 
template(flowpath(X,Y,Z) , 
( 
% Propagation (flow path X->Z): 
arc«(X,pressure),l, [Z,pressure), % (1) 
arc{[Z,pres5ure),1. [X,pressure), % (2) 
arc([X,pressure),l, (Y,flow)). % (3) 
arc([Z,pressure),-l, [y,flow»), % (4) 
arc([Y,resistance],l, [X,pressureJ. res_usp_lim(X,ZI ), % (5) 
) . 
arc([Y,resistance],-l, (Z,pressure]. res_dsp_lim(X,Z) ), % (6) 
arc([Y,resistance],-l, (Y.flow]), % (7) 
% Simple things for fluid flow : 
arc([X,temp).l, [Z,temp]1 , 
arc{[X,composition),l, [Z,composition), 
arc([X,contamination] ,2. [Z,contarnination]), 
% (S) 
% (9) 
% (iD) 
% Other things which happen by virtue of fluid flow. These arcs are 
% for propagating unintended phases, produced by phenomena elsewhere, 
% through the flow path : 
arc([X,solid],2, [Z,solid]), % (11) 
arc([X,liquid],2, [Z,liquid]) , % (12) 
arc( [X,gas]'2, [Z,gasJ), , (13) 
arc( [X,vapour] ,2, (Z,vapour]) , (14) 
5.3.4 Example 4 : Methanol Cooler 
This example (which is also discussed in McCoy and Rushton, 1997) relates to the 
methanol cooler shown in Figure 5.6 below, where hot methanol is cooled by water in 
a countercurrent shell and tube heat exchanger. The SDO model shown in Figure 5.7 
correctly predicts that high flow or low temperature of the coolant causes a lower 
process fluid temperature. In the heat exchanger model this is linked to the possibility 
of the process fluid freezing. In this case, however, since the freezing point of 
methanol is -94°C, compared to DOC for water, the cooling water will never succeed in 
freezing the methanol, because the water would have ceased to flow long before 
reaching the freezing point of methanol. 
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T_ outIat~ 
Figure 5.6: Methanol Cooler and Associated Variables 
Figure 5.7: Partial, Simplified SDG for Methanol Cooler 
A solution to this problem is to enhance the SDG model of the heat exchanger with 
numerical information about the freezing points of the fluids present and rules for 
using this information. The consequence "process fluid freezes" is linked in the model 
to low temperature, T mOll" This is the coolest location for the methanol and is the place 
where it would start to freeze, if it became cold enough. Before deducing from the 
SDG that the fluid can freeze, the lower limit of T mOllt must be evaluated and 
compared to the freezing point of the fluid. The test must be attached to the arc 
between T mOllt and the consequence. 
Two constraints govern the lower limit of T mOllt in the arcs from Twin and Qw. Firstly, 
cooling water must flow in order to reduce the methanol temperature. The cooling 
water will not flow at a temperature below its freezing point, so that the minimum 
water temperature at Twin is around O°C. Secondly, in the cooler there is a constraint 
that the cooling water cannot cause the methanol temperature (T moUl) to fall below the 
value of Twin. From these two together, we can infer a minimum of ooe for T mOllt. 
These tests should be attached to the arcs from Twin to Tlllollt and Qw to T mOll" and in 
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conjunction with the test on the arc connecting T moUl to the freezing consequence, the 
consequence can be rejected as not possible. 
The following two arcs model the effect of low temperature In a shell and tube 
exchanger causing the fluid to freeze: 
arc«(deviation. [leSSTemp,tube]],l, 
[consequence, ['freezing fluid blockage in tubes', 
fluid_can_freeze(tube)]]), 
arc«(deviation. [lessTemp,shell] 1,1, 
(consequence, ['freezing fluid blockage in shell', 
fluid_can_freeze(shell) 1]) 
The fluid_can_freeze () predicate above determines if the minimum 
temperature of the fluid at the given port is below its freezing point, defaulting to true 
if there is no minimum limit or no temperature is given for the fluid. 
Unfortunately, the way heat transfer IS currently modelled In the 
model (using the intermediate variable, 
heatTransfer) means that some of the links shown in Figure 5.7 above do not 
exist. Specifically, the Twin--7T mout and Qw--7T mout arcs are absent. Therefore, it is 
impossible to implement the FMS conditions governing the ordering between 
temperatures on shell and tube side of the cooler, 
shell_tube_exchanger model. 
using the 
However, in a suitable model which did possess the necessary temperature-
temperature and flow-temperature links, the rules required to check freezing point 
information in the methanol-water case would look something like the arcs below: 
arc([tube,temp1,1, [shell,temp). 
assign_rnin_temperature (shell,get_min_temperature (tube) 1. 
arc«(tube,flow),-l, [shell,temp], 
assign_min_temperature(shell,freezing_temp(get_fluid(tube») 
In the above, the low temperature deviation in the tube is assumed to have been 
propagated to the exchanger with the necessary lower limit set at the freezing point of 
the fluid. Then, this limit is passed on to the shell-side fluid. In the second arc, the 
freezing point limit is imposed by the flow-temperature link. When fault propagation 
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considers the freezing consequences for the shell-side (containing methanol), it 
discovers that the limit temperature for the shell-side fluid does not allow it to freeze, 
in the case of the methanol-water system. The ability of AutoHAZID to reject 
infeasible scenarios in such a plant has been demonstrated using a modified heat 
exchanger model. 
5.3.5 Example 5 : Pressure Limits due to Vapour-Liquid Equilibrium 
In a vessel containing liquid and vapour at the same time, there will be an equilibrium 
between the two fluids. If there are no inert gases present in the vapour space the 
pressure will be the vapour pressure of the liquid at the fluid temperature. In this case, 
one can detennine limits on the pressure deviations expected for the vessel, resulting 
from deviations in the temperature of the liquid, if the temperature variations can be 
estimated. 
The crucial condition for application of this limit calculation (for the upper limit of 
pressure) is that there should not be an appreciable partial pressure of inert gas in the 
vessel. Therefore, where nitrogen blanketing is used to maintain a non-flammable 
atmosphere, the calculation of vapour pressure is not so helpful, as the pressure of the 
nitrogen must be taken into account. Where inerts are effectively excluded, as may be 
the case in distillation, then the vapour pressure may be used. 
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The predicate vle~ressure_limits () can be used to calculate the pressure 
limits corresponding to temperature limits already determined, for a vapour-liquid 
system. It uses the predicates and 
" 
" 
Determine and assign the lower limit of vapour pressure to a vapour 
-liquid system represented by the fluids at the two ports given. Takes 
data from the liquid port L and determines its vapour pressure at its 
minimum temperature, assigning that value to the lower limit of pressure 
for the vapour port V : 
predicate (vle_min-pressure_lirnit(L,V), -0·, 
( 
11. 
" 
" 
Fl = get_fluid(L), 
(Fl ! = error). 
Tl = get~in_temperature(Fl), 
PI = cond«Tl == undef_numberl, unde£_nurnber, vp_at_given_ternp(Fl,Tl», 
assign_min-pressure(V,Pl) 
Determine and assign the upper limit of vapour pressure to a vapour 
-liquid system represented by the fluids at the two ports given. Takes 
data from the liquid port L and determines its vapour pressure at its 
maximum temperature, assigning that value to the upper limit of pressure 
for the vapour port V : 
predicate (vle_max-pressure_limit(L,V), -D-, 
[ FI = get_fluid(L), 
11. 
" 
" 
(Fl ! = error), 
Tl = get_ffiax_ternperaturc(Fl), 
PI = cond«Tl == undef_number), undef_number, vp_at_given_temp(FI,Tl», 
assign_max-pressure(V,Pl) 
Predicate which establishes the limits on pressure due to vapour pressure 
in a system where liquid and vapour are in equilibrium : 
(L is the name of a liquid port, V is the name of a vapour port) . 
It is assumed that the temperature of the system principally determines 
the vapour pressure. Calls on two subsidiary predicates, to establish 
lower and upper limits on the pressures. 
predicate (vle-pressure_limits (L,V) ,"D-, 
[ vle_min-pressure_limit(L,V), 
vle_ma~ressure_Iimit{L,V) 
11. 
This predicate has been tested in models of storage vessels, but is not used in this 
context at the moment, because of the problem posed by inert gases. The predicate is 
typically attached to the arc connecting liquid temperature to pressure in the vapour 
space: 
arc({liquid,temp],l, [vapour,pressure],vle-pressure_limits(liquid,vapour) 
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5.3.6 Managing Propagation of Information about Numerical Limits 
As described above, infonnation detennining the limits on deviations is typically 
generated at one point in the plant, but may be used quite remotely, at a distant 
consequence, for example. It is vital that a coherent method is used to manage the 
propagation of this infonnation, so that limits are not propagated to inappropriate 
places. Also, a workable strategy is required for dealing with cases where limit 
infonnation is needed by a predicate, but is not available. 
Where limits on variable deviations are requested but not available, the default 
behaviour should be to allow the condition on the arc or consequence concerned to 
succeed. The functions which access limit values of pressures, temperatures and 
compositions have been designed to return the value undef_number where the 
limit is not known, so that functions or predicates can detect this value. Absence of 
limit infonnation is taken to imply that the deviation being considered is "unlimited", 
so that it should be assumed to be severe enough to cause any consequence it is linked 
to in the SDG. 
Propagation of numerical limit infonnation is at present limited to two simple rules 
for pressure and temperature deviations. These are: 
I. Limits infonnation is propagated forwards in arcs linking pressure to pressure or 
temperature to temperature. 
2. Limits infonnation is discarded when propagating to pressure or temperature from 
any other variable. 
In due course, other rules could be developed to deal with other propagation variables 
(e.g. composition). The fluidisation heuristics mentioned in Section 5.2.2 are a 
possible source of guidance for this venture, although the correctness of rules needs to 
be assured within the system. 
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5.4 Conclusions 
This chapter has described the basics of the fluid modelling system in AutoHAZID. 
On the whole, it seems that predicate conditions and fault path validation are good, 
general-purpose techniques for improving the SDO models. The model of SDO 
conditionality offered in the FMS is one that is suitably general to tackle a very large 
range of problems. What's more, as time goes on, there are fewer cases where new 
predicates need to be defined in terms of internal C++ functions (requiring program 
recompilation) and more cases where the new predicates can be defined in terms of 
already defined operations. This is an indication that the basic machinery is now in 
place to deliver big improvements to the models in AutoHAZID. 
Many of the tests implemented in the FMS so far have had an impact by reducing the 
number of spurious results produced by AutoHAZID. This means that their 
contribution is, in some senses, an invisible one - they contribute to making the 
overall results more correct by controlling what is left out of the final HAZOP report. 
This development has been dictated by the need to remove obviously wrong hazards 
from the results during STOPHAZ, to attain a basic level of performance in 
AutoHAZID. In future, however, there should be more emphasis on the enrichment of 
models to include new, more interesting faults and consequences. If this is supported 
by the FMS, the quality of the HAZOP results can be maintained. 
Clearly, the system is still in development, and some aspects of the fault path 
validation technique are still relatively primitive. The various rules, conventions and 
methods used for limit propagation are an example area where there is still much work 
to be done. I think that the most practical way to formulate these methods and 
conventions is by tackling real problems using the system as it is - this will identify to 
the developer where the weaknesses lie and how one may tackle them. 
The approach used in the development of the FMS, of applying conditions to highly 
specific faults and consequences, seems to be well-justified, given the need for richer 
and more interesting scenarios to be identified in HAZOP emulation. This approach is 
one of the more important ideas behind the Fluid Modelling System. The other 
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important or novel ideas in the work described here include the use of fault path 
validation and the propagation of fluid information through the plant model from data 
given in the input plant description. 
The most interesting application of the FMS so far has been in the processing and 
propagation of limit information to verify propagation of deviations. This is probably 
one of the smartest prospective solutions to the problem of increasing the value of 
individual scenarios in the HAZOP report. It also uses methods which can be 
compared to the sort of na"ive reasoning which might be used by participants in a 
conventional HAZOP. 
The limits processing system in the FMS is still in a very early stage of development, 
and may need to be redesigned at some later date, in addition to the need to widen the 
scope of deviations treated to include (at least) composition. There are many areas like 
.... 
this within the AutoHAZID program and the FMS. Some of the possible areas for 
future improvement are mentioned in the next chapter, which discusses the thesis and 
the work on AutoHAZID as a whole. 
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Chapter 6 . Discussion and Future Work 
This chapter discusses some of the issues raised by the preceding chapters and looks 
to possible future areas of work on AutoHAZID, and on hazard identification by 
computer more generally. The objective is also to record some thoughts about the 
subject which did not fit into the framework of the rest of the thesis. 
First of all, a brief review is given of the strengths and weaknesses of AutoHAZID 
and the HAZID package, in Section 6.1. Then, Section 6.2 gives an overview of the 
main areas considered for future work, some of which are discussed at more length in 
Sections 6.3 to 6.9. Section 6. \0 concludes the chapter with a recap of the topics 
covered. 
6.1 Strengths and Weaknesses of HAZID 
Some of the strengths of the HAZID package (including AutoHAZID as its central 
component), in comparison to other groups working on similar areas, are: 
• Inclusion of a wide range of techniques related to hazard identification, in an 
integrated software environment. Examples include the fluid compatibility checks, 
the HAZOP emulation algorithm, fluid model system, consequence ranking, etc. 
No similar software package (as far as I am aware) tackles such a wide range of 
safety·related tasks. 
• The large, hierarchically organised library of equipment models, which covers a 
wide variety of failure modes and a large number of equipment types. None of the 
other groups reviewed in Chapter 2 have attempted to model this range of 
equipment. 
• The modular modelling approach usmg templates is quite novel, and allows 
repeated features of diverse models to be described concisely. This makes 
maintaining consistency in existing models easier and allows rapid prototyping of 
new models. 
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• A "Model Generation Tool" (MGT) for developing new, user-defined equipment 
models. This makes extensive use of templates, building whole models of vessels 
from components taken from the template library. 
• Use of a "Fluid Modelling System" (FMS) to distinguish between feasible and 
infeasible scenarios. The rule-based system used to validate conditions on faults, 
consequences and propagation arcs is, as far as I know, unique in this field. I 
• A promising prototype system within the FMS for handling numerical limits on 
propagated deviations of (so far) pressure and temperature. The aim of this system 
is to validate whether the deviations in a fault path are sufficient to cause the final 
consequence with which they are associated. Since this is a very novel approach 
within HAZOP emulation, I have not had time to develop the system completely. 
• Ability of the system to model single mapping influences, using a new type of 
extension to the SDG, as discussed in Section 4.2. This method for extending the 
models was developed by myself and Dr. Rushton in response to problems 
recognised in HAZOP emulation results. 
• Two-stage, breadth-first graph search algorithm used for identification of fault 
paths in the SDG. I developed the two-stage approach to prevent repetition in 
searching the graph. 
• Compatibility checks between fluids which mix In the plant, to detect possible 
interactions and problems. 
• Fully integrated access to physical properties data in the FMS, using external 
calculation packages, internally stored fluid data and calculations within 
AutoHAZID. These provide the numbers required for selective quantitative 
assessment of scenarios. 
• The Graphical Tool and Database API allow entry of plant descriptions in a 
graphical format and their automatic transfer to AutoHAZID for HAZOP. 
• A novel classification system has been developed for consequence types and 
ranking of consequences. 
I It should be noted that conditions have been added to SDO models by other workers (e.g. in the 
"extended signed directed graphs" of Oyeleye and Kramer, 1988). However, I believe that the 
flexibility of the FMS rule b.<ed system used in AutoHAZID is a unique development in Ihis field. 
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• Demonstration of a small set of "configuration rules", which detect design faults in 
the plant model and warn the user about them. While the rules are fairly 
elementary, their automation is probably quite new. 
• Consideration of protections in the plant. 
Some of the weaknesses in HAZID are: 
• Input of the plant model into HAZID can be a problem, and will affect the future 
acceptance of the tool by industry. This problem is discussed in Section 6.3. 
• The equipment models are not all at the same level of development or validation, 
so that some of the newer ideas, particularly in the FMS, have not been uniformly 
implemented in the models. 
• Hazards still sometimes don't appear where expected in the AutoHAZID output, 
according to human experts in HAZOP. 
• The efficiency of the program, in terms of slow execution speed or excessive 
memory requirements during graph search, remains a problem for large plant 
models. 
• Many identified rules, models and scenarios have not been added to the libraries 
so far, due to time limitations or difficulties with knowledge representation. 
• Qualitative ambiguity and computational complexity can be problems, as 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
• AutoHAZID is not capable of modelling state-dependent plant behaviour, or 
temporal sequences of events, so that its ability to tackle batch plants, or abnormal 
states of continuous ones, is quite limited. This problem is discussed in 
Section 6.5. 
• The single fault assumption, as discussed in Section 4.3, limits AutoHAZID to 
considering a limited range of possible scenarios (those with a simple, linear 
development sequence). However, it should be noted that this is actually how 
HAZOP is usually carried out, so the HAZOP emulation method is sound in this 
respect. 
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• Recursive calls between functions and predicates in the FMS are not prevented at 
the moment. This could give rise to problems of infinite recursion in FMS 
calculations, at some future stage. 
• Debugging and testing of functions and predicates In the FMS is difficult at 
present, because there is no debugging utility. 
• Comparing HAZOP results files for the same plant model, to find differences, 
must be done by eye, which is a tedious and error-prone procedure. 
6.2 Future Work 
This section briefly mentions some possible areas of work to improve HAZOP 
emulation. Some items tackle the problems identified above. Others extend the 
functions of HAZID to cover activities previously seen as out of scope for the tool. A 
few topics are discussed in greater depth in the sections following this one. 
Some of the future work items are quite trivial changes and are outlined in 
Appendix G. In addition to these "trivial" changes to the existing system, a number of 
larger pieces of work were not completed during the project due to time limits: 
• The equipment and template models in the HAZID libraries are not all at the same 
level of development. For industrial acceptance of a HAZOP emulation tool, 
consistent levels of performance have to be produced, so quality assurance of the 
expertise present in models is very important. Therefore, the equipment models 
must be examined to determine a core of functionality which can be expected of 
everyone of them. Then, in a second sweep, the models can be systematically 
upgraded so that they all meet the minimum requirement. Using this method will 
ensure that the new features which have been selectively added to some models 
during a "test" phase get disseminated to all other appropriate models in the 
library. It will also help to document the features of the package and to locate 
areas for improvement, new rules to add, etc. 
• A large quantity of information, comment and expertise was collected from 
process industry users during the STOPHAZ project (STOPHAZ, 1997a). In 
addition to the feedback on test cases, output from modelling seminars and other 
204 
information collected during the development of HAZID, two other parts of 
STOPHAZ produced results. CHOPIN investigated how to improve the 
development of operating instructions prior to HAZOP. ELDER was developed as 
a hypertext resource, containing safety-related design advice for engineers to use 
when developing process designs from PFD to P&ID stage. Systematic use should 
be made of these information sources, to enrich models by adding new failure 
modes, for example. 
• Related to the previous point, wider use should be made of the fluid modelling 
system, using quantitative rules and landmark values, etc. for fault path validation. 
The integrated links to the properties packages should also be fully utilised. 
• Further use should be made of flags and filters to improve the way the results of 
HAZOP emulation are presented. 
• In principle, any weaknesses in templates, equipment models and FMS rules 
should be tackled by a systematic methodology for model improvement. This area 
of development is discussed in Section 6.4. 
• To move HAZID forward to market, success must be demonstrated with a very 
large plant model, if possible a "live" example of an industrial plant design. 
Program efficiency is less an issue here than the quality of output produced, 
compared to conventional HAZOP studies carried out on the same plant. The 
range of equipment in the model libraries would need to be widened as a result of 
the trial. Issues of information management in evaluating a large plant design have 
not been explored within STOPHAZ, so these will probably be discovered in such 
a trial. 
• So far, the links to external physical properties packages have been demonstrated, 
in practice, for only a subset of the functions specified in the link to ASP~N 
Properties Plus. It would be good to demonstrate access to the full range of 
calculations in HYSYS as well as Properties Plus, to show the generality of this 
particular part of HAZID. Work on this would consist of debugging some 
problems in the interface between the external packages and AutoHAZID. 
Clearly, progress in the above work areas would significantly improve the 
performance of HAZOP emulation across the board. By encoding a broader range of 
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expertise In models developed to a consistent depth, the quality of output from 
HAZID can be made far more consistent. 
The next group of future work topics require quite significant effort, in software 
design and analysis. Some of these involve optimising the user interfaces to the 
software tools in HAZID, as well as encouraging closer integration and further 
development of the functions demonstrated as "proof of concept" in STOPHAZ: 
• AutoHAZID itself is largely text-based in the current version of HAZID. While 
there is nothing inherently wrong about this, some parts of the user interface could 
be improved, and it is natural nowadays to expect a graphical user interface (GUn 
to any commercial software package. Therefore, the user interface of HAZID 
should be redesigned, with a view to optimising the input of plant data, user 
interaction with the HAZOP emulator, and viewing output reports. 
• A properly designed graphical interface to the model generation tool (MGT) 
would also help, by reducing the repetition of user input typical in the question 
and answer session carried out at present. The MGT should also be integrated with 
the design of icons for the Graphical Tool and tools to define the attribute data of 
new units for storage in the Database APl. In short, a fully-fledged model 
development workbench should be developed. 
• The Graphical Tool GUI should be redesigned, to make it easIer to specify 
properties of fluids, component chemicals, etc. 
• In entering models into the MGT or other model development tool, it would be 
helpful to be able to use different representations, to suit the user's past 
experience. Functional equations, SDG arcs and truth tables are examples of 
qualitative representations that are equivalent, and so could be used as alternative 
input formats for models. 
• Redevelopment of the interface to HAZID should be carried out in conjunction 
with a critical appraisal of the features to be implemented in the tool, and a more 
object-oriented reimplementation of the system. Clearly, many "expert" features of 
the STOPHAZ prototypes were put in as proof of concept only. There needs to be 
a full functional specification for any features developed to a commercial stage. 
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• In the longer term, HAZID may form part of an integrated safety software 
environment, combining tools for maintaining checklists, emulating FMEA, 
HAZOP, sneak analysis, performing routine calculations for water hammer, vent 
sizing, etc. The experience gained so far in integrating the parts of HAZID would 
be quite valuable in building such an over-arching system. 
A number of new features could be added to HAZID, to extend its functionality 
beyond HAZOP, or to support the HAZOP emulation done at present: 
• A debugging environment for AutoHAZID and the FMS, to allow the developer of 
new equipment models, functions and predicates to test these without having to 
construct demonstration plant models and do HAZOPs on these. 
• Preliminary check of the plant design to detect the unwanted reactions and 
inherent problems in the plant, before HAZOP emulation. The check could take 
place when the plant model is fluidised, to examine every case where fluids are 
detected to be mixing. 
• Preliminary checks to identify sneak flows, where fluids may be unintentionally 
discharged through vents or drains due to errors in plant operation, for instance. 
• In addition to the tabular report produced during HAZOP emulation, HAZID 
should also produce a concise summary of equipment and fluids in the plant. This 
summary would remind the user of the plant structure and likely resident hazards. 
• The interface to HAZID could be changed, so that it operates as an interactive 
browser for fault paths, instead of a "batch mode" HAZOP emulator, as mentioned 
in Section 4.7. 
• A utility is required, so that results sets can be compared, to quickly identify 
differences between HAZOP reports. This requires a way of saving results in files 
so that the fault-deviation-consequence structure is retained. Such a file format 
would also help in developing other means of presenting results. 
• Selective quantitative simulation could be considered for certain hazardous 
scenarios, to validate their feasibility or to estimate the seriousness of 
consequences. Such an approach may use f10wsheeting packages, or implement 
the sort of mathematical programming simulation described by Purdue. 
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• Links to external HAZAN software and selective hazard analysis could also be 
considered, possibly making use of fault tree analysis to estimate the likelihood 
and magnitude of identified hazards. 
• Non-process propagation of faults can be important in escalation of faults, as 
discussed in Section 6.6. Some effort should therefore be spent examining how to 
model the human factors issues inherent in operating procedures, as well as the 
escalation of scenarios by the "domino effect". 
The varIOUS rule-based systems contained within AutoHAZID should also be 
improved or re-examined in future work: 
• During plant fluidisation, when a pump is encountered, the program does not 
check that a discharge pressure is given. If no value is given, the inlet pressure 
value is propagated straight through the unit. The same is true for temperatures in 
heat exchangers. A similar policy is used when propagating limit infonnation on 
pressures and temperatures, which may not be entirely safe. There should be a 
warning for these conditions, instead of the program silently propagating values 
through the unit. These problems are due to the fact that the models do not define 
the function of equipment items. One idea which may be useful is that of "fluid 
breakpoints", as mentioned in Paper 9 of McCoy et al. A breakpoint is a point 
where a stream undergoes some sort of change, such as a change in pressure, 
temperature or composition. The concept of breakpoints, defined for certain 
variables in the model of the equipment, may be a good way of representing those 
variables whose values should be specified in the plant model. For example, a 
pump is designed to raise pressure, so that its outlet is a breakpoint for pressure. 
The aim of HAZOP is to examine the causes of deviation from intended operation. 
If full equipment specification data is represented in equipment models, HAZOP 
emulation can be extended to consider more than just deviation of process 
variables. 
• In the fluidisation routine, the fluid rule #1 does not include a check for 
conflicting information where a number of output ports are attached to the same 
internal port (e.g. where two different outlet temperatures are given for outlets 
from the same chamber of a vessel). It just finds the first output port that has data 
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which can be transferred and propagates this data. There should be a check for 
such conflicts in the input data, possibly before any fluidisation or application of 
fluid rule # I. 
• The set of rules given in Section 5.3.6, used to propagate information about the 
limits of deviations, should be expanded. In particular, these rules should be 
extended to cover other variables (such as composition), as well as pressure and 
temperature, which are the only deviations whose limits are monitored so far. 
• An ad hoc rule has been used to decide ambiguous causal influences operating in a 
feedback loop, as outlined in Section 4.10, so that the shortest path is not always 
used to determine the fault paths in these parts of the graph. The need for such 
rules should be reviewed, with a view to justifying the approach theoretically, or 
doing something more general to prevent incorrect fault paths propagating through 
loops. The issues of loops and other topological features of the plant and the SDG, 
are discussed further in Section 6.7. 
• Similarly, an ad hoc rule is used to disallow reverse flow propagation in faulty 
units, as described in Section 4.3. The issue of how to control reasoning through 
unhealthy units should be examined in detail, as these sorts of problems are likely 
to be quite common. 
• The set of configuration rules, for detecting design faults in the plant model, could 
be extended in the future. These sort of rules are useful, but are not best reported 
in a HAZOP report format - a separate section of the HAZID report should be 
devoted to such problems detected in the plant. 
Some other possible areas of future work include: 
• The model of fault propagation used in HAZOP emulation can be extended to 
include the idea of generic faults and consequences, as described in Section 6.8. 
• The HAZOP algorithm should be optimised, to reduce the number of repeat 
validation checks carried out during fault path generation. As outlined in 
Section 6.9, a new object class for fault paths is needed, to allow the results of 
fault path validation (current fluids, deviation limits, etc.) to be stored with the 
fault path. 
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• Another area for optimisation is the use of graph pruning. By removing parts of 
the SOO which are not required, the speed of search could be increased. 
• The treatment of chemical interactions and reactions, whether intended reactions 
or not, should be improved, and this facility should be more widely used in 
equipment models. 
• Reverse propagation of temperature and concentration deviations, under 
conditions where reverse flow is occurring, should be modelled, The sort of 
scenario where reverse flow takes hot material to an upstream location, causing a 
problem related to high Temp, rather than revFlow, has never been satisfactorily 
treated in AutoHAZID so far. It might be possible to deal with this by propagating 
composition and temperature values upstream in revFlow propagation chains, so 
long as a link from revFlow to temp (or composition) is made in the upstream 
model. 
• The representation of instrument systems and protective devices In the plant 
model should be improved. 
• Consider abandoning the shortest path heuristic for graph search, accepting that 
multiple paths will be generated. The relevance of competing fault paths could be 
determined by comparing the strength of their causal links in some way, as 
discussed in Section 4.10. 
• The single fault assumption, as discussed in Section 4.3, should be challenged, 
with a view to modelling more complex scenarios than is now possible with 
AutoHAZID. 
• The process-based approach to qualitative modelling, as used by Forbus 
(Section 2.2.4) and the group at Pennsylvania (Section 2.3.4) should be revisited. 
The main problem with this approach was perceived to be computational 
complexity, which it may be possible to avoid by careful formulation of the 
models and the inference methods used on them. Certainly, the power of a system 
capable of representing phenomena in a plant, and reasoning about changes in 
their activation over time, is worth having. The histories idea of Hayes (1979), 
discussed in Section 2.2.3, could be useful in taming the complexity problems in 
this type of model. 
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• Potentially the biggest improvement to the equipment modelling system would be 
to introduce a representation capable of handling landmark values and state-
dependent behaviour, if possible including temporal reasoning within fault paths. 
With such capability, modelling the plant in off-normal or alternative operational 
states (start-up, shutdown, maintenance, batch, etc.) would be possible. This type 
of improvement is discussed in Section 6.S. 
6.3 Access to Plant Descriptions 
One of the most critical success factors for a commercial HAZOP emulator will be 
ease of use, in respect of the input and output interfaces. Because the tool is intended 
to support hazard identification, potentially at a late design stage, one cannot expect 
users to struggle with a difficult interface to access the benefits of HAZOP emulation. 
The effort required to input plant descriptions to HAZID is quite considerable at 
present, especially for larger plants. This problem has been improved significantly 
during the STOPHAZ project using the "intelligent CAD" interface of the Graphical 
Tool, developed by TXT. Nevertheless, if any re-typing or re-entering of plant details 
is needed, the input task quickly becomes unviable for larger plants. 
User compames often have a CAD representation of the plant design in some 
electronic format already, before a HAZOP emulator is used. The ideal situation 
would be where a representation of the plant P&IDs can be read into HAZID, possibly 
via some neutral file format. This requires that there is some "intelligent CAD" 
system in place, so that the equipment items in the plant correspond to objects on the 
drawing. Otherwise, one has to consider how to recognise the plant components from 
the line segments and arcs used to draw them. 
The main problem at present and into the near future is likely to be the proliferation of 
non-standard file formats for structured CAD data, where each format is proprietary to 
a particular CAD program. Communication between diverse software packages is the 
aim of the initiative known as STEP. Ultimately, STEP-compliant file formats will be 
defined for the exchange of process plant information, so that any program able to 
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read in and write out data in STEP format will be able to communicate with a large 
number of other programs with the same capability. So far, STEP has not been 
developed to this stage, so "seamless data exchange" between software is still some 
way off. 
Future work in developing HAZID should investigate the options for intelligent CAD 
on the market, and look at the possibility of automatic transfer of P&IDs from the 
CAD system to HAZID. It is important to make sure that the effort of building such 
interface software is well spent - the file format considered must be technically 
capable of transferring the required data into HAZID and the associated CAD 
package(s) must be widely used in industry. Proof of the viability of HAZID on 
industrial scale plant designs would greatly improve its long-term prospects of 
success. 
An alternative strategy is to shift the focus of automatic hazard identification to an 
earlier stage of design, namely flowsheeting. At this stage, the user is likely to be 
using a graphical interface to a flowsheeting package for sorting out the overall mass 
and heat flows in the plant. Therefore, much of the basic process information is 
available at this stage, such as the main unit operations and materials involved, 
together with flowrates, temperatures and pressures. Clearly, transfer of electronic 
information is still an issue, but the level of detail is less with this option, and re-
entering the flowsheet may be less of a headache. As discussed in Section 4.8, the 
current HAZID models are not suitable for analysis of flowsheets, but it may be 
worthwhile developing a new set - advantages include early hazard identification and 
a reduced volume of results for the user to look through. 
6.4 Methodology Issues in Unit and Fluid Modelling Systems 
To encourage the development of a range of models whose quality is assured to be of 
a certain level, a procedure should be set up to govern how models are created, 
maintained and documented. Following the procedure should ensure that a minimum 
level of competence is achieved in the models produced. This section addresses some 
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issues related to such a modelling methodology, from a general point of view, rather 
than with reference to AutoHAZID. 
Methodology has been mentioned before now, in Section 3.5, where the development 
of the flow path template model was used to illustrate a method for development and 
documentation of new models. Section 6.4.1 offers a view of the general modelling 
process, which can be used as the basis of developing models in the way illustrated by 
Section 3.5. Section 6.4.2 gives guidelines for the sort of documentation that should 
be provided by the model designer, so that the new model is comprehensible to other 
workers, who may need to modify it at a later stage. Section 6.4.3 looks at how 
pointers for model improvement can be identified, and is therefore quite strongly 
linked to Section 3.5.7, which discussed the knowledge elicitation techniques used in 
STOPHAZ. 
Additional possible sources of information for model development include the 
following, which were not used systematically during the development of HAZID: 
• Characteristic failure modes of equipment, as identified by other techniques, such 
asFMEA. 
• Codes and Standards for best practice design. 
• The advice in the STOPHAZ ELDER tool, which was designed as a repository of 
information about safe design. 
• Other sources, such as standardised incident reports, could be used. These often 
include analyses of the causal principles behind accidents, and are therefore useful 
for identifying the mechanism of the incident. A good example of this type of 
expertise is the Accident Database package published by the Institution of 
Chemical Engineers (1997). 
In addition to the advice offered here, Paper 9 of McCoy et al. (\ 998) contains some 
suggestions for methodologies to be followed in processing HAZOP results into 
formal qualitative equipment models. Such methods are needed to make the best use 
of information from modelling seminars and other meetings, where experts are 
questioned about the expertise they use in hazard identification. 
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6.4.1 A General Approach to Model Building 
This subsection presents a general view of the process of building fonnal models of 
equipment or phenomena. Although the emphasis during development of this 
methodology has been on qualitative models for HAZOP emulation, there is no reason 
why such an approach could not also be used for other types of model or application. 
The aim of the methodology is to build robust and maintainable models, in which all 
assumptions, restrictions and dependencies are clearly stated. 
The view of the modelling process adopted here is presented in Figure 6.1, where the 
equipment or phenomenon model is a formal representation which can be manipulated 
using mathematical or other symbolic means. The model must represent some portion 
of the real world in such a way that the behaviour predicted by the model, when used 
in simulation, is similar to that which would be observed in reality. 
The designer determines the development of the model, as illustrated schematically in 
Figure 6.1. The first task is to define a "system boundary" around that part of the real 
world which is to be modelled, effectively cutting off the "system" from the rest of the 
world. This is shown as a process of "restriction", and determines the scope of the 
model's applicability. 
The next step is for the designer to form an understanding of the functioning of the 
system. This can be seen as a process of "abstraction", producing an "internal mental 
model" in the designer's head. It can be very useful if the designer writes down what 
they understand about the system at this stage, even if it is not possible to state this 
very precisely, as this can be used as the basis of a later structured investigation of the 
problem. 
The process of "formalisation" consists of translating as much as possible of the 
internal mental model into the formal language of the model system. The formal 
model so produced can then be used in simulation and any weaknesses of the model 
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can be addressed at this stage, possibly introducing extra restrictions or 
generalisations of the model. 
"restriction" "abstraction" ''formalisation'' 
'-----.I ASSUMPTIONS 14----' 
Figure 6,1 : The Modelling Process 
The above procedure can be seen as a generally applicable method for model building, 
whether the final model is qualitative or quantitative in nature. The product of the 
modelling process is not just the formal model, containing the symbols and rules of 
the final implementation of the model. Just as important for defining a model is the set 
of assumptions which govern the system, or range of systems, for which the model is 
applicable. It is also important to give an explanation of what the designer understood 
about the system and how they went about formalising that internal understanding. 
In any case, if enough information is presented in the assumptions (description) of a 
model, it should be possible to reproduce the formal model from scratch. Therefore, a 
good aim is to state as much as possible of the reasoning, assumptions, restrictions, 
etc., while the model is being constructed. This is a difficult task, as a lot of 
knowledge seems to be "given", or "obvious" in the design exercise, leading to poor 
documentation of such knowledge. It might also be difficult to ensure that known 
deficiencies and problems are documented, but this information is vital for future 
development of models, as well as for signalling known weak areas. 
The control of changes to models, once built, should be carefully examined, as even 
small changes can have wide-ranging effects on the performance of the model. Above 
all, it is unwise to "tinker" with individual rules without first examining whether any 
of the assumptions of the model are affected. Such tinkering frequently occurs when 
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there are small problems with the results produced by the model and there is a 
temptation to go in and do a "quick fix". 
The process of model development as described conceptually above does not address 
the question of how to get started on a particular problem. Typically the brief for a 
problem may be as complex or ill-defined as "model flow and pressure propagation in 
a chemical plant" (see Section 3.5). When given an open-ended problem like this, the 
best approach is to target a single fairly well-defined system which captures the most 
commonly observed types of behaviour in the problem area. This target definition is 
an activity in the "restriction" part of Figure 6.1, and gives rise to a number of scope-
limiting assumptions, which should be documented at this stage. 
By concentrating attention on a well-understood instance of the phenomenon or item 
which needs to be modelled, the models will more likely be correct and well-
populated by known assumptions, and will hopefully be re-usable in a wide variety of 
situations. This approach should also prove economical in quickly producing models 
to be used as "base models" for further development. Such development is made by 
varying the assumptions used in a base model, so that the new model becomes either 
more general, or applicable to a different problem area. Clear statement of model 
assumptions is vital for this process. 
The ultimate goal (in developing from a base model) might be elimination of 
restricting assumptions, giving a fully general model for the phenomenon being 
studied, but it need not be. Some of the "base" assumptions in a model may be harder 
to eliminate than others. Whereas some assumptions are made for the sake of agreeing 
conventions for the models, others may be made to render the problem tractable or 
understandable, and so could be more closely tied to the nature of the model itself. An 
example of the latter might be the assumption, in the flow path model developed in 
Section 3.5, that no work is done on the fluid in the flow path. It is much more 
complicated to model a fluid where shaft work is involved, than in the simple flow 
path model. 
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6.4.2 Unit Model Documentation 
For a knowledge-based system to be acceptable to industry, all models need to be 
developed to a consistent level, and the assumptions made during this modelling must 
be documented. As a minimum standard of documentation, the following types of 
information should be provided, where appropriate, for any template or equipment 
model: 
• SCOPE OF MODEL 
• Give the common name of the entity to be modelled and a basic description of 
its function(s). 
• State any known subtypes of the entity modelled, and indicate whether they are 
modelled. 
• State any known entities which the modelled entity is a subtype of. 
• Give some impression of how general/specific the model is. 
• Describe the known internal features/subcomponents of the real object and 
state if they are modelled/not modelled. 
• State any other features known but not modelled. 
• Define how connections are made to other models. 
• Describe the context/applicability of the model. 
• DESCRIPTION OF MODEL 
• Give details of the component parts of the model: 
• Ports, for connection to other units, or for definition of internal locations. 
• Chambers, as separate spaces within the equipment. 
• Other structures (packing, etc.). 
• Fluids present, where these can be stated without presupposing the context 
of the model in a plant. 
• Materials of construction, if appropriate. 
• Phenomena operating within the model. 
• What variables are relevant to the model. 
• Connections between parts of the model, and to other modelled entities: 
• Internally, between ports. 
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• 
• 
• To other units. 
• Between variables in the model. 
• Failure modes and hazards, with their associated deviations. 
• Define any state dependent behaviours in the unit and any attribute-conditional 
subtypes which could be defined to model them. 
• Fluid model system dependencies. 
• Higher order modelling decisions or conventions (e.g. causal hierarchy). 
• List modelling principles/assumptions. 
• State how well developed the model is, any known deficiencies, problems, etc. 
FORMAL DEFINITION OF MODEL 
• Name of model. 
• Parent of model. 
• Known child models. 
• Specify ports and internal connections. 
• Attributes relevant to model sUbtypes. 
• Reference to libraries where defined/used. 
• Text of the SDG arcs in the model. 
OTHER INFORMATION 
• Change history, names of authors, etc. 
• Supporting analysis for modelling, e.g. truth tables, methods used, etc. 
• Schematic line diagram of unit, with ports. Should show internal connections 
between ports, if appropriate. 
• Bitmap icon for equipment type. 
• Schematic diagram of parts of SDG model. 
The documentation should allow a complete understanding of how the model is built, 
functionally, and how it compares to the equipment it is designed to mimic. Providing 
this level of documentation would make the job of extending existing models, and 
developing new ones, much more straightforward. It would also provide an assurance 
of quality in the model libraries, which is bound to be a critical factor in determining 
industrial acceptance of any system like HAZID in the longer term. 
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6.4.3 Improving Model Performance 
In the same way that equipment models in the HAZID unit model library benefit from 
the use of a sound development methodology, it is important to use sound methods for 
identifying, developing and maintaining rules within the FMS. So far, little work has 
been done on the methodology of FMS development. 
As with unit models, any improvement policy should combine methods to tackle both 
"false negatives" and "false positives", with respect to the results of HAZOP 
emulation. False negatives are scenarios not present in the results, which should be, 
whereas false positives are identified scenarios which are not interesting, or not 
feasible. 
To enrich the fluid modelling system, so that it represents a wider scope of real 
problems (eliminating false negatives), "brainstorming" techniques can be used to 
identify candidates for new fluid rules. This approach can be used in addition to the 
method of criticising results produced by HAZOP emulation on case study plants. An 
example of this sort of "brainstorming" was attempted by myself and Prof. Lees, to try 
to identify rules governing limits on pressure and temperature deviations. The minutes 
of our meeting are reproduced as Appendix F and can be seen as an information 
resource, containing ideas for further development in the FMS. 
To tackle the false positives In the HAZOP results, a methodology needs to be 
adopted for identifying problem areas and for formulating and implementing solutions 
to them. This sort of activity concentrates on criticism of the results of HAZOP 
analyses and might include the following elements: 
• The starting point is a result (fault-consequence pairing) which does not make 
sense in some way. Therefore, this is a "false positive" which should be removed. 
• First, the fault path(s) giving rise to the result should be examined carefully, to find 
out where the weak or incorrect link is. 
• If the fault or consequence is not valid in the specific case identified, an FMS 
condition could be added, to restrict the applicability of the item. 
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• If some arc in the path is clearly not a feasible influence in the model, then it 
should be removed. However, it is important to determine that the arc is genuinely 
incorrect, and wasn't put into the model for some other specific reason. 
• Where there is no obviously wrong link, each component of the fault path must be 
examined, to see where there is a gap between model and reality. If a weak link can 
be identified, this is a candidate position for applying a conditional rule. Identifying 
this point requires a good understanding of the hazardous scenario identified. Such 
an understanding should be documented, so that the basis for modelling the 
scenario is understood at a later date. 
• Possible strategies for dealing with the model weakness include use of new or 
different variables for propagation, use of single mapping influences, as described 
in Section 4.2, or adding propagation conditions to arcs. 
• To add new conditions to the arcs in the graph, one must consider what information 
is required to decide the new condition and whether that information is present 
locally or needs to be propagated somehow. Using fault propagation, faults cause 
local effects which may be propagated via deviations to remote locations, where a 
susceptibility to some deviation gives rise to a consequence. Maintaining the local 
nature of these events embodies the "no function in structure" principle and ensures 
that the equipment models developed are usable in many different contexts. 
• Once any fluid rule has been created, the rationale for its development should be 
documented. Such documentation should include an explanation of the real-world 
problem it is designed to solve, as well as the information it uses and any 
assumptions it makes about the plant data available in the system. 
6.5 Modellinq State-Dependent Behaviour and Temporal Sequences 
A very significant improvement to the AutoHAZID modelling system would be to 
develop a representation capable of handling landmark values and state-dependent 
behaviour, if possible including temporal reasoning within fault paths. With such a 
capability, modelling the plant in off-normal or alternative operational states (start-up, 
shutdown, maintenance, batch and semi-batch, etc.) would be possible. 
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The references to state-dependent behaviour mentioned in this thesis, which may be of 
use when considering how to tackle the subject, are: 
• De Kleer and Brown (1984) discuss the issue of state-based models and their 
relationship to causal reasoning. 
• In the work published by Purdue University, Srinivasan and Venkatasubramanian 
(1996) discuss a method for using Petri nets and digraphs for modelling the 
progress of a batch processing recipe. 
• The work of the group at Pennsylvania University, as reviewed in Section 2.3.4, 
illustrates a process-based approach to simulation, which relies on model 
rebuilding in response to state changes. It may also provide pointers to the types of 
ambiguity and complexity problems to be tackled when building state-dependent 
simulators. 
There are at least two big issues to tackle within a representation which is to handle 
the state-dependent behaviour of plant components. One is the state-dependency issue 
- how to represent the fact that parts of the model change when the state changes. The 
other is how to detennine what state transitions are possible when simulating the 
model behaviour. 
The fonner problem can be tackled using rules of the fonn: "if equipment is in state I 
then use model_section!", or some equivalent. That is, the use of each different 
section of the model would depend on the state the equipment was in. Such a system 
could be implemented using the rules of the FMS, by attaching state-dependent 
conditions to the relevant SDO arcs in the equipment models. 
The latter problem, that of detennining legal state transitions, can be tackled by 
defining the applicability of a state transition in a number of ways: 
• A state is dependent on a certain variable being within a range, defined by 
landmark values of that variable. The state is only valid when the variable is 
within the landmark values. 
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• State transitions may be caused by faults, which effectively change the model of 
the equipment item. 
• State changes can also be caused by operator actions, such as opening or closing 
valves, switching machines on or off, etc. 
• Alternatively, no cause can be sought for the state change - it may be assumed to 
occur spontaneously, or at least one may not be interested in the cause of it. 
In certain cases, the above definitions of state applicability may be muddied by the 
possibility that a state transition is not guaranteed by the cause given. A probability 
may be associated with a statement like: "if the control valve fails closed, then a 
change to state I may be caused". In this case, both possibilities (i.e. change or no 
change) should be followed up, and computational complexity becomes a problem if 
this sort of "forking" occurs too often. 
States should be defined, either in relation to individual equipment items (e.g. 
"pumpJ I is running"), or in terms of a certain number of global conditions which may 
affect many units in the plant (e.g. "electric power is failed"). Using the latter type of 
state-dependence, some types of common-mode failures could be examined, and 
systematic "what-if?" studies could be carried out on the plant to see how it would 
respond in the event of a power or cooling water failure, for example. The constraints 
imposed by operating instructions (or safety interlocks) on the states of valves in the 
plant, may also be represented by this sort of global constraint. 
It should be noted that allowing some of the above types of state transition to occur, 
outside the immediate causal pathway of the fault path being considered, amounts to 
relaxing the single fault assumption. The result is that the fault paths are no longer 
simple or linear, as before. An example is: "the flow into the tank increases and, 
because the level control loop is in manual state, the tank overfills". The operator 
leaving a control loop in manual is not an immediate cause of the tank overfill, but is 
a plausible state of affairs for the plant when that event is caused by the increased 
flow. 
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It is important, therefore, to address the single fault assumption in the context of this 
type of state-dependent behaviour. A certain number of state changes may be 
plausible, but a large number of independent and coincident events of this nature are 
highly unlikely. One might imagine relaxing the single fault assumption slightly, to 
allow a limited number of additional state changes in a fault path. The ambiguity 
introduced to the SDG by allowing equipment state changes may be tamed using this 
sort of method. However, the logic used in arguing that events are independent, and 
therefore unlikely to occur together, could be rather difficult to formalise. 
The present FMS rule system could, in principle, be used to implement state-
dependency in equipment models. A number of attributes would be defined, giving 
the states of each equipment item in the plant, and a smaller number of "global states" 
for the plant as a whole, as mentioned above. These state attributes would be 
accessible by functions of the FMS. 
State-dependent parts of models would be expressed with conditions, dependent on 
the state attributes, attached to the relevant parts of the SDG model. Some parts of this 
"attachment" could be automated, so that the model builder would not have to 
explicitly code these "activating conditions" into models. They would be added by the 
system in response to the relevant syntax (e.g. defining state-dependent blocks of arcs) 
in the model library. 
HAZOP search would operate as it does at present, generating fault paths for later 
validation by the FMS. Therefore, arcs belonging to all states of the equipment would 
be treated as equally valid in the search (this would certainly cause complexity 
problems!). Only at the validation stage would infeasible paths be rejected, including 
those where the states of equipment were found to be inconsistent with one another. 
During validation, legal state transitions would be allowed, as discussed above, 
subject to some limit on the number of simultaneous "failure" events. The current 
states of equipment items in the fault path (and elsewhere) would have to be recorded 
by the FMS as the validation proceeded, in much the same way that "current fluids" 
are tracked by the FMS at present. 
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It may be that the suggested solution above (using the FMS) is flawed, and that the 
simulation of state-dependent processes requires some new system to be developed. I 
feel that the biggest problem, after designing an adequate representation for the state-
dependent models, will be the complexity introduced by the state changes in the 
system. Finding means to localise the effects of these changes and manage the "single 
fault assumption" (or its successor, the "maximum N faults assumption") may be the 
key to tackling this problem. 
6.6 Non-Process Propagation of Faults 
AutoHAZID concentrates on modelling fault propagation using an almost entirely 
process-based view of propagation - deviations cause other deviations by virtue of the 
interconnection of process equipment via streams between them. "Real World" 
propagation of hazards can also occur by other means, due to the other types of 
connections present in the plant. Connections between components in the plant can be 
viewed as types of constraint in the model. The types of connections/constraints 
present in a real plant include the following: 
• Process streams connect one equipment item to another. These are well-modelled 
at present. 
• Signal connections from sensors to controllers to control valves constitute (in part) 
the control and protective systems in the plant, which further constrain its 
behaviour. Instruments, trips, relief devices and control loops are represented to a 
limited extent in AutoHAZID - improvement is possible in this area. 
• Physical proximity and spatial layout are often important factors in the escalation 
of hazardous scenarios, where the "domino effect" comes into play. An example is 
where an explosion in one part of a plant causes a missile to be propelled through 
a pipeline, or into a vessel in another part of the plant. The two damaged pieces of 
the plant may be entirely unrelated, from a process viewpoint, so that such factors 
may be overlooked in a study of the plant design. 
• A further level of constraint is that imposed by the operating procedures of the 
plant. These "soft constraints" rely on the operators following the instructions and 
impose restrictions on the possible states of the plant, defining some of these 
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states as more probable than others. Clearly, errors in following instructions are 
possible. It may be possible to model the ways that such mistakes occur, and use 
this as the basis of hazard identification. It may also be possible to analyse 
interventions directed at correcting disturbances in the plant, using such models. 
It is possible to consider a HAZOP emulation tool being used to identify possible 
"domino effect" scenarios, or hazards caused by human error in relation to the 
operating instructions. What is needed in either case is a means of representing the 
necessary information (plant layout details or draft operating instructions), and then an 
inference procedure which allows systematic checking of the proposed design. 
It seems that future work to identify the "domino effects" in a plant could make use of 
the work of Hayes (l979) on histories, as discussed in Section 2.2.3, to govern the 
range of possible interactions between equipment items. 
6.7 Loops, Plant Topology and Higher Level Constraints 
Some of the problems encountered with HAZOP emulation have been related to the 
presence of loops in the plant model, and the inability of the system to model high 
level constraints in the SDG. This type of problem has been mentioned briefly in 
Section 4.9 in connection with qualitative ambiguity. Modelling higher level 
constraints, spanning a number of process units, can reduce ambiguity in predicted 
behaviour. 
An example is given in Figure 6.2, where a spill-back line returns part of the liquid 
pumped from a vessel back into that vessel. Changing the flow in the spill-back line 
can itself have no effect on the level in the tank, unless the net flow out of the loop 
changes. This constraint is not captured by the SDG, but could be detected by suitable 
analysis of the plant topology. 
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Figure 6.2 : Mass Balance Problem with Spill-back Loop 
There should be a concerted effort to identify cases where high level constraints are 
required, and to capture those constraints by analysing the topology of the SOG or of 
the plant itself. Care must be taken, however, to be sure that the constraints introduced 
are generally applicable, in all plants containing the relevant structures. 
In the particular case of feedback control loops, the system can be made to deduce 
certain features of the loop from the SDG arcs and the plant topology, such as the 
controlled variable in the loop. This data can be confirmed to the user, and used to 
reason about possible failure modes of the loop, and their effects on the plant. 
6.8 An Extended Representation for Fault Propagation 
The fault paths in AutoHAZID so far have been entirely linear. An initial fault is 
linked to a final consequence via a sequence of deviations. Faults must appear at the 
start of a fault path and consequences may only appear at the end of fault paths. There 
is no scope for faults or consequences to appear as intermediate events in the chain. 
Firstly, this limitation should be removed: faults and consequences should be 
modelled as equivalent events, from the point of view of fault propagation. There 
should be no problem with consequence events being linked to further deviations or 
consequences through escalation of the hazard. A typical example is where some 
initial failure causes a valve or other component to become blocked, which then gives 
rise to further variable deviations and (possibly) to another consequence. In HAZOP 
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emulation at the moment, the blockage must be modelled as two separate events (one 
fault and one consequence), whereas it should be represented as a single event. 
Also, the way faults and consequences are modelled at present ignores the similarity 
between the same events occurring in different equipment items. The "leak to 
environment" fault in a pump is entirely disconnected from the same fault in a storage 
tank, from the point of view of the modelling system. This means that when such 
faults or consequences are changed, they must be changed everywhere in the unit 
model library. 
A more sensible system would treat faults and consequences as model entities, 
instances of which are used in equipment models. A library of event types, analogous 
to the current library of equipment models, could be constructed. In such a library of 
event types, a change to the event model would imply that all instances of that event, 
in equipment models and templates, would be changed. 
If faults and consequences were modelled in this way, as fully fledged objects in the 
model system, the next step would be to model the relationships between similar 
(generic or specific) events. During the STOPHAZ project, Prof. Lees developed the 
idea of consequence classification and evaluation (discussed in Paper 5 of McCoy 
et aI., 1998, and in Section 3.3.8). Using this idea, a number of basic types of 
consequence are defined, and each specific consequence may be classified as an 
instance of a number of different types. Future work in modelling could treat events as 
instances of generic types in this way, so that only the most general events would be 
present in the SDG models. Specific consequences and faults would be modelled as 
instances of the generic types in the SDG models. 
Under such an interpretation, fault propagation would take place in two dimensions 
(see Figure 6.3 below) instead of the linear, one-dimensional propagation used at 
present. An initial, specific fault occurs, which is an instance of some more generic 
fault type. The generic fault type is linked by a number of variable deviations, in the 
SDG, to a generic consequence event. The generic consequence is realised in the plant 
by an instance of a more specific consequence type. Clearly, this type of scheme may 
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involve more complicated model building, and possible extensions to the SOG search 
algorithm, compared to the current models in HAZID. 
fault 
(specific) 
consequence 
(specific) 
Figure 6.3 : Alternative Fault Propagation Model 
6.9 Optimisation of the HAZOP Algorithm and Fluid Modelling System 
The speed of the program is quite drastically reduced by the execution of the fault 
path validation technique, particularly the parts of the system which maintain the 
deviation limit information in the fault path. 
Part of the reason for this is repeated search. When the plant model is loaded, 
AutoHAZID compiles a set of lookup tables for the alarms and indicators on the plant, 
giving the causes by which those devices are activated. This involves calling the 
search algorithm for each of the deviations related to the alarms and indicators, which 
negates many of the advantages of two-stage search. It also involves search which is 
repeated at a later stage, when the HAZOP is performed. Therefore, this task of 
compiling lookup tables for the instruments is inefficient, and should be done when 
the causes of all the HAZOPed deviations have been determined by HAZOP. 
Also, the fault path information is stored in such a way that the results of fault path 
validation (such as the current fluid lists), for partially completed fault paths, are not 
available for reuse later on in the search algorithm. The scenario objects used for 
storing the search data do not allow storage of this data. The result of this 
representational shortcoming is that there is some repeated validation in the algorithm. 
at least doubling the work done. Specifically, when partial fault paths are joined 
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together producing longer paths, the whole long path has to be re-validated and when 
consequences are added to the fault paths at the end of the HAZOP search phase, all 
the fault paths have to be validated once again. 
This is a strong argument for changing the data structures used in the HAZOP 
algorithm, so that fault paths and partial fault paths can be represented as objects 
which record all the context information generated by validation, including current 
fluids. The validation of these paths could be updated whenever they were extended, 
with minimal effort, and the fault path objects would be copied whenever necessary, 
so that repeat validation of the same partial paths could be avoided. 
6.10 Conclusions 
This chapter has discussed the strengths and weaknesses of the HAZID approach to 
hazard identification, and outlined a number of areas of possible work to improve 
HAZOP emulation in the future. A small number of these topics have been discussed 
at length - I hope that the sketches offered by Sections 6.3 to 6.9 are sufficient to 
allow another person to continue the work done on HAZID and, in particular, on its 
Fluid Modelling System. 
The seven areas of future work discussed in detail were: 
I. Access to Plant Descriptions 
2. Methodology Issues in Unit and Fluid Modelling Systems 
3. Modelling State-Dependent Behaviour and Temporal Sequences 
4. Non-Process Propagation of Faults 
5. Loops, Plant Topology and Higher Level Constraints 
6. An Extended Representation for Fault Propagation 
7. Optimisation of the HAZOP Algorithm and Fluid Modelling System 
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The main areas of concern reflected in these headings are: 
• Improving the representational strength of models used. 
• Management of large volumes of information, in the form of models encapsulating 
expert knowledge. 
• Optimisation of program performance. 
• Developing interfaces to external systems. 
These summarised concerns seem representative of the sorts of problems which need 
to be tackled, to gain an even more acceptable level of performance from a model-
based hazard identifier, such as AutoHAZID. The next chapter attempts to summarise 
the conclusions that may be drawn from the work presented in the thesis. 
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Chapter 7 : Conclusions 
The automation of HAZOP analysis, using qualitative plant models for process 
simulation, is motivated by the prospect of saving some of the time and money 
traditionally spent in HAZOP studies conducted by teams. The AutoHAZID computer 
program was developed in the STOPHAZ project to emulate HAZOP, using 
qualitative reasoning methods. 
This thesis has described how qualitative reasoning can be successfully applied to 
hazard identification by emulation of HAZOP. It has also demonstrated, however, that 
purely qualitative models are not sufficient to provide the accuracy required in 
reported hazards. Checks based on quantitative information are needed to prevent 
spurious identification of hazards. 
The qualitative model system in HAZID proved to be a highly efficient way of 
modelling fault propagation in the majority of simple hazard scenarios. However, 
there were some problems with the method, as outlined in Chapter 4 and summarised 
below: 
• Indiscriminate reporting of hazards and repetition in HAZOP reports. 
• Qualitative ambiguity, leading to undecidable influences in the SOG and to 
problems with computational complexity. 
• The SOO only represents two types of deviations in process variables, which is a 
problem for flow, for instance. 
• The "shortest path heuristic", used in the graph searching algorithm at the heart of 
HAZOP emulation in HAZIO, is not theoretically sound. 
• The SOO model of an equipment item does not change when that equipment fails, 
so that it is possible to reason through unhealthy equipment, with erroneous 
results. 
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• Single mappIng influences In the plant are not represented In the SDG as 
originally formulated. 
An important method used to tackle many of these problems was by using quantitative 
information, typically concerning the fluids in the plant, implemented in the Fluid 
Modelling System (FMS). The FMS was described in Chapter 5 and is summarised 
briefly below: 
• The FMS verifies the feasibility of fault-consequence scenarios produced by the 
(qualitative) HAZOP search algorithm. 
• It does this by evaluating (optional) conditions attached to the fault, the 
consequence and the propagation arcs that link fault to consequence in a scenario. 
If any condition in the chain fails, the scenario is suppressed. 
• The FMS conditions are implemented by a system of predicates and functions, 
which use information on the fluids in the plant, and their properties. 
• A number of sources of information are integrated by the FMS in providing the 
rule-based checks. These sources include information provided in the plant model 
on fluids present, their temperatures and pressures, as well as internal and external 
program modules for determining physical property values. 
• The FMS also does some reasoning about the limits of process variable deviations 
in scenarios, and their ability to cause the consequences they are linked to. 
The choice of fault propagation as a model for scenario development was a good one, 
despite the consequent limitation of HAZOP emulation to single fault, single 
consequence scenarios. Once the capability to conduct practically useful HAZOP 
emulation studies on real industrial problems has been demonstrated, the model of 
scenario development may be widened to include more complicated constraints 
between events. 
The SDG is a very useful formalism for building models of equipment suitable for 
representing fault propagation. It allows the causal links between variables to be stated 
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in a quite natural way. Search on the SDG is also probably the most efficient model 
for inference which could have been chosen. 
The frame-based models in AutoHAZID make use of inheritance and are organised 
into a hierarchy of types within the unit model library. The definition of equipment 
models in this way facilitates the easy construction of plant models with a minimum 
of externally supplied information. Maintenance of the unit model library is eased by 
the hierarchical nature of the model frames, and by use of template models, which cut 
down on the number of arcs in the unit models by modelling commonly observed 
features of equipment models. Proliferation of unit models in the library, to cover 
multiple subtypes of more general models, is reduced by the use of attribute-
conditional model sections in the more general model frames. These factors all 
contribute to making the model library easy to use when creating plant models or 
adding new unit models. 
Despite the success of the qualitative SDG based approach to modelling hazardous 
scenarios, there are problems which cannot be solved using just qualitative fault 
propagation. Such problems are related to dependencies which are not represented in 
the qualitative graph models. For example, the linear model of fault propagation in 
AutoHAZID does not allow for simultaneous events to be modelled (i.e. no "AND" 
logic). Also, there is no representation of the dependency of scenarios on the 
properties of plant fluids, in the simple SDG. 
The FMS was introduced as a means of adding dependencies outside the immediate 
scope of linear propagation of process variable deviations. It allows properties of the 
fluids in the plant (as well as other plant information) to be used in the evaluation of 
conditions which allow the verification of fault paths. The model of fault path 
verification used in the FMS mimics some features of scenario development in the 
real plant. In order for a deviation to cause a consequence, it must have a sufficient 
magnitude, for instance. 
In formulating conditions for the FMS, the modeller is given the option of making use 
of external physical properties packages to determine fluid property values, or of using 
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information resources within the AutoHAZID program itself. This demonstrates the 
versatility of the integrated HAZIO package, which also provides access to plant 
descriptions prepared in the Graphical Tool. 
Due to the application of the FMS, the focus of HAZOP results produced by 
AutoHAZIO was improved and the quantity of irrelevant output was reduced. This 
added significantly to the value of the HAZOP emulation results. 
Quite separately from the development of the FMS, an innovative new extension to 
the SDG was developed, to model single mapping influences, where the usual dual 
mapping SDG arcs are not sufficient to capture the real influences in some equipment. 
This extension (using code numbers to represent the single mapping influences) seems 
to be the most specific enhancement possible within the framework of the SDG - any 
further change would require a more radical change to the model system. 
The experience of developing the "flow path" modelling technique, for fluid flow and 
pressure propagation, was particularly valuable. A number of methodological issues 
were highlighted by this effort, including the use of the "causal hierarchy" idea for 
controlling and simplifying the scope of permitted influences between variables. It is 
likely that this approach to solving modelling problems could be used elsewhere. 
None of the research groups reviewed in Chapter 2 have tackled the HAZOP 
emulation problem as comprehensively as we have at Loughborough. It appears that 
we have a program capable of making use of a wider range of equipment to study 
much larger case study plants. However, there are still problem areas in this domain, 
as discussed in Chapter 6. A few of these are summarised below: 
• There is no means at present to model state-dependent behaviour and temporal 
sequences of events. 
• Non-process aspects of the plant model are not represented well. The constraints 
imposed by operating instructions, instrument systems, and spatial relationships 
between equipment (for domino effect prediction), could all be modelled. 
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• The topology of SDG models, and that of the plant itself, can be examined to 
extract infonnation about higher level constraints in the plant (e.g. mass balance 
constraints). This could help tackle ambiguity problems in HAZO? emulation. 
• The representation of fault propagation could be extended, in terms of making 
fault and consequence events equivalent in the SDG, and allowing a taxonomy of 
such events. The latter measure could simplify equipment models greatly. 
• The use of ad hoc rules, outside the equipment and fluid modelling systems, 
should be re-examined. Examples are the rules to prevent propagating reverse 
flow deviations through leaking units, or to prevent anomalous influences being 
reported in feedback loops. 
• For industrial acceptability, all model development should be carried out using a 
methodology which ensures consistent model quality and documentation. 
Solving the problems above, related to representation of all aspects of the plant and its 
behaviour, will significantly widen the scope of hazards which can be identified. 
The most immediate problem for the future use of HAZO? emulation is (automated) 
access to plant descriptions. Software links to existing CAD or intelligent CAD 
packages must be defined (possibly using STE? file transfer) in order to make the use 
of a HAZO? emulator worthwhile. 
In conclusion, HAZOP emulation by computer is potentially worthwhile, and the 
qualitative approach is the right one for basic modelling of fault propagation. 
Qualitative reasoning is an efficient fonn of simulation which mimics human-like 
thought processes. However, there are unavoidable problems with a purely qualitative 
approach, which cannot be solved without the use of some quantitative information. 
Such infonnation should not rely on numerical simulation of the process, because this 
requires too much numerical data. Verifying hazard scenarios, by testing fluid-
dependent conditions attached to the qualitative models in the hazard identifier, seems 
to tackle the problem at an appropriate level of detail. 
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Appendix A . Outline of the AutoHAZID 
Package 
AutoHAZID is a text-based program which is embedded, for the purposes of a 
Windows-based implementation, in a very simple Windows graphical user interface. 
Nevertheless, the main interface between the user and the program is by interaction 
with a text-based menu system, and the program can still be used as a (separately 
compiled) UNIX application. This appendix outlines the start-up procedure for the 
HAZID program and the options available on the program's main menu, and finally 
gives a sample of the type of output produced by HAZOP emulation. 
A.1 Program Start-up 
This section outlines the start up procedure of AutoHAZID, placing emphasis on the 
Windows version of the program. Double clicking on the AutoHAZID icon starts up a 
"wrapper" program, which displays a window with just two menns and two menu 
items ("Start HAZID" and "Exit"). This program only configures a link to the API 
database used in HAZID and allows the user to start the AutoHAZID program proper. 
As an alternative to starting AutoHAZID in this way, a number of command line 
options can be used. These have been designed mainly for use with the UNIX version 
of the program but are available in all versions. They allow the user to specify that the 
program should perform certain tasks in a "non-interactive" mode before starting the 
program's main menu. The command line options are not discussed further here, but 
are documented in the Advanced User Options Section of the AuloHAZID 
documentation (STOPHAZ Project, 1997b, Appendix 4). 
Start-up continues as follows. After initialising the text menus and the Windows 
interface, AutoHAZID reads the configuration settings file, hazpaths. dos. This 
allows some optional aspects of the program configuration to be specified, as well as 
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giving the names of files to be read into the program, directories in which to store 
HAZOP results, etc. Other files read in during the start-up phase give information on 
translations of model names between the API and the unit model library, details of 
permitted deviation names in the SDG and details of standard consequence types. 
Details of which variables in the plant model are considered to propagate upstream 
and downstream between connected units are set up by a "hard-wired" routine in the 
program itself. The program then attempts to make a link to the physical properties 
package specified in the configuration file. Next it reads in the template library, the 
unit model library and the fluid library files, using the parser, and sets up a list of 
Fluid objects for storing the information from the fluid library. The main menu for 
interaction with the user is then started. The main menu appears as in Figure A.I 
below. 
Menu 
O. a. Load plant from API 
1. l. Load plant from file 
2. r. Set consequence threshold rank (1-5) 1 
3. y. Change analysis options 
4. z. Set deviations for HAZOP 
5. s. Set units to HAZOP 
6. t. Set unit types to HAZOP 
7. h. HAZOP plant 
8. u. HAZOP one unit 
9. o. Display output file 
10. c. Causes of a deviation 
11. p. Causes of a protection being triggered 
12. d. Causes of a consequence 
13. i. Display a frame 
14. v. Display fluid information 
15. b. Test routines 
16. e. Evaluate a function/predicate 
17. q. Quit Menu 
Input a choice : 
Figure A.I : AutoHAZID Main Menu 
The main options available from this menu are described in the following sections. 
The options are selected by typing either the number or the letter listed, in response to 
the "Input a choice ;" prompt. 
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A.2 Load Plant from API or Text File 
In the Windows implementation of AutoHAZID, there are two options for loading a 
plant description into the program: from the Database API or from a manually keyed 
text file. The UNIX version of the program only offers the latter option. 
If the user elects to load a plant description from the API, the first action of the 
program is to remove from memory details of any previously loaded plant. It then asks 
the user to choose a plant description from the list of those available in the database. 
The next step is for the program to read all the data in the database associated with 
this plant and write the information to a text file in the same format as would be 
required for a keyed-in plant description. Once the file has been produced, it is read 
back into AutoHAZID through the parser, and various internal data are initialised as 
in the case below, where a plant model is read from a file. 
If the option to load a plant description from a text file is chosen, the user is prompted 
to give the name of the file (the existence of which is verified); then the details of any 
previous plant description are removed from memory. The file is read into the 
program through the parser and the various data structures associated with the plant 
model are initialised. Initialisation includes connecting units to one another within the 
plant model, checking that mandatory POlt connections have been made, preparing 
lists of information concerned with splitting the plant up into "lines" for HAZOP, 
checking protection devices, etc. The SDG model of the plant is constructed and 
indexed for efficient access at this point, and the information on the fluids present in 
the plant is propagated throughout the plant model. 
A.3 HAZOP Analysis of Whole Plant or Single Unit 
Once a plant model has been loaded into AutoHAZID, a HAZOP study can be carried 
out on it. From the main menu, the user can choose to perform a full HAZOP on the 
whole plant model, or to HAZOP only one unit, in the sense that only the deviations 
belonging to that unit will be examined for causes and consequences. 
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In the "HAZOP plant" option, the whole plant is examined, subject to the scope 
settings described in Section A.4. These allow the user to choose which units, unit 
types or deviations to include in the analysis. 
When the user chooses to run a HAZOP on the whole plant, the program first asks for 
an output file name (which must not exist already in the results directory) and then 
asks the user if they wish to define the order in which units are examined. If the user 
does not want to order the units, the program will do this automatically, using its own 
breakdown of the plant into flow lines. Manually choosing the order of units requires 
that the user type the identifying numbers of units, which are indicated by 
AutoHAZID in a list, in the user's preferred order. When the order of units has been 
decided, the program goes on to perform a HAZOP analysis of the plant, printing 
results to the specified file when it has finished. An example of the type of results file 
typically produced by HAZOP emulation is given in Section A.8 of this appendix. 
The "HAZOP one unit" option is simpler, in that it asks for a unit name and a fiie 
name to send the results to, then goes on to examine the named unit and print the 
results to the named output fiie. The menu option "Display output file" can be used in 
the Windows version of AutoHAZID to display the results produced by HAZOP 
emulation, or the text file can be examined using any text editor or similar program. 
Some details of the processing that goes on in the HAZOP algorithm arc given in 
Appendix B. 
A.4 Scope of HAZOP 
AutoHAZID allows the user to set up a restricted scope for the units and/or deviations 
to be examined in the HAZOP analysis. Options are presented for the user to choose 
which units, unit types or deviations will be examined in the HAZOP which is 
subsequently initiated as described in Section A.3 above. This is implemented in three 
"toggle menus", which allow the user to switch on or off different options in the lists 
given. 
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A.S Flags for Reporting and Filtering 
A number of features of the HAZOP analysis and reporting procedure are controlled 
by flags which may be manipulated by the user. These are present in the "Set 
consequence threshold" item on the main menu and in the "Change analysis options" 
sub-menu, accessible from the main menu: 
• Set consequence threshold. This option allows for consequences below the given 
severity threshold to be eliminated from the results set produced by HAZOP. Each 
of the consequences in the unit models has an associated consequence severity 
ranking, in the range I to 5, where I is least severe and 5 is most severe. 
In the "Change analysis options" sub-menu the following choices can be made: 
• Display faults with no consequences. If this reporting option is on, then faults not 
associated with any consequence will be reported in the HAZOP report. This 
increases the size of the report significantly. 
• Display consequences with no causes. If on, this reporting option will leave in the 
report all consequences found linked to a deviatior., including those which were not 
associated with any cause found by fault propagation. 
• Filter out repeat faults. When many similar faults are reported as causes of the 
same deviation, the repetition can be distracting. Therefore, it is possible to remove 
all but one of the similar faults in the results, incidentally modifying the fault 
description by adding "etc." to it. if this filtering option is switched on, the program 
will eliminate repetitions of faults with the same descriptor string, belonging to 
units in the same "line", with the same unit type. 
• Filter out repeat fault-consequence pairs. This IS a reporting option to remove 
repetitions of scenarios, which otherwise may be reported for a number of different 
deviations. 
• Display protections present. This option controls whether the program will look for 
(and report) any protective devices in association with scenarios it identifies. 
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• Only display faults with no protections. When the "Display protections" option is 
turned on, this option controls whether scenarios which have protections associated 
with them will be reported. 
• Use fluid model defaults. This is a switch for de-activating the fluid modelling 
system, so that certain queries will return default answers. 
Section 4.4 also discusses the above features for filtering and reporting, in the context 
of the methods used in AutoHAZID to improve on the unfiltered output from fault 
propagation. 
A.6 "Causes-Of" Options 
Three options are provided in AutoHAZID to allow the user to request explanations of 
HAZOP results from the program. These give a way for the human user to look 
directly at the fault paths generated by the machine, to see if there is some problem or 
unappreciated feature in the HAZOP results as produced. The options are: 
• Causes of a deviation. The user identifies a variable deviation to the program, 
which then performs a search to find all faults which cause the· deviation. It 
displays the fault paths in order of length. 
• Causes of a protection being triggered. For a plant in which there are some 
protective units, this option is used to find fault paths which will cause those 
protections to operate. The user chooses a protection in the plant and the program 
displays the fault paths it finds, in urder of length. 
• Causes of a consequence. The user chooses one of the defined consequences for a 
unit in the plant model and the program then searches for fault paths leading to that 
consequence. It displays the fault paths in order of length. 
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A.7 Other Options 
A few options are available on the AutoHAZID menu which have been used mainly 
for testing the program and accessing information about the plant or models within it. 
These are not present in the released versions of the program, but are nevertheless 
quite useful sometimes: 
• Display frame. This allows the user to see the information in the program on 
particular unit models or instances of those models in the plant. 
• Display fluid information. This option allows the information on fluids present in 
the plant to be displayed, either for the whole plant model or for a single particular 
unit in the plant. 
• Test routines. Used during program development, this option may be attached to 
any function which needs to be tested in isolation from the mainstream activities of 
AutoHAZID. At the moment, this option activates a simple function to analyse the 
forwards and backwards branching factors of the plant SDG in memory at the time. 
• Evaluate function or predicate. This option provides access to the functions and 
predicates of the fluid modelling system (see Chapter 5). The user types an item to 
be evaluated and a "context" unit for the query, and the program activates an FMS 
query to evaluate the item. 
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A.a Example of HAZOP Report produced by AutoHAZID 
The text below gives an example of the type of output produced by HAZOP emulation 
by AutoHAZID. It is an output file produced for the water separator example cited by 
Lawley (1974). 
Report for FULL PLANT HAZOP. 
HAZOP started at Sun Mar 07 11:47:34 1999 
HAZOP completed at Sun Mar 07 11:51:41 1999 
Library Used 
Plant Used 
Results File 
Templates File 
Fluids File 
Flag Settings used 
library2 
plants\lawley.pl 
results\lawley.txt 
tlib 
fluidlib 
display faults with no consequenc05 NO 
display consequences with no causes NO 
filter out repeat faults YES 
filter out repeat fault-conseq pai~s YES 
display protections p-.:esent NO 
only display faults with no protections YES 
consequence rank threshold set at 1 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------I DEVIATION I CAUSE iCONSEQUENCE I I 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IheatExchangerl Itaill leak to environment, 
ImoreFlow tubeln heatExchangerl leak to environment I 
toxic release 2, I I 
fire/explosion risk 2 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IheatExchangerl IdummyHead3 high temp upstream 
ImoreTernp tubelnj 
I tube overte1Uper~ture I I 
I rupture 3 I I 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IheatExchangerl 
IlessFlow 
I shellln 
IheatExchangerl 
lmoreFlow 
Ishellln 
Ivalve2 leak to environment, 
IflowControlvalvel leak to environment 
I 
I tail2 leak to environment, 
IheatExchangerl leak to environment 
I 
I
toXiC release 2, I I 
jfire/eXPlosion risk 2 I 
I fire/explosion risk 
12, toxic release 2 
11 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I
heatExchangerl IbUfferTankl moreTemp topLiquid, 
moreTemp pumpJ2 external fire 
I shellIn I 
Ishell overtemperaturel I 
Irupture 2 
I 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lheatExchangerl IpumpJ2 leak to environment 
I moreComposition 1 
I sheUln I 
I fire/explosion risk III 
12, toxic release 2 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lheatExchangerl 
ImorePressure 
I tube 
IdurnmyHead3 high pressure upstream, 
Itaill high pressure downstream 
I 
I tube overpressure 
Irupture 3 
I 11 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IheatExchangerl 
IlessTemp tube 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
]flowControlvalvel control failure - open, I freezing 
IheatExchangerl (etc) leak to environment, blockage 
IheatExchangerl tube rupture, I 
IpumpJ2 morePressure out, I 
lheatExchangerl interface failure, I 
I taU2 leak to environment, I 
I dummyHead3 low temp upstream, I 
IdurnmyHead3 low pressure upstream, I 
I tail2 low pressure downstream, I 
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fluid 
in tubes 3 
IheatExchanger! 
Imorepressure 
1 shell 
Itaill complete blockage downstream, 
IheatExchangerl tube blockage, 
IfloWControlValvel passes when no flow is 
Idesired, 
IdummyHead3 no flow upstream, 
IbufferTankl lessTemp topLiquid, 
Itaill high pressure downstream 
IpumpJ2 morePressure out, 
Itai12 high pressure downstream 
1 
Ishell overpressure 
lrupture 2 I 1 
1 I 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IheatExchangerl lessTemp shell 
I 
I 
1 
I 
IfloWControlvalvel control failure - open, I freezing 
IheatExchangerl (etc) leak to environment, blockage 
!heatExchangerl fouling, 
I dummyHead3 low pressure upstream, I 
IheatExchangerl tube rupture, I 
! dummyHead3 no flow upstream, I 
I tail2 low pressure downstream, I 
I tai12 leak to environment, I 
Itail! complete blockage downstream, I 
IflowControlValvel passes when no flow is 
Idesired, I 
Itaill high pressure downstream, 
IheatExchangerl tube blockage, I 
IpumpJ2 morePressure out, 
IbufferTankl lessTemp topLiquid, 
IbufferTankl lesSLevel topLiquid, 
IdummyHead3 low temp upstream 
fluid 
in shell 3 
IheatExchangerl IheatExchangerl no drains available linadequate isolation! I 
Imaintenance I I and drainage 2 I 
IdummyHead3 
IlessFlow out 
IdummyHead3 leak to environment 
1 Ifire/exPlosion risk 2, toxic release 2 I I 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IdummyHead3 
IrevFlow out 
1 
Itaill high pressure downstream, 
IdummyHead3 low pressure upstream, 
IheatExchangerl tube rupture I
Possible upstream 
contamination 3 
11 
I tail! noFlow inldummyHead3 no flow upstream, 
1
10SS of I I 
I 
IbufferTankl 
llessFlow i:nl 
I 
IbufferTankl 
ImoreFlow in! 
I 
IbufferTankl 
ImorePressure 
linl 
lbufferTankl 
IlessFlow in2 
IbufferTankl 
ImoreFlow outl 
I 
1 
IbufferTankl 
ImoreFlow out2 
lbufferTankl 
ImoreFlow out3 
IbufferTankl 
IlessPressure 
I vapour 
1 
I 
Itaill complete blockage downstream, 
IheatExchangerl tube blockage 
IhalfMileLine leak to environment, 
Ivalve4 (etc) leak to environment, 
IvalveS leak to environment, 
IlevelControlvalve leak to environment, 
Ivalvel leak to environment 
production/revenue 2 
Itoxic release 2, I fire/explosion risk 2 
1 
!levelControlValve control failure - open, li~complete phase 
3 IbuffeiTankl less Pressure vapour, I separation pumpJl morePressure out, 
IvalveS opened or passing, 
IlevelControlValve passes when no flow is I 
I desired I 
IbufferTankl unacceptable equipments in 
Ivent lines 
1 
IpressCntrlValve2 leak to environment 
I pumpJ2 leak bufferTankl 
1bufferTankl 
IbufferTankl 
to environment, 
morePressure vapour, 
lessLev€l topLiquid, 
moreLevel topLiquid 
IpressCntrlValvel leak to environment 
I 
inadequate pressure 
relief on vessel 5 
1 
1toxic release 2 
1 
lincomplete phase 
Iseparation 3 
I 
jfire/explosion risk 
12, toxic release 2 
11 
I I 
I I 
I~on-hazardous release [ I jvalve6 leak to environment 
1 
jbufferTankl vapour leak to environment I flammable vapour 
I lrelease 2, vessel 
I ldepressurisation 2, 
I I toxic vapour release 
1 12 1------------------------------------------------------------------
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IbufferTankl 
Imorepressure vapour 
I 
I 
IpressCntrlValvel control failure - open, 
IpressCntrlValve2 control failure -
Iclosed, 
IbufferTankl lessTemp topLiquid, 
IpressCntrlValvel (etc) leak to 
I environment , 
pressCntrlValve2 (etc) leak to 
environment. 
dummyHead2 low pressure upstream, 
pressCntrlValvel passes when no flow is 
I desired 
IpressCntrlValve2 control failure - open, 
IpressCntrlValvel control failure -
Iclosed, 
IpressCntrlValve2 passes when no flow is 
Idesired. 
IbufferTankl moreTemp topLiquid. 
\dummyHead2 high pressure upstream, 
Itail3 incorrect sizing 
Ivessel depressurisation 2 
I 
Ipossible overpres5urel Irupture 2 I 
1 1 
I 
IbufferTankl IdumrnyHead2 high temp upstream. moreTemp vapourlbufferTankl external fire, I
design temp exceeded I I 
- structural I 
I IbufferTankl moreTemp topLiquid weakening 2 I I 
I
bufferTankl 
moreLiquid 
1 vapour 
1 
IbufferTankl 
ImoreTemp 
I tOPLiquid 
1 
!levelControlValve control failure - open, 
IbufferTankl moreLevel tOPLiquid, 
IlevelControlValve passes when no flow is 
Idesired, 
IbufferTankl less Pressure vapour, 
IpumpJl morePressure out, 
IvalveS opened or passing 
IpumpJl external fire, 
IbufferTankl external fire, 
IdummyHeadl high temp upstream, 
IhalfMileLine external fire 
liquid droplet 
entrainment 3 
I
deSign temp exce..:ded I I 
- structural I I 
weakening 2 I I 
1 1 1 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I bufferTankl 
I contamination 
ItopLiquid 
lbufferTankl 
IlessLevel 
ItopLiquid 
I 
I 
I 
IbufferTankl 
ImoreLevel 
ItopLiquid 
I 
I 
I 
I dumrnyHeadl upstream contamination, Iliquid contents 
IpumpJl ingress of lubricant or seal fluidlcontaminated 3 
I into pump 11 
IbufferTankl 
I 
liquid leak to environment I gas breakthrough 3, I toxic liquid release I 
1
2, flammable liquid I 
I release 2 I 
l~~~~~~~~~~~~~~i;~-~~i~;-~~~;~~~-----------I~;;-b~~;~~~;~~~~-;---T--I 
IlevelControlvalve control failure - 1 
closed, I 
valveS (etc) leak to environment, 1 I I 
pumpJ2 leak to environment, I 
bufferTankl liquid leak to environment, I 
valve6 (etc) leak to environment, 
bufferTankl more Pressure vapour, 
Ivalvel partly closed, 1 
valve4 (etc) leak to envi.ronment, 
valvel (etc) leak to environment, 
valve4 (etc) closed, 
pumpJl nOFlow out, 
pumpJl less Pressure out, 
I lev~lControlvalve (etc) leak to env~ronment, valve3 (etc) partly closed, 
IhalfMileLine (etc) leak to environment, 
IhalfMileLine blockage, 
Ivalve! closed, 
I
pumpJl revFlow out, 
dummyHeadl low composition upstream 
IlevelControlValve control failure - open Ivessel overfilling 2 I 
IbufferTankl less Pressure vapour, ' I 
I pumpJl morePressure out, I I 
IvalveS opened or passing, 11 1 1 
IlevelControlvalve passes when no flow is 1 
1 desired 1 1 
l~;i;~~-~~~~i;-~i~~~~~--------------------,ii~i~-~~~~i~~---------I 
1 pumpJ2 noFlow in. I entrainment 3, I 
I tail4 high pressure, Ivessel overfilling 2 1 
IpumpJ2 revFlow out, 
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1 bufferTank1 
IlessTemp botLiquid 
IbufferTankl 
\lessLevel 
IbotLiquid 
I 
I bU~ferTankl ma1ntenance 
IdurrunyHead2 
IlessFlowout 
IdurnmyHead2 
IrevFlow out 
I tai 14 moreFlow 
lin 
I 
IdummyHeadl high composition upstream, valveG closed 
IbufferTank1 1essTemp topLiquid 
IdummyHeadl low composition upstream, 
IbufferTankl liquid leak to environment, valve6 (etc) leak to environment, 
IfreeZing fluid in sump - blockage of 
Idrain outlet 2 
1 1 
1 1 
11 
I incorrect liquid out I 1 
13 1 
1 
1 1 
\bufferTankl morePressure vapour I I 
1
------------------------------------------------------------------
bufferTankl lessPressure vapour. I incorrect liquid out I I 
IbufferTankl moreLevel topLiquid, \3, gas breakthrough I I 
IbufferTankl lessLevel topLiquid 13 I I 
!bufferTankl no vents available 
1 
IdummyHead2 leak to environment 
1 
IdumrnyHead2 low pressure upstream 
1 
1 
inadequate isolation I I 
and drainage 2 I I 
I toxic release 2 
1 
lpossible upstream 
Icontamination 3 
I I 
1 1 
1 1 
Itai14 leak to environment IPoSSible treatment I 1 
I system overload 3, 1 
I non-hazardous release 1 1 
1 11 
l~~~~~;;~~;~-~~;;~;~;i-~~~~~~~~~---------I~~;;~~i~-~~~~~~~~---I-I 
IbufferTankl morePressure vapour Isystem overload 3 1 I 
I
tail4 IbufferTankl moreLevel topLiquid, 
morePressure in bufferTankl more?ressure vapour I
possible drain systeml I 
overpressure 2 I I 
I
tai13 moreFlow IpressCntrlValvel contr0l failure - open, \fire hazard at outlet I I 
in I tai13 incorrect sizing, 3, toxic hazard at 11 
1 bufferTankl more Pressure vapour, outlet 3 I 
I IpressCntrlValvel passes when no flow is I 1 
1 1 desired 1 1 
1 
~ai13 revFlow 
1ll 
IpressCntrlValvel leak to environment 
1 
I
tai13 IdummyHeadl high composition upstrea~, 
moreComposition durnmyHead2 high composition upstream 
lin 
1 
taiD 
:,ontamination 
1ll 
IduromyHead2 
I 
upstream contamination 
I fire/explosion risk 41 I 
ltoxic hazard at 
loutlet 3, fire hazard at outlet 3 
1 
environmental 
contamination 3 
1 
11 
11 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
purnpJ2 revFlow 
in 
I
tail2 high pressure downstream, 
pumpJ2 loss of drive, 
pumpJ2 incorrect pump setup/installation 
1 
I
PurnPJ2 IbufferTankl lessLevel topLiquid, 
less Pressure in pumpJ2 leak to environment, 
buffe.r:rankl lesspressure vapour 
IpurnpJ2 
lin 
lessTempI bufferTankl lessTemp topLiquid 
1 
I ~UmPJ2 1ll 
1 
IpumpJ2 
Imorevapour in 
I 
1 bufferTank1 lessLevel topLiquid 
1 
I
bufferTankl moreTemp topLiquid, 
purnpJ2 external fire 
lpumpJ2 moreFlowlbufferTankl morePressure vapour, 
lout lpumpJ2 less Pressure out 
IpumpJ2 noFlow 
lout 
IfloWControlvalvel fails closed, 
Ivalve2 closed, 
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possible suction 
piping overpressure 
2, seal failure due 
to revelse impeller 
rotation 2 I 
I
cavitation - possible 1 1 
mechanical damage 3 I 
1 
seal failure -
freezing of seal 
I fluids 2 11 
Ivapour lock 3, pump I 
I
damage - increased I 
vibration 3, bearing I 
loverheat - loss of 1 
Ilubrication 3 
Icavitation - possible 1 1 
Imechanical damage 3 
Ipossible motor 
loverload or trip 3 
I possible seal 
lovertemperature 2, 
11 
IPumpJ2 
morePreS5Ure 
out 
I 
Itai12 complete blockage downstream, heatExchangerl shell blockage 
IflowControlvalvel control failure -
Iclosed, 
IpumpJ2 pressure surge at startup or 
I shut-down, bufferTankl morePressure vapour, 
IpumpJ2 nOFlow out, 
Itai12 high pressure downstream. 
Ivalve2 partly closed 
Ipossible pump casing 
I overtemper a ture 2 
IposSible seal overpressure 2, 
IPossible ~ casing or delivery pipework overpressure 2 
1 
I 
I I 
I 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IpumpJ2 
lout 
moreTemplbufferTankl moreTemp 
IpumpJ2 external fire 
topLiquid, 
IpumpJ2 
[maintenance 
I 
IpumpJ2 no drains available 
1 
IpumpJ2 startup IpumpJ2 no pressure sensor on pump I delivery 
1 1 
Itai12 noFlow inlfloWControlValvel fails closed, 
Ivalve2 closed, 
I I
heatExchangerl shell blockage, 
tai12 complete blockage downstream, 
IpumpJ2 nOFlow out 
IpumpJl lessFlowlval'/e? (etc) leak to environment in I 
IpurnPJl moreFlowlpurnpJl leak to environment in I 
lI?urnPJl noFlow 1n 
1 
IdurnmyHeadl no flow upstream, 
Ivalve7 closed 
1 
Ipossible pump casing 
lovertemperature 2, 
lpossible seal overternpera ture 2 I 
I inadequate isolation I I 
land drainage 2 I 
Icannot monitor I I pressure development 1 1 
lat start-up 4 I 
Iloss of 
Iproduction/revenue 2 
I 
1 
fire/explosion risk 1 1 
2, toxic release 2 
Ifire/explosion risk 
12, toxic release 2 I I 
1 
dry running - 1 1 
possible p~p rupture 
12 1 1 
IpurnpJl revFlow 
lin 
Ivalve? leak to environment, Ipossible suction 
1 1 IpumpJl incorrect pump setup/installation, Ipiping overpressure 
1 I 
I 1 
durnmyHeadl low pressure upstream, 12, seal failure due 
purnpJl loss of drive to reVel"Se impeller 
1 I I Irotation 2 
IpumpJl Ivalve7 (etc) leak to environment, 
Ilesspressure in purnpJl leak to environment, durnmyHeadl low pressure upstream, valve? partly closed, I valveS opened or passing 
cavitation - possible I 1 
mechanical damage 3 I 
I1 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
morePressure l.n I 
purnpJl . I purnpJl uni t can be locked in 
1 1 
potential for liquid 
lock in and damage to 
uni t by thermal 
expansion 3 I 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------Il~PJl leSSTempldummYHeadl low temp upstream 
IpumpJl 
!morevapour in IdummYHeadl high temp upstream, pumpJl external fire 
Ip urnPJl moreFlowldurornyHeadl high pressure upstream, out I pumpJl less Pressure out 
purnpJl noFlow 
out 
IlevelControlvalve fails 
Ivalvel closed, 
Ivalve4 (etc) closed, 
IhalfMileLine blockage 
closed, 
I 
seal failure -
freezing of seal 
fluids 2 
1 1 
1 1 
I
cavitation - possible 1 1 
mechanical damage 3 I 
1 
possible motor 
overload or trip 3 
Ipossible pump casing 
l
overtemperature 2, 
possible seal 
overtemperature 2 
1 1 
1 1 
11 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IpumpJl 
I
morepressure 
out 
I 
1 
IlevelControlValve control failure -
Iclosed, 
Ivalve4 (etc) partly closed, 
1 
purnpJl noFlow out, 
purnpJl pressure surge at startup or 
I shut-down, 
Ivalvel partly closed, 
IdummyHeadl high pressure upstream 
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I
Possible seal 
overpressure 2. 
possible pump casing 
lor delivery pipework 
loverpressure 2 
1 
I 
1 
IpumpJl 
lout 
1 
1 
moreTempldummyHeadl high 
IpumpJl external 
temp upstream. 
fire 
possible pump casing 
Qvertemperature 2, 
possible seal 
IpUInpJl maintenance 
IpumpJl startup 
I 
1 
IpumpJl no vents available 
1 
IpumpJl no pressure sensor on pump 
I delivery 
1 
over temperature 2 
I inadequate isolation I I and drainage 2 I 
1 
cannot monitor 11 
pressure development 
at start-up 4 
lhalfMileLine IhalfMileLine unit can be locked in 
ImorePressure in Ipotential for liquid I I lock in and damage tol 1 
1 
I 
I 
1 
I hal fMi le Line 
lmoreTernp out 
1 
IhalfMileLine 
I maintenance 
IdummyHeadl 
IlessFlowout 
IdumrnyHeadl 
IrevFlow out 
1 
ItailS moreFlow 
jin 
1 
I 
levelControlValve control failure -
lclosed, 
IpumpJl morePressure out, valve4 (ete) partly closed 
IdummyHeadl high temp upstream, 
IhalfMileLine external fire, pumpJl external fire 
IhalfMileLine no drains available 
IdurnmyHeadl leak to environment 
1 
lunit ~ thermal I expans~on 3 
I pass ible overpressure I I 
I rupture or leakage 3 I 
I I I 
l~eSign temp exceeded I I 
1 1 1 
linadequate isolation I I and drainage 2 
I toxic release 2, I I fire/explosjon risk 2 
IpumpJl loss of drive, Ipossible upstream I I IdurnmYHeadl low pressure upstrea.:>, Icontamination 3 pumpJl incorrect pump setup/installation I 1 1 
[tailS leak to environment lpossible treatment I I 
I I system overload 3, I I fire/explosion risk I 
1 12, toxic release 2 1 
1------------------------------------------------------------------
IvalveS opened or passing [possible treatment I 1 
I I system overload 3 I 
ItailS IvalveS opened or passing, [possible drain system I 1 
[overpressure 2 I lmorepressure in1tailS blockage - frozen fluid 
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Appendix B : Improved Algorithm for 
HAZOP Search 
This appendix briefly describes the HAZOP algorithm used in AutoHAZID, which 
was developed to reduce the amount of repeated search which took place in an earlier 
version. The approach to graph search outlined here may be of general interest for 
applications other than HAZOP emulation. Firstly, the "traditional" way of modelling 
the HAZOP study, which forms the basis of the older HAZOP algorithm in 
AutoHAZID, is outlined. Then, some disadvantages of this method are identified and 
a more efficient method is suggested. 
The purpose of the HAZOP emulation algorithm in HAZID is to imitate the procedure 
followed by a conventional HAZOP study team in examining the design of a plant, 
and to produce a table of resu;ts in a similar format, using the headings of "deviation", 
"cause", "consequence" and "protection". 
Therefore, the algorithm must examine every deviation of a process variable in the 
plant model and find faults which could cause that deviation. It must also report 
consequences of the deviation and consequences of any faults which cause the 
deviation, as well as the presence of any protective devices which could prevent, or 
reduce the impact of, the hazardous scenarios found. 
From this definition, which closely mirrors the definition of the conventional RAZOP 
study procedure, the HAZOP algorithm is shown in Figure B.l below. 
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I Start I 
+ 
c ~ Select a plant unit 
... 
'I Select a port I 
... 
Select a process ~ 
deloiation ~ 
.. 
Find a fault leading to the ~ process deloiation 
.. 
Find all consequences of the fault 
and of the deloiation 
~ 
L Apply filtering rules I 
+ L Identify protections I 
+ 
Update HAZOP 
Report 
+ 
Repeat for all 
faults 
... 
Repeat for all 
deloiations 
+ 
Repeat for all 
ports 
-+ 
Repeat for all 
. main units 
... 
I End I 
Figure B.1 : "Traditional" HAZOP Algorithm 
The procedure outlined in Figure B.1 is centred around the analysis of separate 
deviations. Firstly the deviation is fonnulated from a unit, port and deviation guide 
word applied to a process variable. Then the causes of the deviation are found by 
searching the SDG, giving a list of the fault paths leading to the deviation. Then the 
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consequences of the deviation and of the faults are added to the results set. Results are 
filtered and protections added to the results for the deviation. This deviation is then 
added to the results set. The whole procedure is repeated for every appropriate 
deviation in the plant. 
Because it requires the use of graph search, finding the causes of a deviation is the 
most costly step in the procedure. Each deviation is associated with a node in the 
SDG. To find the causes of the deviation, all the paths leading to a change in that node 
must be found. Then, all paths which do not give rise to the deviation under 
examination are discarded. This is very wasteful if the HAZOP procedure must 
actually examine both deviations of the SDG node in due course. 
Another source of wasted search effort becomes apparent when considering how the 
deviations in the HAZOP report may chain together and cause one another. If the 
causes of deviation D I have already been established in the HAZOP and, when 
searching for causes of another deviation D2, D I is found to be a cause of D2, then 
the search procedure illustrated above will repeat the search which was done to find 
the causes of D I. In cases where the whole plant is to be HAZOPed, this is a large 
source of repeated search effort, which could be avoided with a little more intelligence 
on the part of the search algorithm. 
The HAZOP search algorithm currently used in AutoHAZID is more "intelligent" 
than the "traditional" algorithm shown above. When finding the causes of a deviation, 
the new HAZOP emulation approach takes account of other "HAZOPed" deviations 
and avoids repeating the search for causes of those deviations. The new algorithm 
proceeds as follows: 
• Compile a list of the deviations which need to be "HAZOPed". The content of the 
list depends on how the user has chosen to have the study performed. 
• From the deviation list, compose a list of the SDG nodes which correspond to the 
deviations (this list is shorter than the list of deviations). 
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• Search for the causes of any effect on the nodes in this list, using graph search in 
the SDG. This is a two-stage graph search procedure, which produces a list of fault 
propagation paths for each node in the list: 
• The first stage of the search involves searching backwards from a subject 
node, expanding lists of paths backwards, either to originating faults or as 
far as the first other node also found to be in the list of subject nodes being 
examined. A number of completed paths will be formed, from a fault to a 
node, but a number of partial fault paths will also be formed, leading from 
one "HAZOPed" node to another. 
• The second stage of the search "knits together" the partial paths produced in 
the previous stage, .to form lists of completed paths. Therefore, if there is a 
partial path linking node NI to node N2, then all the causes of NI will be 
used to compose new paths which end in N2. This second stage search is an 
iterative procedure, but it avoids a lot of the repeated search inherent in 
earlier versions of the search algorithm. 
• Partition the results of the search into the paths which give rise to each of the 
deviations in the original deviation list. For each node, paths will usually be 
produced with both "direct" and "reverse" influences; these usually correspond to 
"less" and "more" deviations of some process variable in the plallt. 
• Identify the consequences of the deviations and the faults which cause them, and 
add information about any protections which operate, putting all these results into 
lists suitable for transfer to HazRes result objects, prior to formatting and filtering. 
• Transfer the results just prepared into new HazRes objects, adding the results of the 
configuration checking rules. 
The function which starts up HAZOP emulation and deals with the collection of 
resuits, preparation of deviation lists, different options for ~nalysis, etc., is 
PerformFullHazop (). The function which coordinates the emulation procedure 
to do a HAZOP on a list of deviations is full_hazop2 ( ) . The structure of these 
functions is outlined in Figure B.2 and Figure B.3 below. 
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The algorithm described here has the effect of cutting down the RAZOP time required 
for the Lawley case study plant, from 12 minutes to about 4 minutes. These figures 
should be treated with caution, however, as the former was obtained for the summer 
1996 version of AutoRAZID and the latter with the January 1999 version. Differences 
between the two versions might be significant in favour of a better or a worse speed-
up factor. 
Also relevant to speed-up considerations is the note produced by Or. Larkin after the 
change to the algorithm, which showed that the dependency of run-time on size of 
plant was much more severe for the old algorithm than the new one (Larkin, 1996). 
~ Prepare global data structures 
used in HAZOP 
I-- Check that specified output file(s) 
can be opened 
~1 Prepare list of deliations to HAZOP I H Erase compatibility report 
Cmeport::EraseO 
Coordinate HAZOP 
Emulation - I Write HAZOP header text to output file I 
PertormFullHazopO 
I- Pertorm HAZOP on list of deliations fulLhazop20 
H Ciean L.ip storage variables I 
I- Pnnt HAZOP results to file(s) pnntResultsO 
Pnnt compatibility check resulls at 
I- end of HAZOP report 
CTReport::Display() 
'-. 
Clear up global storage used 
dunng HAZOP and results printing 
Figure 8.2 : The HAZOP coordinating function, PerformFullHazopO 
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Create a list of Scenarios based on 
r--- nodes from de"'ation list 
make_scenarios_frorn_de",ationsO 
H First stage search procedure I 
expand_scenariosQ 
Pertonn a HAZOP Study 
H Second stage search procedure 
further_expandO I 
on a giwn list of de\'iations I-
fulLhazop2O Comert Scenarios from node-based 
- to de"'ation-based Scenarios 
make_de'wS_frorn_scenarios 
Add consequence data, protections 
- and conwrt paths into results format 
do_other_scenario_thingsO 
Compose a HazRes object for each 
- original de\1ation and merge in 
configuration checking results 
Figure B.3 : The new RAZOP emulation algorithm, full_hazop20 
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Appendix C : Flow and Pressure Modelling in 
Dividers and Headers 
The flow path models for flow and pressure propagation presented in Chapter 3 rely 
on the assumption that the flow path in which flow is considered to occur has only 
one inlet port and one outlet. For equipment in which that assumption is not valid, the 
appropriate qualitative model is somewhat more tricky to develop, because of the 
inherent ambiguity in the mass balance equation (e.g. Qin = Qo",' + Q,",,), for a 
qualitati ve model. This appendix considers the models of flow and pressure 
propagation for "tee-pieces": pipes which either split an input flow (dividers), or join 
multiple flows together (headers). Two of the simplest models are considered here. 
Both models contain four locations (ports) where pressure is defined. The divider 
model has onc inlet (in), one internal port (self) and two outlet ports (outl and out2). 
The header model has two inlet ports (inl and in2), one internal port (self) and one 
outlet port (out). 
The divider and header models do not contain faults or consequences, just the arcs 
governing fault propagation through them. There are not many interesting things that 
can go wrong with a tee-piece, which cannot also occur in other equipment types. 
The parts of each model which deal with pressure deviation propagation and the flow 
deviations lessFlow and moreFlow are constructed by putting three flow path models 
together and removing the nodes for resistance in each flow path. Resistance nodes 
are used in modelling blockages and other faults, so they are not needed. 
In use, the flow path models seem to predict accurately most of the expected 
behaviour of a "tee-piece", with respect to propagation of pressure and the flow 
deviations, lessFlow and moreFlow. However, as was the case for unbranched flow 
paths, noFlow and revFlow cause significant problems in dividers and headers. No 
flow is considered in Section C.2 and reverse flow in Section C.3. 
266 
A number of possible definitions for the model of a tee-piece are possible. In the 
divider model presented below, an attempt has been made to make the model as 
general as possible, so that both legs of the divider are considered to be usually 
carrying fluid flows. This may not always be the case for actual dividers, where one 
or both of the legs may be connected to a "blocking" component, such as a closed 
valve. Such a situation may be best handled by a check on the configuration of the 
component in the plant model, followed by selection of an appropriate, simpler, 
model for the divider. AutoHAZID uses this approach. 
Another possible complication for building models of general tee-piece components is 
that controllers may constrain the actual behaviours of the flows and/or pressures in 
the plant. Typically, in the case of a real divider, some control system would control 
either the f10wrate into the divider, or the pressure near it. It turns out that the 
deviations possible in the two constrained cases are subsets of those for the 
unconstrained case. Therefore, the general divider model is suitable for all cases 
where a control loop is in operation, but will over-predict deviations in these cases. 
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C.1 Development of divider Model 
The latest divider model is shown in Figure C.l below, including the arcs for 
modelling noFlow and revFlow, which are discussed in Sections C.2 and C.3. 
+ 
Figure C.l : Pressure and Flow Propagation Model for a divider 
The assumptions used ill the above divider model are as follows: 
• Flow and pressure are modelled in the unit by considering the flows between, and 
pressures at, four locations: one inlet port (in), one internal location (self), and two 
outlet ports (outl and out2). in is considered to be connected to self, and self is 
considered to be connected to both outl and out2. 
• The divider unit is filled with a single phase fluid (either liquid or vapour) and 
enclosed by rigid walls. 
• Density changes in the fluid are not modelled, so that the fluid is assumed to be 
incompressible, within the scope of the model. 
• Fluid in the flow path is considered to normally flow from in, via self, to outl and 
to out2. Therefore, no flow and reverse flow are exceptions to this condition, 
which require separate consideration in the model. Also, none of the inlet or outlet 
legs of the divider is considered to be blocked, or attached to a closed or blocked 
component. 
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• The flows and pressures in the unit are not constrained by any control system, so 
that the divider provides modelling for an unconstrained, general case. 
• Pressure deviations are allowed to propagate freely from any inlet or outlet to any 
other port in the unit, upstream or downstream. 
• Row deviations (lessFlow and moreFlow) are not propagated - they are only 
generated locally, for each part of the divider. 
• The causal hierarchy described in Section 3.5.4 is considered to operate In the 
divider unit. 
• The relevant variables are P and Q, representing pressure and flow. Resistance, R, 
is not used in this model. noFlow and revFlow are also present as deviations. 
• There is no significant height difference between the locations in, outl and out2, 
so that static head is the same everywhere within the unit. 
• No shaft work is done on the fluid within the flow path. 
• The fluid does not exchange sig!1ificant quantities of heat with its surroundings. 
• Within the SDG model, the shortest path between two nodes determines what the 
appropriate influence is between those nodes. 
• The driving force for flow is pressure difference, which is not represented 
explicitly in the model. As in the unbranching flow path model presented in 
Section 3.5.5, upstream pressures have a direct effect on flow, and downstream 
pressures have a reverse effect. 
• Deviations in pressure within the divider are considered never to be sufficient to 
cause the flow to reverse in the flow path. 
C.2 Modelling noFlowfor the divider 
In the unbranched flow path model, noFlow was simply propagated between the inlet 
and outlet, without linkage to other variables in the flow path model. For a divider. 
however, it is reasonable to expect blockage of one leg to cause deviations in flow and 
pressure in the other legs. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to put arcs into the model to represent the pressure 
changes caused by noFlow in one of the legs of the divider, because of the effect this 
has on the flow variable in the same leg as the blockage - the deviation lessFlow 
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would be predicted at the same time as the deviation noFlow in an outlet leg, for 
example. 
Therefore, the model in Figure C.l only links noFlow to deviations in flow 
throughout the unit, and to reverse flow in the outlet legs. It may well be the case, 
however, that the fault which is the root cause of noFlow also causes a pressure 
change, so that these same effects will be propagated independently. 
Note that, due to the interpretation of noFlow as a blockage event, noFlow in anyone 
of the legs of the divider does not imply noFlow in either of the other legs - because 
there is a split in the flow path, fluid is not necessarily blocked by any single 
blockage. 
C.3 Modelling revFlowfor the divider 
As with the unbranched flow path model, pressure is not linked to reverse flow in a 
divider. This means that the real effect of lessPressure in one of the outlets causing 
revFlow ill the other outlet is missed in the model presented in Figure C.l, but to put 
the necessary arc in to achieve this effect would mean that a whole host of other 
spurious predictions would appear. 
The effects that !ill< represented by the revFlow model for a divider, are those of 
revFlow on the outlet flows from the unit, and the possible effects of revFlow in the 
inlet port on revFlow in the two outlet ports. Reverse flow of fluid in one of the 
outlets causing a possible reduction in the inlet flow to the divider is not explicitly 
represented because o( thc difficulties this would cause. However, the initial fault 
causing reverse flow should include an effect on pressure, which can propagate to the 
divider and cause the necessary flow deviations. This underlines the importance once 
again of llsing consistent methods for developing failure modes information for 
equipment in the plant model system. 
One further area in which the model fails to represent a recognised real effect, is that 
the possible reverse flow effect in the inlet, caused by revFlow in either outlet leg, is 
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not represented. Again, the problem is that the arcs needed for these links would 
create so many incorrect additional predictions, that the change was judged not worth 
putting in. 
It may be possible in future to circumvent the problems with determining consistent 
flow deviations in the legs of the divider, by using quantitative infonnation on 
pressure deviation limits. 
C.4 Development of header Model 
The header unit is modelled in the same way as the di vider, and the header model 
produced (Figure C.2 below) is analogous to the divider model presented above. 
Figure C.2 : Pressure and Flow Propagation Model for a header 
The assumptions used in the header model are similar to those for a divider: 
• Flow and pressure are modelled in the n!lit by considering the flows between. and 
pressures at, four locations: two inlet ports (in] and in2), one internal location 
(self), and one outlet port (out). in] and in2 are considered to be connected to self, 
and self is considered to be connected to out. 
• The header unit is filled with a single phase fluid (either liquid or vapour) and 
enclosed by rigid walls. 
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• Density changes in the fluid are not modelled, so that the fluid is assumed to be 
incompressible, within the scope of the model. 
• Fluid in the flow path is considered to normally flow from in] and in2, via self, to 
out. Therefore, no flow and reverse flow are exceptions to this condition, which 
require separate consideration in the model. Also, none of the inlet or outlet legs 
of the header is considered to be blocked, or attached to a closed or blocked 
component. 
• The flows and pressures in the unit are not constrained by any control system, so 
that the header provides modelling for an unconstrained, general case. 
• Pressure deviations are allowed to propagate freely from any inlet or outlet to any 
other in the unit, upstream or downstream. 
• Flow deviations (lessFlow and moreFlow) are not propagated - they are only 
generated locally, for each flow path. 
• The causal hierarchy described in Section 3.5.4 is considered to operate in the 
header unit. 
• The relevant variables are P and Q, representing pressure and flow. Resistance, R, 
is not used in this model. noFlow and revFlow are also present as deviations. 
• There is no significant height difference between the locations in], in2 and out, so 
that static head is the same everywhere within the unit. 
• No shaft work is done on the fluid within the flow path. 
• The fluid does not exchange significant quantities of heat with its surroundings. 
• Within the SDG model, the shortest path between two nodes determines what the 
appropriate influence is between those nodes. 
• The driving force for flow is ·pressure difference, which is not represented 
explicitly in the model. As in the unbranching flow path model presented in 
Section 3.5.5, upstream pressures have a direct effect on flow, and downstream 
pressures have a reverse effect. 
• Deviations in pressure within the header are considered never to be sufficient to 
cause the flow to reverse in the flow path. 
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Appendix 0 : Object Types in AutoHAZID 
The purpose of this appendix is to give a brief explanation of some of the more useful 
C++ object classes developed during the STOPHAZ project, for use in the 
AutoHAZID program. The information presented is technical in nature, describing 
some of the internal details of the Str, DObject, Location and FPath classes. Further 
information on all technical aspects of the program can be found in the STOPHAZ 
project deliverables (STOPHAZ Project, 1997a), or by reference to the source code of 
the appropriate object classes. 
Many of the ideas (coding "idioms") used in the classes described below were 
inspired by "Advanced C++" by Coplien (1992). 
Storing character strings with Str 
The Str class is an object class which provides a simpler string handling system than 
that provided by the usual method in C, which is to consider strings as arr~ys of 
characters and access them using character pointers. Some of the better features of the 
C system are kept, such as accessing individual characters using the square bracket 
array subscript notation, but the functions available to this class allow a much more 
intuitive use of character strings. 
Str is the class which will be used by programmers, whereas the StRep class supports 
Str in what it does (see Figure D.l below). For this reason, StRep functions and data 
cannot be accessed from outside the scope of the Str and StRep functions. 
Str is a reference counted class which uses the StRep class to maintain the storage of 
the characters and a count of the number of Str objects which share the same StRep 
object pointer. Str objects themselves can thus be created, copied from others and 
destroyed more quickly, and using less storage, than would be the case if the 
characters were stored and allocated for each Str object. 
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Any number of Str objects can share the same characters using this reference counting 
method. The StRep object maintains a count of the number of objects which contain a 
pointer to it. When this count falls to zero the StRep object is destroyed, recovering its 
own storage and that of the characters in the string. When a Str object is destroyed, 
only the Str is recovered, unless the count for its StRep object goes to zero. 
Str:: Str:: 
StRep "lpRep StRep "lpRep 
L 
StRep:: 
Int IICount 
char "lszRep -~ 
IIII ... II 
Figure 0.1 : Many Strs can share the same characters using StRep objects 
Summary Features of the Str class: 
• Initialisation from the following types: Str, char*, char, int and double. 
• Conversion to the following types: char* (should be used with caution). 
• Assignment, copying, construction and destruction without the need to worry 
about assigning memory. 
• Output to streams using the Display () function and left shift operator. 
• Input from streams using the right shift operator and the ReadLine ( ) function. 
• Uses integer indexing scheme similar to that used by C arrays, with subscripts 
running from 0 to (length - 1). Use of array subscript notation (square brackets) in 
reading single characters in the strin·g. Users of this class should be aware that 
usmg an index outside the legal range for a Str object will cause an error or 
warning. 
• Concatenation of Str with Str or char* type character string, uses the 
functions Append () and Prepend ( ) . 
• Comparison of strings is possible using the equality and inequality operators 
which are overloaded for this class. Also, an equivalent to the s trcmp ( ) 
function is provided in the form of Compare ( ) . 
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• Various "sub-string" operations are defined for splitting up strings. These are 
modelled on equivalent operations in the BASIC language: Left (int), 
Right (int), Mid(int, int) , ToRight(int), After(int). 
• Searching for occurrences of strings within a Str is provided by the Find ( ) 
function. 
• Conversion to and recognition of numbers is provided In the functions 
IsInteger (int&) and IsDouble (double&). 
• Conversion to upper and lower case characters is provided by ToUpper () and 
ToLower ( ) , respectively. 
DObject 
The DObject class is designed to offer many of the symbolic manipulation and pattern 
matching features of the clauses found in Prolog. This class can store data of many 
different types and forms quite transparently and can be used to develop prototype 
applications relatively quickly. However, one concern which may arise from the 
widespread use of this class is the efficiency of the programs which result. 
The motivation for developing this class was that there are many different data types 
in the AutoHAZID system and there are some areas of the program where a flexible 
"untyped" data object would be of great use in making the operation of the program 
more powerful. Examples include the system which is used to represent the rules 
belonging to the fluid model system, which should allow quite complex structures to 
be put together to represent rules. Also, the representation of plant models in the 
system should provide the ability to store new slots and their values in Frame objects, 
without requiring too many changes to the parser and other code in the system. 
DObjects here allow the definition of a generalised slot type which stores a list of 
DObjects as its values. 
The DObject class allows objects to be of several types, which are implemented via a 
type field in the object, rather than using some other method (such as C++ based 
inheritance). The types are enumerated in the enum type DObType, which is declared 
in the file dobtype. h. The types are as listed in Table 0.1 below. 
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Type Description 
Atom "Constant symbols", as in Prolog. These should start with a lower case letter and include 
no spaces. Alternatively, they may be enclosed in single quotes (e.g. 
constant_symbol or 'flammable a tmosphere I ). 
Integer Integer constant values. 
Real Real number values, implemented using double precision floating point numbers in C++. 
Variable Variable symbols, as in Prolog. The variable name should start with an upper case letter or 
an underscore character (e.g. Uni tName or _ var iable12 5). 
Structure Similar in form to a predicate term in Prolog. An identifier which has the same format as 
an Atom, followed by a list of terms (each of which may be an object of one of the types 
listed here), separated by commas and enclosed in round brackets 
(e.g. equals (4, plus(2,2» ). 
StrType Strings of characters, enclosed in double quotes (e.g. "hello world" ). 
ListType Lists of terms, which may be any of the types listed here) separated by commas and 
enclosed in square brackets (e.g. [a, b, [4,5. 02J ,VarlJ ). 
Table D.l : Data types stored in the DObject class 
With a class which allows this sort of flexibility in the range of information it can 
store, it is possible to build programs which perform quite powerful symbolic 
operations, such as pattern matching. This feature is built into the DObject class, in 
the form of the UnifyMatch () function, which allows one DObject to be matched 
against another, making allowances for variables in each term. 
The DObject class is a reference counted class, using the DObRep class to store the 
data which it manipulates. The DObRep class remains invisible to the user, hidden 
behind the public interface of the DObject class. The data which are stored include the 
following (which may not.all be in use at anyone time): 
• A string giving the "name" of the DObject, used for Atom, Variable, Structure and 
StrType objects. 
• An integer value for the DObject, used only for Integer type DObjects. 
• A double precision floating point number value, used for the Real type. 
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• A DObList (list of DObjects) which comprises the argument list of a Structure 
type DObject, or the list elements of a ListType DObject. 
The relevant files for defining and implementing the DObject class are: dobj ec t . h, 
dobject.cpp, dobrep.h, dobrep.cpp, doblist.h, doblist.cpp, 
dobtype . h, newparse. h, and newparse. cpp. The Binding class is also 
closely related to the DObject class and must be present for any of the advanced 
matching functions of DObject to be used. 
The main features of the DObject class are: 
• The usual set of constructors, destructor and assignment definitions are provided 
so that DObjects can be declared, assigned and copied, destroyed and passed as 
function arguments, just as if they were a built-in type of the C++ language, such 
as int or double. 
• Other constructors allow the programmer to initialise DObjects of any type given 
in Table D.1, by providing the data needed to set up the new object. 
• The DObject type can be automatically assigned or constructed from a Str object, 
using parsing code implemented in the file newparse. cpp. It can also be 
converted back to Str form, using a conversion operator defined for that purpose. 
• Read and write access to the data members of the DObject is provided by a set of 
member functions, which include functions to read or change specific elements of 
a ListType or Structure DObject and to add new elements to a Structure or 
ListType. 
• Two functions are provided for displaying the contents of the DObject. The 
function Display () simply prints the contents of the object out to a single line 
on the output stream given, while the Pret ty () function prints tll", DObjcct out 
to the output stream on multiple lines if needed, making sure that the length of 
each line is not greater than a given number of characters. 
• The function ExactMatch () allows the programmer to compare DObjects 
together where every part of one object must match the other one exactly. 
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• UnifyMatch () is a function which allows a less rigorous matching process to 
take place, known as "unification matching". This means that the two terms must 
be formally identical, in such a way that all the non-variable components must 
match exactly between the two objects, but variables may be allowed to match 
single terms in the other DObject, subject to the provision that the variable 
bindings produced are not inconsistent. The procedure therefore produces a yes/no 
answer saying whether the match succeeded, plus a list of variable bindings 
generated by the match. This is a very powerful symbolic technique, widely used 
in Prolog. 
• DoBinding () and DoAllBindings () are used in UnifyMatch () to 
perform variable binding substitutions on a DObject. 
• MakeVarsDistinct () is also used in UnifyMatch () and ensures that any 
variable names in a DObject are not also used in another DObject to which it is to 
be matched, which would cause confusion. In the case where variables have to be 
renamed, UniqueVar iableName () is used to generate a variable name which 
has never so far been used. 
• VariablesUsed () is used to find out the names of the variables used in the 
DObject, and Grounded () simply tests if the list so produced is empty. These 
are both support functions fur uni fyMa tch ( ) . 
• The DObject and DObRep classes both use customised memory management 
primitives, new and delete, which use a simple first-fit allocation routine. 
A number of functions of the BindList class are particularly useful in supporting the 
unification matching of DObjects. These are: 
• The function BindList: : AddBinding () attempts to add a new Binding to 
thl:! list currently stored, whilst maintaining the integrity of the Bindings already in 
the table. The arguments to this function are DObjects giving the variable and its 
value to be added to the table. 
• If the variable is not so far in the BindList, then the new binding can be 
added. 
278 
• If the variable is in the BindList and the value of the new Binding does not 
unify with the value in the BindList already, then the Binding is not added 
and the function fails. 
• If a unification match succeeds, then the variable bindings produced by the 
match are added to the BindList by a recursive call to AddBinding ( ) . If 
all bindings are inserted properly, the function succeeds, otherwise it fails . 
• BindList:: CollapseBindings () is a function which attempts to simplify 
the variable Bindings in the list by reducing chains of variables. This does not 
reduce the number of elements in the BindList, but converts the values of any 
which can be so reduced to constants where this is possible. 
• The function BindLi s t: : LookupBinding () retrieves the value recorded for 
a variable, if there is one in the BindList. 
• BindList:: ResolveFinalValue () gets a value for a variable from the 
BindList, converting it to a non-variable tenn, if this is possible. 
Location 
The Location class stores, and allows for the manipulation of, infonnation concerning 
fluids at particular places in the plant (characterised by a [unit,port] pair). The 
checks and predicates of the fluid modelling system rely on objects of this class to 
communicate infonnation about fluids. 
The Location object is a reference counted object class which uses the LocRep class to 
carry the data for any number of copy Locations. The implementation of reference 
counting is similar to the method used for the Str class. The relevant source code files 
for these classes are location.h, location.cpp, locrep.h and 
locrep. cpp. 
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The specific data stored in the LocRep object (on behalf of Location objects) are: 
• Strs indicating the relevant unit and port names for the Location. 
• A Str object indicating the type of the process port to which the Location refers: 
• 'T' indicates that it is an input port of the unit. 
• "0" indicates that it is an output port of the unit. 
• "U" indicates that it is an internal (uni tports) port in the unit. 
• Numerical values for the temperature of the fluid (in 0c), its pressure (in bar abs) 
and its quantity (in kg inventory for internal ports, or kglhr flow rate for input and 
output ports). 
• A list of names of chemical components of the fluid, and a corresponding list of 
compositions (mole fraction values) for the fluid components. There is also an 
integer value for each component, to store flags concerning the component, such 
a~ whether it is a contaminant or not. 
• A DObList list of DObjects is provided to record miscellaneous information 
(notes) on behalf of the fluid modelling system. This is mostly used to record the 
limits of deviations of process variables during validation of the fault paths 
uncovered in the HAZOP search. 
The main user-uccessible features of the Location class are: 
• The usual set of constructors, destructor and assignment definitions are provided 
so that Location objects can be declared, assigned and copied, destroyed and 
passed as function arguments, just as if they were a buiit-in type of the C++ 
language, such as int or double. 
• Location objects can be converted to or from appropriate DObject Structures. The 
form used is: location (Uni t, Port, Type, Temperature, Pressure, 
Quantity, [[Componentl,Compositionl,Flagsl], .. ],Notes) 
• Functions are provided to allow the class user to read the data stored in the 
Location object. These are: Uni tName ( ), PortName ( ), PortType ( ) , 
Pressure (), Temperature (), Quantity (), NoComps (), 
CompName ( ), CompValue ( ), CompFlags ( ). The last three requIre an 
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integer index of the component In the Location, between 0 and 
(NoComps ( ) -1). This can be found from the name using the function 
FindComplndex ( ) . 
• Similar functions are defined to change the values of the data stored in the object, 
or to give them "undefined" values. These are: SetUnitName (), 
SetPortName ( ) , 
SetTemperature(), 
SetPortType (), SetPressure (), 
SetQuanti ty (), UnSetTemperature (), 
UnSetPressure () and UnSetQuanti ty ( ) . 
• Components of the fluid can be added to or removed from the Location using the 
functions AddComponent () and RemComponent ( ) . 
• The flags which indicate whether a component is a contaminant or not can be 
changed using the functions SetContaminantF1ag ( ) and 
ResetContaminantFlag (), or read USIng the function 
IsContaminant (). 
• The Display () function can be used to output a representation of the 
information in the Location to an output stream. This is the same function used by 
the left shift operator, '«'. The function Describe (), which uses' 
DescriptionString ( ), produces a more intelligible format for all the 
information except for the "notes" field. 
• Two functions are provided to compare Locations for equality. The equality 
operator, '==', tests all the fields, so that numerical data, unit, port and component 
data must match between two Locations. A less strict comparison is the function 
Same Place ( ) , which tests to see if the unit and port fields of the two Locations 
are the same. 
• A number of functions are provided to read, add, remove, search through and 
change the contents of the notes in the Location. These are: Ge tNotes ( ) , 
SeUJotes (), AddNol:e (), RemNote (), RemMat.chingNotes ( ), 
FindMatchingNotes () and HasNotes () . 
• The function Mixture () takes two Locations and produces a new Location 
corresponding to mixing together the fluids from each one. The two Location 
objects need not refer to the same place in the plant, but the resulting mixture 
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object is defined at the same place as the "host" object which initiated the function 
call. 
FPath 
The FPath class is used in the validation of fault paths which is perfonned during the 
HAZOP search algorithm and elsewhere when the program searches for the causes of 
some deviation. The FPath represents the path to be validated, along with data such as 
the list of fluids relating to that path, and various classification data generated by the 
validation process. 
The data stored in this object type are as follows: 
• A List of pointers ,0 Arcs, defining the path which is the subject of the FPath. 
• A List of currently defined fluids, in Location objects, which defines the necessary 
infonnation about fluids relevant to the nodes visited along the fault path. 
• Fields to store infonnation concerning the classification and ranking of the 
consequences of the fault path (see Section 3.3.8). These are: 
• An importance number, between 0 and 5. 
• A consequence rank number, between 0 and 5. 
• A category for the consequence of the path, taken from the list ('none', 
'haz', 'op' and 'haz_op'). 
• A bit field of up to 16 bits, encoding whether the consequence of the FPath 
is a member of the various standard classes of consequences. 
The main features of this class are as follows: 
• The usual constructors, destructor and assignment are defined in order to make the 
type into a "concrete class". The FPath can also be initialised from a List of Arc 
pointers, which represents the fault path. 
• FPath objects can be compared for equality using the '==' operator. 
• FPath object~ can be printed to an output stream using the function Display (). 
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• The current fluid list belonging to the FPath can be accessed (for reading or 
changing) using the function Fluids ( ) . 
• The List of Arc pointers which makes up the path in the FPath object can be 
accessed (for reading or changing) using the function Pa th ( ) . 
• The last Filler in the path can be referenced using the EndOfPath () member 
function. 
• The steps in the fault path represented by the FPath object can be checked using 
the fluid modelling system, with the function Valida te ( ). This function 
performs all the necessary tests on the links in the fault propagation chain, and 
maintains the necessary information on the numerical limits of deviations, as 
described in Chapter 5.· It makes particular use of the extemal function 
propertyHolds () and the private member functions Fwd_Limits () and 
RemoveLimits (). 
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Appendix E : Table of Functions and Predicates 
in the Fluid Modelling System 
This appendix provides a complete listing of the functions and predicates developed 
for the fluid modelling system described in Chapter 5. The columns in Table E.I give 
the following information: 
• Prototype: An indication of the prototype (i.e. name and list of arguments) for the 
function or predicate. 
• P/F: A flag indicating whether the item is a function ("F') or predicate ("P"). 
• Imp?: An indication of whether the function or predicate has been fully 
implemented in the FMS ("Y" indicates that the item has been implemented and 
tested in AutoHAZID). 
• Used?: Indicates whether the item is actually used in the FMS. 
• System: This shows whether the item is implemented in a C++ function ("C"), 
defined in terms of other items ("D"), or corresponds to a rule in the VIT fluid rule 
system ("V"). 
• Group: This is the group of the FMS in which thl:! function or predicate IS 
considered to belong. The groups are listed below. 
• Description: A short description of what the predicate is supposed to test, or what 
the function is supposed to evaluate. 
Functions and predicates in the FMS' are considered to belong to one of a number of 
groups, covering the type of activity that it deals with. The complete list of groups is: 
I. Logical operations 
2. Mathematical operations 
3. General-purpose operations 
4. Plant, fluid and fault path data access 
5. Limit data access 
6. Combining fluids (including compatibility checks) 
7. Properties of single fluids 
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8. Consequence evaluation 
9. Contamination 
IO.Design parameter checks 
II.Miscellaneous physical checks 
12.Leakage checks and limitations 
13.Checks on VLE pressure limitations 
14.Pressure deviation limits corresponding to resistance changes in flow paths 
Table E.I : Functions and Predicates in the Fluid Modelling System 
Prototype P I U S G Description 
/ m s y r 
. 
F P e s 0 
? d t u 
? e p 
m 
GROUP 1. LOGJ:CAL OPERATJ:ONS 
true P Y Y C 1 Logical constant. 
false P Y Y C 1 Logical constant. 
op_and (Tl. T2) P Y Y C 1 Logical AND operator. Also valid as 
infix operator n && n • 
op_or(Tl.T2) P Y Y C 1 Logical OR operator. Also val id as 
infix operator " I I " . 
not(Tl) P Y Y C 1 Logical NOT operator. 
GROUP 2. MATHEMATJ:CAL OPERATJ:ONS 
op_add(Tl.T2) F Y Y C 2 Addition of numerical values. Also 
valid as infix operator "+" . Multiple 
arguments possible. 
op_mult(Tl.T2) F Y Y C 2 Multiplication of numerical values. 
Also valid as infix operator "* " 
Multiple arguments possible. 
op_sllb (Tl. T2) F Y Y C 2 S'lbtraction of numerical values. Also 
valid as infix operator " - " 
op_div(Tl,T2) F Y Y C 2 Division of numerical values. Also 
valid as infix operator .. /" . 
power (Base, F Y N C 2 Exponentiation of numerical values. 
Exponent) 
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Prototype P I U S G Description 
/ m s y r 
F p e s 0 
? d t u 
? e p 
m 
op_ge (T1, T2) p Y Y C 2 Comparison: ngreater than or equal 
to· . For numerical values of T1 and 
T2. Also valid as infix operator n>;::n. 
op_le(T1,T2) P Y Y C 2 Comparison: "less t.han or equal to" . 
For numerical values of T1 and T2. 
Also valid as infix operator .<;::n. 
op_lt(T1,T2) P Y Y C 2 Comparison: "less thana. For numerical 
values of T1 and T2. Also valid as 
infix operator "<". 
op_gt(T1,T2) P Y Y C 2 Comparison: ngreater than" . For 
numerical values of T1 and T2. Also 
valid as infix operator n>". 
GROUP 3: GENERAL PURPOSE OPERATJ:ONS 
op_ne (T1, T2) p Y Y C 3 Comparison: "not equals· . For any type 
of value for T1 and '1'2. Also valid as 
infix operator 11 ! ::: n • 
op_eq(T1, T2) P Y Y C 3 Comparison: "equals". For any type of 
value for T1 and T2. Also valid as 
infix operator n::::::n 
op_assgn P Y Y C 3 Assignment of the value of T2 to 
(T1,T2) variable Tl. Also valid as infix 
operator ":::" T1 m'-".st be an unbound 
variable before this predicate is 
called, and will be a bound one 
afterwards. 
undef_number F Y Y C 3 A function (with no arguments) which 
returns the special constant value for 
undefined numbers. 
grounded (T1 ) P Y N C 3 Test the term Tl and fail if it 
contains any ungrounded variables. 
unify_match F Y N C 3 Unification IT'.atch of terms Tl ann T2. 
(T1,T2) Returns false if the match was not 
possible, or a list of variable 
bindings of the form: 
[[XVar,XValJ, [YVar,YValJ, ... J. 
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Prototype P I U S G Description 
/ m s y r 
F p e s 0 
? d t u 
? e p 
m 
get_binding F Y N C 3 Look for the value of Var as given in 
(BList,Var) the binding list BList. Format of 
BList is as for return from 
unify_match () . 
list _length(L) F Y N C 3 Returns the length of the list L. 
list_element F Y N C 3 Returns the term in the list Ll at 
(Ll,Il) position Il, where (0 <= Il < 
list_length(Ll)) . Returns 'error' if 
the index is not good for Ll. 
list_append F Y N C 3 Appends the item Tl to the end of the 
(Ll,Tl) list Ll. Returns the new list Ll. 
list-prepend F Y N C 3 Puts the item Tl in at the start of 
(Ll,Tl) the li::;t Ll. Returns the new list Ll. 
list_insert_af F Y N C 3 Inserts the element Tl after the 
ter(Ll,POS,Tl) indexed position POS in list Ll. 
Returns the new list. Returns 'error' 
if POS is not a good index for list Ll 
(it should be in range 0 to length-l) . 
max_in_list(L) F Y Y C 3 Determines a maximum value of the 
numerical elements in the given list. 
Returns 'undef _number' if L is not a 
list, or if the maximum nUI!'.eric item 
in the list was 'undef _number' . 
min_in_list(L) F Y Y C 3 Determines a minimum value of the 
numerical elements in the given list. 
Return3 'undef_number' if L is not a 
list, or if the minimum numeric item 
in the list was 'undef _number' . 
echo (Term) P Y Y C 3 Diagnostic feature. When executed, 
this predicate will evaluate Term and 
I 
print the result to the standard error 
stream, cerr (which will usually print 
it to the screen) . 
cond( F y Y D 3 Function evaluates the condition given 
Condition, and if true, returns the value of 
Terml , Term2 ) Terml when evaluated, otherwise 
returns the value of Terrn2 when 
evaluated. Analogous to the cond 
function in LISP. 
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Prototype P I U S G Description 
/ m s y r 
F p e s 0 
? d t u 
? e p 
m 
GROtJ'P 4: PLANT, FLm:D AND FAULT PATH DATA ACCESS 
max-port F Y N D 4 Determines the largest diameter of the 
_diameter ports associated with the current 
context unit. 
get_attribute F Y Y C 4 Returns the value of the named 
(AttName) attribute for the current context unit 
in the plant model. Returns an Atom 
for ' is' slots, or a ListType for 
'info' slots. If the attribute is not 
found or doesn't have a value, returns 
, 'undefined' . 
get_fluid F Y Y C 4 Access to the current fluid for the 
(Port) given· port. Returns 'error' if the 
fluid cannot be retrieved. 
get_nominal F Y Y C 4 Access to the nominal (plant 
_fluid(Port) description) fluid for the port given. 
set_fluid P Y Y C 4 Set the current fluid information for 
(Port, FI) the given port to be the fluid FI. 
get 'pressure F Y Y C 4 Returns the numerical value of the 
(Fluid) pressure for the given fluid. 
get F Y Y C 4 Returns the numerical value of the 
_temperature temperature for the given fluid. 
(Fluid) 
get F Y N C 4 Returns the mole fraction of the 
_composition component in the fluid given. 
(Fluid,Ccmp) 
set-pressure F Y N C 4 Sets the pressure of the given fluid 
(Fluid,Value) to be Value, returning the modi fied 
fluid. 
set F Y Y C 4 Sets the temperature of the given 
_temperature fluid to be Value, returning the 
(Fluid, Value) modified fluid. 
set F Y N C 4 Sets the composition of the component 
_composition in the given fluid, returning the 
(Fluid,Comp, modified fluid. If the named component 
Val) is not in the fluid, a warning is 
issued and the function returns the 
unchanged fluid. 
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this _unit F Y N C 4 Returns a string giving the name of 
the current context equipment item. 
insulation P Y Y D 4 Is the current plant unit insulated ? 
dead_heading F Y Y D 4 Retrieves the dead-heading pressure 
-pressure for the unit concerned (typically a 
pump) , from the attribute 
~dead_head-pressure-. Returns 
undef_number if not defined. 
full _dh F Y Y ·D 4 Determines the maximum pressure a pump 
-pressure or compressor will see if its 
(Port) discharge (Port) is blocked off. This 
is the sum of the dead-heading 
pressure and the operating pressure of 
the pump inlet. Returns undef_number 
. < ~4 either data are not available . 
vessel_height F Y N D 4 Gets the height, in metres, of the 
current unit (typically a vessel) , 
from the attribute "vessel_height". 
Returns undef_number if not defined. 
vessel_volume F Y N D 4 Gets the volume, in cubic metres, of 
the current unit (typically a vessel) , 
from the attribute "vessel_volume- . 
Returns undef_number if not defined. 
max_design F Y Y D 4 Finds the maximum design pressure for 
-pressure the equipment item being considered. 
Uses the attribute 
"max_allowable-pressure-. Returns 
undef_nurnber if no value is found. 
min_design F Y Y D 1 Finds the minimum design pressure for 
-pressure the equipment item being considered. 
Uses the attribute 
"min_allowable-pressure N • Returns 
undef_nurnber if no value is found. 
min_design F Y Y D 4 Finds the minimum allowable 
_temperature temperature for the equipment being 
examined. 
max_design F Y Y D 4 Finds the maximum allowable 
_temperature temperature for the equipment being 
examined. 
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GROUP 5: LJ:MJ:T DATA ACCESS 
Note: Three types of operation are implemented in this part of the 
FMS: 
1. The functions beginning with 'get_min_' and 'get_max_' return the 
values of the relevant limit, for the fluid given as the first 
argument of the function. 
2. The functions beginning with 'set _min 
-
, 
and 'set_max_' modify the 
limit data for the fluid in the first argument. They return the 
modified fluid, but do not change the data associated with any port 
in the current fluids list. 
3. The predicates beginning with 'assign_' are used to change the 
current fluid data associated with the given port, so that it has 
the given limit value. They always return true. 
get_min_temper F Y Y C 5 Finds the minimum temperature for the 
ature (Fluid} given fluid. 
get_max_temper F Y Y C 5 Finds th8 maximum temperature for the 
ature(Fluid) given fluid. 
get_rnin-pressu F Y Y C 5 Finds the minimum pressure for the 
re (Fluid) given fluid. 
get_max-pressu F Y Y C 5 Finds the maximum pressure for the 
re(Fluid) given fluid. 
get_min_compos F Y N C 5 Gets the minimum cOILlposi tion ef the 
i tion (Fluid, component in the fluid given. 
Comp) 
get_max_compos F Y N C 5 Gets the maximum composition of the 
ition(Fluid, component in the fluid given. 
Comp) 
set_min_temper F Y Y C 5 Sets the minimum temperature of the 
ature(Fluid, given fluid to Value. Returns the 
Value) modified fluid. 
set_rnax_temper F Yly C 5 Sets the maximu!H tempera t: urt;! 0 f the 
ature(Fluid, given fluid to Value. Returns the 
Value) modified fluid. 
set_min-pressu F Y Y C 5 Sets the minimum pressure of the given 
re(Fluid, fluid to Value. Returns the modified 
Value) fluid. 
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GROUP 6: COMBJ:NJ:NG FLUJ:DS (J:NCLUDJ:NG COMPATJ:BJ:LJ:TY CHECKS) 
fluid_mixture F Y Y C 6 Finds the fluid corresponding to 
(Flul,Flu2) mixing the two given fluids together, 
without doing any compatibility 
checks. 
mix_ fluids F Y Y D 6 Mixes the fluids Fl and F2 together to 
(Fl,F2) produce a third fluid, which is 
returned. Calls on the compatibility 
table checks, which may generate side-
effects. These side-effects may be 
used to annotate the current fluids in 
the fault path being considered. 
compatibility F Y Y C 6 Runs check on the compatibility of the 
_check(Fl,F2) components in the given fluids. This 
checks the components in the fluids 
via the reactivity group matrix of 
VTT. The result is a list oC 
Stl-uctures, of the form 
[heat_generation (Compl, Comp2, 
TempMax) , ••• J . The possible 
interactions are listed in 
Section 5.2.8. Implementea by VTT. 
add_to_cornpat P y Y C 6 Adds the results (Rep) produced by the 
_report (Rep) co,"patibility check to the overall 
compatibility report for the HAZOP. 
GROUP 7: PROPERTJ:ES OF SJ:NGLE FLUJ:DS 
liquid(Port) P Y Y D 7 Could the fluid associated with the 
given port contain a liquid phase 
component ? Defaults to true if fluid 
state is not known. 
solids Present P N Y C 7 Could solids oe present in the fluid 
(Port) in Port ? Returns a default value at 
the moment. 
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freezing (Port) P Y Y C 7 Determines if any of the components of 
the fluid associated with the given 
port are below their freezing point at 
the current temperature. Does not use 
limit temperatures, just the current 
fluid data. 
flammable P Y Y C 7 Determines if the fluid in the given 
(Port) port is flammable. Simply tests each 
of the components to see if any 
qualify. 
toxic (Port) P Y Y D 7 Determines if the fluid in the given 
port is toxic. Uses the function 
toxici ty () , which relies on fluid 
library info. 
crystalliser P N Y C 7 Determines if the fluid in the given 
(Port) port is likely to crystallise. Uses a 
default return value at the moment, 
because no data are available to test 
the condition. 
polymeriser P N Y C 7 Determines if the fluid in the given 
(Port) port is likely to polymerise. Uses a 
default rE:turn value at the moment, 
because no data are available to test 
the condition. 
dissolvedGas P N Y C 7 Determines if the fluid in the given 
(Port) port contains dissolved gas 
components. Uses a default return 
value at the moment, because no data 
dre available to test the condition. 
brittle(Port) P N Y C 7 Determines if the materials of 
construction 
I 
associated with the given 
port are lik2ly to become brittle at a 
low temperature. 
decomp (Port) P N Y C 7 Determines if the fluid in the given 
port is likely to undergo 
decomposition. 
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state(Fluid) F y N C 7 Given a fluid, determine its state, as 
one of the following: [unknown, 
vapour, liquid, solid, vap_liq, 
solid_vap, solid_l iq, sol id_vap_l iq) 
Uses physical properties package 
requests or c++ functions as 
appropriate. 
boiling_temp F y N C 7 Finds the range of temperatures over 
_range (Fluid) which the given fluid will boil at its 
current pressure. Returned in the form 
of a list: [lowvalue, highvalue) . Uses 
prop~rty package requests or fluid 
librarI information as appropriate. 
mol_weight F y N C 7 Returns the average molecular weight 
(Fluid) of the given fluid. Returns the value 
undef number if this cannot be 
-
calculated. 
freezing_temp F y N C 7 Returns the temperature at which the 
(Fluid) 
. 
first component in the fluid begins to 
freeze, from liquid. Uses property 
package requests or fluid library 
information as appropriate. There may 
be problems running this request using 
ASPEN Properties Plus. C++ version of 
function not capable of dealing with 
mixtures of components. Returns 
undef _number if freezing point not 
available. 
vapour F y Y C 7 Returns the vapour pressure exerted by 
-pressure the fluid at its current temperature. 
(Fluid) Uses property package requests or the 
fluid library information, as 
appropriate. 
viscosity F y N C 7 Returns the viscosity of the given 
(Fluid) fluid at current conditions. 
density(Fluid) F y N C 7 Returns the density of the given fluid 
at current conditions. Uses property 
package requests or fluid library data 
as appropriate. 
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enthalpy F Y N C 7 Calculates the specific enthalpy of 
(Fluid) the given fluid. 
specific_heat F Y N C 7 Calculates the specific heat capacity 
(Fluid) of the given fluid. Uses property 
package requests or fluid library 
information as appropriate. 
latent _heat F Y N C 7 Calculates the latent heat of fusion 
_fusion(Fluid) for the given fluid. 
latent_heat F Y N ·c 7 Calculates the latent heat of 
_evap(Fluid) evaporation for the given fluid. Uses 
property package requests or fluid 
library information as appropriate. 
phase_temperat F Y N C 7 Calculates the temperature limits of 
ures(Fluid) phase change for the given fluid. 
Returns in the form of 
[freezing-point, boiling-pointj . There 
may be problems running this request 
using ASPEN Properties Plus. 
phase F Y N C 7 Calculates the pressure limits of 
--pressures phase change for the given fluid. 
(Fluid) Returns in the form of [press_vapour, 
press_solid] . 'I·here may be problems 
running this request using ASPEN 
Properties Plus. 
flashpoint F Y N C 7 Returns the closed cup flash point 
_temp (Fluid) temperature of the given fluid. There 
may be problems running this request 
using ASPEN Properties Plus. 
autoignition F Y N C 7 Returns the AIT of the given fluid. 
_temp (Fluid) There may be problems running this 
request using ASPEN Properties Plus. 
lower_flarorn F Y N C 7 Return the lower flammable limit of 
_limit (Fluid) the given fluid. There may be problems 
running this request using ASPEN 
Properties Plus. 
upper_flamm F y N C 7 Return the upper flammable limit of 
_limit (Fluid) the given fluid. There may be problems 
running this request using ASPEN 
Properties Plus. 
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cas_number F Y N C 7 Returns the CAS number of the given 
(Comp) fluid component. 
vacuum (Port) P Y Y D 7 Is the port under vacuum ? 
pressurised P Y Y D 7 Is the port under pressure ? 
(Port) 
nearBoilingPoi P Y Y C 7 Is the fluid in Port near its boiling 
, 
nt(Port) point ? 
vapour (Port) P Y Y C 7 Does the fluid in Port contain vapour? 
flashRelease P Y Y ·C 7 Would the fluid in Port flash if 
(Port) depressurised to 1 bara? 
brittleFlash P Y N C 7 Check to see if any of the components 
(Port) in the fluid at the given port will 
cause the material of construction to 
be weakened if flashed to atmospheric 
pressure. 
foamer (Port) P N Y C 7 Check to see if the fluid in the named 
port contains a component liable to 
cause foaming. Implemented to return a 
default value at the moment, because 
the information needed is not 
available yet. 
solid(Port) P Y N V 7 VTT predicate. Does the fluid present 
for Port contain solid? 
corrosion P N Y C 7 Are the materials associated with Port 
(Port) susceptible to corrosion ? Returns a 
default value Eit the moment, because 
. 
data for deciding query are not 
available. 
hydrocarbon P Y Y C 7 Succeeds if the fluid associated with 
(Port) the named port contains a hydrocarbon 
component. Returns a default value at 
the moment, because data for deciding 
query are not available. 
exothermicReac P y Y C 7 Succeeds if an exothermic reaction is 
tion(Port) intended at the given port. Returns a 
default value so far, because no data 
are available to decide the condition. 
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endothermicRea P Y Y C 7 Succeeds if an endothermic reaction is 
ction(Port) intended at the given port. Returns a 
default value so far, because no data 
are available to decide the condition. 
hazardous P Y Y D 7 Returns true if the fluid at the given 
(Port) port is toxic or flammable. 
non_hazardous P Y Y D 7 Returns true if the fluid at the given 
(Port) port is non-toxic and non-flammable. 
toxicity F Y N C 7 Returns the toxicity of the given 
(Fluid) fluid, according to the data in the 
fluid library. This is the max. value 
for the componencs in the fluid, or -1 
if some value or <":'Imponent is unknown 
to the fluid library. 
vp_at_given_te F Y Y D 7 Determines the vapour pressure of the 
mp(Fluid,Temp) given fluid at the given temperature. 
Used in vle_min-pressure_limit() . and 
vle_max-pressure_limit() . 
fluid_can_free P Y Y D 7 Succeeds if the current fluid 
ze (Port) associated with the given port can 
attain a temperature below its 
freezing point. Makes use of lower 
limit tE>..mperature of fluid. Defaults 
to true if there is no minimum 
temperature defined or if the freezing 
point cannot be found. 
GROUP 8: CONSEQUENCE EVALOLAT:ION 
get F Y N C 8 Gets the consequence belonging to the 
_consequence current fault path, or 'error' if the 
path is not a completed one. 
is_consequence p Y N C 5 Checks the co~sequenc€: givei1 to se" if 
_type it has the given code value as a 
(Conseq,Code) standa"d type of consequence. 
get F Y N C 8 Returns the rank number of the given 
_consequence consequence. 
_rank (Conseq) 
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get F Y N C 8 Returns the category of the given 
_consequence consequence (from none, haz, op. 
_cat (Conseq) haz_op) . 
loc _€val F N N 8 Loss of containment evaluation. Given 
(Fluid. Type) a fluid and the type either "toxic· or 
"flammable N , the function determines a 
rank value for the generic loss of 
containment event for that fluid. Not 
fully implemented yet. 
GROUP 9: CONTAM:INAT:ION 
add_air P Y Y D 3 Adds air as a contaminant to the 
_contamination current fluid at Port. changing the 
(Port) current fluid there. 
add_coiltarninat F " Y D 9 Add a number of compounds as ~
ion (Fluid, contaminants to the fluid. returning 
CrnpList) the new fluid. 
fluid_ from F Y Y C 9 Given a list of component names, makes 
_components a fluid containing those components. 
(CompList) Used by add_contamination() to produce 
a fluid containing a list of named 
contaminants. 
rnake_fl uid F Y " C 9 Makes all the components of the fluid 
" 
_contaminant into contaminants, returning the 
(Fluid) modified fluid. Also used by 
add_contamination() to add named 
contamir~ants to another fluid. 
becomes_toxic P Y N D 9 Detects if the fluid belonging to the 
(Port) named port has changed from a nominal 
fluid which is not toxic, to a current 
fluid which is toxic. 
becomes I' N N D 9 Detects if the fluid belonging to the 
-
flammable named port has changed from a nominal 
(<'ort) fluid which is not flammable. to a 
current fluid which is flammable. Not 
yet implemented. 
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port-port_cont P Y Y D 9 Transfers the fluid present in the 
amination first (high pressure) port to the 
(HP_Port, second (lower pressure) port. as a 
LP_Port) contaminant. Includes a call to the 
fluid compatibility checks. Sets the 
composition of LP_Port to the mixture 
of components, for use in (for 
example) contamination arcs attached 
to interface failure in heat 
exchangers. 
GROUP 10 : DESIGN PARAMETER CHECKS 
exceed_design P Y Y D 10 Determines if the maximum pressure at 
-pressure the port can exceed the design 
(Port) pressure of the unit. Defaults to true 
if any data are missing. 
exceed_design P Y N D 10 Determines if the minimum pressure at 
_vacuurn(Port) the port can go below the minimum 
design pressurE: of the unit. Defaults 
to true if any data are missing. 
design P Y Y D 10 Can the fluid at the given port exceed 
_overTemp the upper design temperature of the 
(Port) equipment? Defaults to true if any 
data are missing. 
design P Y N D 10 Can the fluid at the given port be 
_underTemp less than the lower design temperature 
(Po""t) limit of the equipment? Defaults to 
true if any data are missing. 
GROUP 11: MISCELLANEOUS PHYSICAL CHECKS 
boiling P Y Y D 11 Does the fluid boil between Portl and 
(Port1,Port2) Port2? 
rollOver(Port) P Y Y C 11 Checks to see if the vessel containing 
the given port is large enough to 
experience the "rollover H phenomenon. 
This limit is arbitrarily set at 50 
cubic metres. 
hot (Port) P Y Y D 11 Arbitrary test to see if the given 
port is above ambient temperature (35 
degrees C) . 
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low-press P Y Y D 11 Test to see if the pressure of the 
(Port) given port is less than 2 bara. Used 
for classifying vessels. 
hot_weather F Y Y D 11 Returns the maximum ambient 
_temp temperature for hot weather (currently 
set at 40 CC) . 
cold_weather F Y Y D 11 Returns the minimum ambient 
_temp temperature for cold weather 
(currently set at -30°C) . 
GROUP 12 : LEAKAGE CHECKS AND LJ:MJ:TATJ:ONS 
pressureLeak P Y Y D 12 Predicate for setting che low pressure 
(Port) limit value for a scenario involving a 
leak out of a pressurised system. 
Tests that the port is pressurised and 
I if it is, sets the minimum pressure 
limit for that port to be 1.0 bara, 
for the leak scenario only. 
vacuurnLeak P Y Y D 12 Predicate for setting the high 
(Port) pressure limit Value for a scenario 
involving a leak into a vacuum 
process. Tests that the port is under 
vacuum and if it is, sets the maximum 
pressure for that port to be 1.0 bara, 
for the leak scenario only. 
GROUP 13: CHECKS ON VLE PRESSURE LJ:MJ:TATJ:ONS 
vle-pressure P Y Y D 13 Sets the scenario pressure limits for 
_lirnits(L,V) a vapour port (V) based on the vapour 
liquid equilibrium between V and the 
liquid port· .(L) . Uses the limit values 
of terr:pe!:"ature for the liquid pert and 
a calculation of vapour pressure for 
th~ liquid. Changes the limit values 
of the current fluid data for V. 
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vle_min-pressu P Y Y D 13 Sets the minimum pressure limit for 
re_limit (L, V) the vapour port (V) based on the 
vapour pressure of the liquid in the 
liquid port (L) at the minimum 
temperature limit so far determined 
(in the current scenario) for the 
liquid. Changes the lower pressure 
limit of the current fluid data for V. 
vle_max..-pressu P Y Y D 13 Sets the maximum pressure limit for 
re_limit(L,V) the vapour port (V) based on the 
vapour pressure of the liquid in the 
liquid port (L) at the maximum 
temperature limit so far dete~mined 
(in the current scenario) for the 
liquid. Changes the upper pressure 
limit of the current fluid data for V. 
GROUP 14: PRESSURE LIMITS IN FLOW PATHS WHEN RESISTANCE CHANGES 
res_dsp_limit 
(USPort, 
DSPort) 
res_usp_limit 
(USPort, 
DSPort) 
P Y Y D 14 Sets the maximum attainable pressure 
of the downstream port, DSPort, to be 
the maximum pressure of the upstream 
port, USPort, or the nominal pressure, 
if there is no defined maximum for 
USPort. The nominal pressure of a port 
is the pressure specified for that 
port in the plant model. Used in the 
flowpath() template. 
P Y Y D 14 Sets the minimum attainable pressure 
of the upstream port, USPort, to be 
the minimum pressure of the downstream 
port, DSPort, or the nominal pressure: 
if tbere ..ls no defined minimum for 
DSPort. The nominal pressure of a port 
is the pressure specified for that 
port in the plant model. Used in the 
flowpath() template. 
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Appendix F : Minutes of Meeting to Discuss 
Limits of Variable Deviations 
This appendix presents, for reference, the minutes of a meeting held between myself 
and Prof. Lees, to discuss the idea of rules for the estimation of the limits on process 
plant deviations. Many of the ideas discussed have not so far been implemented in the 
AutoHAZID system, but could be developed further. 
It should be noted that, in the following, completeness cannot be guaranteed. The 
method used was directed at finding limits for pressures and temperatures only and 
used a guide word approach for stimulating ideas. Also, the scenarios identified may 
not "cleanly" define a single fault propagation chain, but very often involve a whole 
family of constraints which mayor may not be easily formalised for implementation 
in AutoHAZID. 
The original minutes are presented below: 
Introductory Notes 
Prof. Lees and I met on 5th August 1996 to discuss in greater detail the problems 
behind the estimation of landmark values on deviations in plant process variables. 
We decided to examine the limits on pressures and temperatures in plant in a "brain-
storming" way, using a table from Bunn and Lees (1988) as a prompt for stimulating 
ideas about possible phenomena to consider. 
We made the assumption that fault propagation does not attempt to consider more 
than one scenario (fault-consequence pair) at a time, and that the mechanical integrity 
of the plant can be assumed unless the fault or consequence dictates otherwise. 
Essentially, this boils down to the assumption that the only deviations which need to 
be considered are those belonging to the fault-consequence chain being examined. 
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In the notes that follow there may be many maximum and/or minimum figures for the 
pressures and temperatures considered. The actual envelope of the variable could be 
determined by taking the smallest of the maxima and the largest of the minima 
appropriate for that variable. 
Implementation of the following ideas is left completely open for the moment. It is 
possible that the implementation could take the shape of generally applicable rules or 
characteristics of particular types of equipment (limits described in the unit model 
library, for example), or conditions expressed in individual arcs. 
Consideration of Limits of Variable Deviations 
In systems containing liquids, the lower limit ef pressure is the vapour pressure of the 
liquid present. The vapour pressure is, of course, affected by the temperature af the 
system. An example of the vapour pressure dependence on temperature is the 
reduction of pressure in an ammonia storage sphere caused by a cooling shower of 
rain on the outside of the vessel. 
The pressure drop caused by leakage from a pressurised vessel to atmosphere is 
limited to I bara. The pressure rise caused by a leak of air into a vacuum system is 
limited to 1 bara. 
If a small hole in a vessel leads to depressurisation of the vessel and subsequently to 
flash vaporisation of some of the liquid contents, then cooling can take place, giving 
rise to brittle fracture of the vessel and a larger leak. 
Pressurised fluid being released as a jet from a small hole in a vessel can impinge on 
other equipment, causing non-process escalation of the effects - this is known as the 
"domino effect". 
Vacuum relief devices will limit the minimum pressure in a vacuum system. Pressure 
relief devices will limit the maximum pressure in a pressurised system. Such devices 
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may include bursting disks as well as relief valves. Note that these are protection 
devices, which may fail - how should we deal with these? 
Mechanical "burst pressure" for a pressurised system, if there is no relief device 
attached to it. 
Nominal minimum/maximum inlet pressures and temperatures may be given. Care 
should be taken that these can be trusted to be the real limits of these variables, as they 
may correspond to the design condition envelope for the plant. 
Maximum delivery pressure .of a pressure raiser. Note that this maximum IS also 
dependent on the pressure on the suction side of the pressure raiser. If the pressure 
raiser is a positive-displacement type, the pressure due to dead-heading it will he 
much higher - the possibility of isolating the pressure raiser discharge must be 
considered in detennining the maximum here. 
Minimum suction pressure of a vacuum pump. Note also the limit of vapour pressure 
in systems with liquid in them, as mentioned above. 
Gas breakthrough at the base of a column, or in a vessel, could expose some usually 
liquid-filled components of the plant to the pressure of the gas or vapour-filled parts. 
In this case, the relevant pressure to consider is the nominal pressure of the vapour 
filled sections (e.g. the nominal discharge pressure of the compressor used in that 
system). 
Heat exchanger interface failure will cause the low pressure side of the exchanger to 
be exposed to the full pressure of the high pressme side. The maximum here is the 
nominal pressure of the inlet to the high pressure side of the exchanger. 
Hi'gh pressures generated by non-intentional combustion of gases in process 
equipment are limited by the appropriate constant volume combustion calculation. 
The most pessimistic estimate of pressure-rise would use a stoichiometric basis for the 
combustion, but very often this is not realistic. 
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In the case of heating due to an external fire, where relief or fire valves are not 
present, the pressure limit may be that pressure generated by the system fluid at the 
temperature where the metal in the system fails. In this case, the other effect, of 
overpressure failure of the system, may also take place. The examination of the 
interplay of these two effects is potentially quite complicated. 
Thermal expansion of liquid-filled systems is relevant when considering locked in 
fluids subject to a temperature rise caused by heat exchange with the environment. 
Some calculation involving the coefficient of thermal expansion, ~, would be 
appropriate here, to calculate the highest expected pressure, dependent on an 
estimated maximum ambient temperature. 
The problem of water in hot oil (the "chip-pan effect") is typical of those effects 
where the magnitude of the pressure increase is not easy to detennine. In this case, 
some quantity of water makes its way into a hot oil system anJ there boils rapidly, 
causing an expansion. The amount of water and the volume of the system, temperature 
of the oil, etc., are all needed for this calculation. Since the amount of the contaminant 
(water) in the system is highly uncertain, the possibility of making a reasonably 
confident "safe" calculation of the pressure rise is very slim. 
In this problem, it is enough to detect that the water contamination would in fact boil 
when it gets into the hot oil. 
A similar sort of quantification problem occurs when we consider the Bhopal disaster. 
It is thought that a quantity of water got into a storage tank containing methyl 
isocyanate, and therc caused a runaway reaction, leading to an overpressure release 
from the vessel. Here it is also difficult to quantify the amount of the contaminant and, 
although the runaway phenomenon is quite different from the hot oil problem, the 
magnitude of the pressure change cannot be deduced for the same reasons. Here, a 
compatibility matrix should warn of the dangerous runaway reaction between the 
process fluid and contaminant. 
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Accumulation of inertlnon-condensable gases at high points In a plant may cause 
blockages and other problems too. 
For heat exchangers, where the process fluid is heated by some heat transfer fluid or 
steam, the maximum temperature for the process fluid is the maximum temperature 
expected from the heat transfer medium. The maximum process pressure IS 
determined by considering the process fluid blocked in at such a temperature. 
In furnaces and burners, which can be extremely hot, the best estimate of the 
maximum process side .conditions is the failure of the tube metal due to heat or 
overpressure. This establishes limits on the maximum temperature and pressure in the 
process fluid side of the furnace tubes. 
In the event of loss of cooling medium in a cooler, the maximum process fluid 
temperature. at the outlet of the exchanger will be the nominal process fluid inlet 
temperature. 
Loss of cooling in a condenser will lead to vapour accumulation ill the process side 
and possible breakthrough of vapour into the condensate outlet. In the case of a 
distillation column, the pressure of the column will increase until the process 
temperature in the reboiler is the same as the steam temperature, or the relief pressure 
is reached, or the burst pressure of the column is reached, whichever is the lowest. 
The coolant in a cooler must remain flowing in order to cool the process fluid. 
Therefore, the minimum temperature that the process fluid can get to is either its own 
freezing point or the freezing point of the coolant, whichever is higher. 
The weather will have certain characteristic temperature limits, depending on the part 
of the world in which the plant is situated. These will define the envelope for 
environmental temperature. 
The brittle fracture temperature of the materials of construction IS an important 
temperature minimum. 
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Freezing expansion of water in pipes, as a result of cold weather, gives rise to 
blockage and a pressure effect on the pipes, possibly damaging them. Some 
calculation might be devised to determine if the pipe will be endangered by freezing in 
this way. Do any other fluids expand on freezing, as water does? 
For systems containing liquids, when a leak to environment occurs the liquid will 
depressurise. If the fluid would normally be vapour at ambient conditions, it will 
flash. The evaporation of the process fluid can chill the equipment to a minimum of 
the boiling temperature of the fluid at I bara. A similar principle applies where the 
evaporative cooling happens within a system: the minimum temperature is the 
saturation temperature at the lower pressure. 
For gases/vapours, typically, cooling occurs on expansIOn and heating 0n 
compression, due to the Joule-Thompson effect. It is likely that calculations could be 
found to estimate the size of these effects, for application in processes where 
expanders or compressors are found. 
Mixing with another cold fluid can cause some process materials to freeze, e.g. 
benzene plus cold slugs of ethylene in a flare stack, freezing the benzene. 
If fluid is erroneously introduced (in a batch process, for example) to a cold vessel, it 
could freeze, causing problems, such as freezing the impeller in a reaction vessel, 
plugging inlets or outlets in the vessel, or measurement points, inconvenience 
generally ... 
Tn runaway reactions, one temperature limit is the "adiabatic reaction temperature" 
(typically for batch or semi-batch reactors). Another is the temperature at which the 
venting on the reactor operates. 
Pumps and compressors are a source of high temperature when dead-heading or 
overheating, or when recycling fluid (under spill-back, for example). In all these 
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cases, the magnitude of the effect is not easy to quantify without some arbitrary 
judgements about the process. 
For compressors, if the coolers which should remove the heat of compression from the 
process fluid are lost, then it may be possible to calculate the maximum to which the 
discharge temperature would go. This is not straightforward, however. 
Loss of tracing (steam or electric) on traced pipework could drop the temperature to 
ambient. 
If steam tracing goes wrong and more heat than intended is given to the process, then 
the trace steam temperature could be a useful guide to the maximum process 
temperature reached. 
Some materials have a very high heat of solution, and this could be a factor in some 
cases. Calculations of temperatures here have the same problem as the water in hot oil 
example above - that too many data are needed for the calculation which cannot 
usually be pinned down exactly. Detection of the problem using compatibility 
matrices, plus the judgement that the temperature cannot go above the boiling point of 
the solvent, may help in this case. 
Shock compression of gas by slugs of fast-moving liquid may give rise to large 
compressive heat effects, which sometimes are big enough to cause problems. 
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Appendix G : Future work changes to HAZID 
A number of important but quite trivial changes should be made to the HAZID system 
in the future. These are in addition to the more difficult changes noted in Chapter 6: 
• Consequences without a defined importance rank in the model library are always 
screened out of the results set, because of the way the consequence thresholding 
operation has been implemented. There are no such consequences in the library at 
the moment, but they could be added in future. Consequences without rank 
information should instead be reported wherever they are found (or a warning 
should be issued when a consequence is found without a rank number). This is a 
trivial coding change to the thresholding function. 
• A user option (flag) could be added, to switch the fluid compatibility checking 
functionality in AutoHAZID on or off. 
• Consider making the "stopping points" feature an option on the flags menu. 
• Consider making all flag options configurable from the hazpaths. dos 
configuration file. 
• The numerical value -999.0 is used for undefined values in the fluid model 
system and elsewhere. In the future, this value may be required as a legitimate 
defined value. The functions and predicates of the FMS should use some type of 
"not a number" symbol (e.g. the Atom, 'undef ined'), instead of a valid 
numerical value, when they are not capable of giving a value for a calculation. 
This is part of the larger problem of developing a consistent approach to missing 
information in the FMS. 
• The definitions of fluid model system predicates and functions should be 
separated from the unit model lihrary and put in a library file of their own. 
• Recursive calls between fluid model functions or predicates should be detected 
and prevented, or warnings should be issued. Until there is some reliable way of 
eliminating infinite recursion in the FMS, recursion and iteration should be 
avoided. 
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